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 The   U.S.   Department   of   Education’s   Race   to   the   Top   program   marked   the   first   use   of   a  
competitive grant program by the federal government to influence state-level education policy. 
Using a directed state-dyad dependent variable and a piecewise linear growth model to capture 
states’   policy   differences   and   changes,   this   dissertation   investigates   the   impact   of  Race   to   the  
Top on state-level education policy diffusion in teacher policy, college and career readiness 
policy, and persistently lowest achieving schools policy during the first two rounds of the 
competition, spanning March 2009 to August 2010.   
The analysis suggests that states were most reactive to federal preferences in the teacher 
policy area; after the release of federal program guidance and the announcement of Round 1 
winners, state policies converged and moved towards the policies of the Round 1 winners, 
adopting  policies  to  tie  teacher  evaluations  to  students’  academic  growth,  compensate  based  on  
performance, and incentivize teaching in high-need schools, among others. The effects of federal 
preferences were not as distinct in college and career readiness policy, in which state policies 
were generally converging during this time frame, or in persistently lowest achieving schools 
policy where other grant programs may have mediated the influence of RTTT. Nonetheless, this 
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study provides evidence to suggest future use of competitive grant programs as a means for the 
federal government to influence state education policy.  
This study adds to education policy research through the use of diffusion theory to 
understand the effects of federal competitive grants, rather than another policy tool, on state 
policy reforms. Further, this research contributes to policy and diffusion literature by 
demonstrating the value of piecewise linear growth models to simultaneously model the spread 
of policies across states and the influence of federal preferences on state policy decisions over 
time. 
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 I1TRODUCTIO1 
In February 2009, the US Congress passed the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act 
(ARRA), an estimated $840 billion economic stimulus package intended to temper the effects of 
the U.S. economic recession. Though the legislation is known primarily for its emphasis on job 
creation   through   funds   for   “shovel-ready”   construction   and   infrastructure   projects,   the   bill  
provided significant financial assistance to schools, districts, and state education departments. In 
addition, ARRA designated $4.35 billion in discretionary funds for a new U.S. Department of 
Education’s  competitive  grant  program,  Race  to  the  Top  (RTTT).  As  proposed,  $4  billion  of  this  
discretionary pool1 was intended to encourage states to develop reform plans to address state, 
district and school capacity in four reform areas, also known as the four assurance areas: 
Adopting standards and assessments that prepare students to succeed in college and 
the workplace to compete in the global economy; Building data systems that 
measure student growth and success, and inform teachers and principals about how 
they can improve instruction; Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining 
effective teachers and principals, especially where they are needed most; Turning 
around our lowest-achieving schools (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
2009). 
                                                 
1 $350 million was allocated to a grant program for multistate consortia to support the development of academic 
assessments. 
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The final RTTT program guidance was not released until November 2009, but within 
weeks of   ARRA’s   passage   Education Week published an article about the competitive grant 
programs in ARRA,  noting  that  “the  $5  billion  pot  of  federal  money  put  at  the  disposal  of  U.S.  
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to help state and local projects under the $787 billion 
economic-stimulus package is drawing attention far out of proportion to its size”  (Klein, 2009). 
Soon afterward, the states began preparing their applications and making policy changes in the 
four assurance areas, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was preparing grants to support 
state  education  agencies’  RTTT  grant  writing, and education policy pundits were naming early 
favorites2 (McNeil, 2009). 
This dissertation investigates state policy changes from March 2009 through the end of 
RTTT Round 2 in August 2010, focusing on policy changes in two of the four assurance areas 
(recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals, turning 
around lowest-achieving schools) and college and career readiness, an implied focus of the U.S. 
Department of Education. Using a diffusion theory framework, I examine where states looked 
for policy ideas—to other states or to the federal government—during the first two rounds of 
RTTT awards. The first chapter will briefly describe RTTT and the state and federal education 
policy context for the RTTT program, as well as prior attempts to influence public education in 
states, districts, and schools. Further, I will introduce states’  policy  changes during the first two 
phases of the RTTT program, and set forth the theoretical framework for and parameters of this 
dissertation and the implications of the findings of my analyses.  
                                                 
2 Of  the  four  “early  favorites,”  Colorado,  Florida,  Massachusetts  and  Louisiana,  none  were  chosen  for  first  round  
grants and only Florida and Massachusetts eventually received grants. 
  3 
 E/EME1TAR< A1D SECO1DAR< EDUCATIO1 ACT A1D FEDERA/ 
I1F/UE1CE O1 STATE EDUCATIO1 A*E1CIES DISTRICTS A1D SC+OO/S 
Since its initial passage in 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) has been 
a significant vehicle through which the federal government has attempted to influence and guide 
state  education  policy.  In  the  multiple  reauthorizations  of  the  legislation,  the  intent  of  the  law’s  
Title I provisions and funding mechanisms has morphed from an initial focus on resource 
redistribution and equalization toward an emphasis on student academic performance and 
accountability. As described by Manna (2011, 2006) and others (c.f. McGuinn, 2006), the 2001 
reauthorization of ESEA, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), reinforced the performance and 
accountability focus of   the   law’s 1994 reauthorization, adding consequences for schools and 
districts not meeting progress goals. NCLB focused on the achievement of students and the 
performance   of   a   school’s   students   over   time,   emphasizing accountability over redistribution, 
and requiring states to develop standards and assessments to assess student performance.  
NCLB was, on its face, simply the reauthorization of a 36-year-old law, but it marked an 
unprecedented attempt by the federal government to influence the content, quality, and 
accountability of education at the state and local levels. Though the amount of Title I funds to 
states is small, approximately $8.78 billion in the federal   government’s   2001 budget3 (U.S. 
Department of Education, n.d.), the threat of losing even a small amount of funding pushed states 
to make policy changes to implement accountability requirements. The federal requirements in 
NCLB guidance did not specify the rigor of state standards or the quality of corresponding state 
                                                 
3 To put this in perspective, the U.S. Census bureau reports 2001 spending for public elementary and secondary 
education was $410.6 billion (Dixon, 2012). Title I funding comprised 0.02% of total expenditures. 
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assessments; as such, states adopted standards and assessments that varied widely on these 
characteristics.  
RTTT program guidelines and the form of the program itself, a competitive grant, 
represented  the  Obama  administration’s  attempt to improve  NCLB’s less effective accountability 
measures. As Manna (2011) argues, NLCB’s   over-specification of consequences and under-
specification of uniform state goals created a perverse incentive for states to create low standards 
which could be easily met by schools. Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Education 
conceived of RTTT as a competition under which state plans would be judged on the basis of the 
rigor and quality of their existing and proposed policies and standards. In designing RTTT as a 
competitive grant, the USDOE made a distinct choice to break from the formula grant 
mechanism used to distribute federal Title I and similar program funds, such as those associated 
with Special Education (McGuinn, 2012). Scholars and policy makers suggest that multiple 
federal formula grant funding streams have lead to fragmentation in state education agencies; 
they describe a lack of coordination within departments of education that limits the capacities of 
the agencies to assist schools and districts (Brown, Hess, Lautzenheiser, and Owen, 2011; Unger, 
Lane, Cutler, Lee, Whitney, Arruda, and Silva, 2008).  The intent of RTTT was for states to 
develop comprehensive, coordinated plans to avoid this sort of “silo-fication.” Rather than 
designating a process for improving systems and schools without specifying the goals for school 
and system improvement, as was the case for NCLB, in RTTT the USDOE appears to have 
intended to set the goal for states, leaving them to develop their own plans for reaching those 
goals.  
  5 
 RTTT A1D STATE-/E9E/ PO/IC< ACTI9IT<  
The competitive aspect of the Race To The Top grant program attracted considerable attention in 
both the education and mainstream press (e.g. Dillon, 2009; McNeil, 2009; Shear and Anderson, 
2009).  And, as suggested by the reports from states in Chapter 4, many states were taken with 
the idea of winning, not only for the additional funding, which as explained above was relatively 
small, but for recognition. As such, states put considerable effort into the preparation of their 
applications. The deadline for Round 1 applications was in January 2010, less than a year after 
the creation of the program, and almost all state applications, with appendices, were over 1000 
pages4. By late 2009, many states legislatures had passed significant education policy changes or 
were planning to introduce legislation to do so. States’  legislative  and  policy  changes  included  
developing more comprehensive longitudinal data systems spanning across state agencies, 
linking student achievement and demographic data to their teachers and fellow students for the 
purpose of teacher and principal evaluation, evaluating and revising laws and regulations 
regulating teacher and school leader preparation programs and certification, and signing on to 
implement a new set of national common standards and aligned assessments.  
Forty-three first and second round RTTT applicants made significant regulatory changes 
and twenty-three states enacted substantive reform legislation in the months before and after the 
first round application deadline. Some of the most detailed legislative and regulatory changes 
were made in areas related to teacher and school leader evaluation and to the provisions for 
addressing   the   needs   of   states’   lowest   performing schools. For example, in 2010, New York 
passed legislation that overhauled its teacher evaluation system, requiring the inclusion of value-
                                                 
4 The final regulations for Race to the Top were published on November 18, 2009 and revised on January 27, 2010; 
state applications for Phase 1 funding were due January 19, 2010 (Race to the Top; Final Rule, 2009). 
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added   student   achievement   growth   scores   in   districts’   evaluation   and   restricting the rights of 
teachers given low-performance ratings to appeal disciplinary action (New York Con. Ed. L., 
2010). Tennessee, in its First To The Top legislation, fundamentally changed the teacher 
preparation and tenure system and created a new state-run Achievement School District, which 
removes the   state’s   lowest   performing   schools   from  home districts and places them under the 
supervision of the state Department of Education (Tennessee Code Annotated, 2010). And 
Maryland, which did not apply in Round 1 but applied for and won Round 2 funding, passed 
comprehensive   legislation   that   included   overhauling   the   state’s   teacher   evaluation   system,  
requiring  that  50  percent  of  teachers’  annual  evaluations  be  based  on  their  students’  achievement  
growth (Bimbaum, 2010).  
 RESEARC+ 4UESTIO1S A1D FRAME:ORK FOR T+E A1A/<SIS 
The context for RTTT and the narrow time frame during which states could make policy 
changes, and the breadth and depth of the changes they made, gave rise to the central questions 
of this investigation. Specifically:  
1. Is there evidence that states adopted policy ideas from other states? (horizontal 
diffusion) 
a. Did states look to states with which they shared demographic, political, or 
economic characteristics?   
b. Did states adopt policies similar to those in states perceived to be favorites 
to win the competition?  
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c. Did states that did not win Round 1, but who applied to round 2, adopt 
policies similar to those in Tennessee and Delaware after the announcement of 
their Round 1 awards?  
2. Did state policymaking change in response to significant federal actions (e.g. the 
release of final program guidance)? (vertical diffusion) 
3. Were there differences in state diffusion patterns across the three policy areas 
included in this study (teacher policy, college and career readiness policy, lowest-
performing schools policy)?  
 
To address these questions, this dissertation draws on policy diffusion theory, most 
prominently described by Walker (1969) and Berry and Berry (1990) in their investigations of 
state policymaking behaviors. While the diffusion theory of policy spread has been used 
extensively to examine the correlates of diffusion across states (horizontal diffusion), e.g. Berry 
and Berry (1992), Mintrom and Vergari (1998), Wong and Langevin (2007), and, more 
limitedly, between states and the federal government (vertical diffusion), e.g. Welch and 
Thompson (1980), Savage, (1985), Karch, (2010), the application of diffusion theory to examine 
policymaking behavior that could be influenced by both horizontal and vertical diffusion 
processes is much more limited. Federal influence on state policymaking behavior, vertical 
diffusion, is often treated as a nuisance for which the researcher controls, rather than as one of 
the phenomena under investigation. In this analysis, federal action, e.g. the release of federal 
program guidance or the announcement of Round 1 winners, may have had a significant 
influence on state policymaking behavior. 
  8 
The analysis was conducted using a piecewise linear growth model employing a directed 
measure of policy distance between states as the dependent variable and taking into account state 
internal factors that prior policy diffusion research has identified as influential in the diffusion 
process,  e.g.  state’s  shared  political  ideology,  per  capita  income,  size,  legislative  professionalism, 
and interest group strength. The use of a directed state-dyad measure of state policy distance as 
the dependent variable, while unusual in state policy diffusion research, is guided by recent 
diffusion studies that have sought to untangle state diffusion processes more complex than the 
investigation  of  the  pattern  of  one  policy’s  spread  across  states  (see,  for  example, Volden, 2006; 
Boehmke, 2009; and Gilardi and Füglister, 2008). The directed state-dyad measure has 
advantages over the dichotomous and event count variables most often used in previous diffusion 
research. With the inclusion of independent variables capturing state characteristics shared across 
the dyads or unique to either the policy sending or the policy receiving states, this form of the 
dependent variable allows for the investigation of the influence of states’  internal  characteristics  
and of the impact of the characteristics of states from which policy ideas could be adopted. In the 
context of state level RTTT-related policymaking, it is important to explore not only whether 
particular policies were adopted by multiple states but also to parse the impact of internal state 
factors, the interaction of state factors among states, the influence federal actions, and the 
differences in determinants of diffusion patterns for different types of policies. 
In addition, the piecewise linear growth model employed for the analysis allows the 
comparison of effects of factors during the two time periods, from March 2009 through the 
release of the final federal program guidance in November 2009 (Time 1) and from December 
2009 through the announcement of Round 2 winners in August 2010 (Time 2). Further, as this 
model  of  states’  policy  changes  best  fits  the  data,  the  model  itself  offers  evidence  of  the impact 
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of   the   explicit   expression   of   federal   preferences   in   the   final   program   guidance   on   states’  
policymaking  behavior;;  the  model  dividing  the  “pieces”  of  state  policy  change  at  the  point  when  
final guidance was released was a significantly better fit than other models (e.g. quadratic, 
linear), as will be detailed in Chapter 3. 
 DATA FOR T+E A1A/<SIS 
The data for the investigation are policies (both statutory and regulatory) in the 46 states that 
applied for first or second round RTTT funding that were introduced and passed or approved 
between March 2009 and August 2010. These dates were chosen to correspond to the passage of 
ARRA, in which the four assurance areas were outlined, in February 2009 and to the awarding of 
the first and second round of RTTT grants in March and August 2010, respectively. Policies 
were examined to determine whether they fell into any of the three policy areas under 
investigation (teacher policy, college and career readiness policy, and persistently lowest 
achieving schools policies).  Using   Education  Week’s  EdCounts policy indicators, each policy 
coded for the presence or absence of each of the policy indicators. This process will be discussed 
further in Chapter 3 and list of the policy indicators used can be found in the Appendix. 
Additionally, this research incorporates state-level characteristics found to be significant 
in prior diffusion research. These data include information about state economic and 
demographic characteristics (e.g. population, per capita income, per pupil expenditures), other 
measures of state capacity (e.g. legislative professionalism), state political climate (e.g. party 
control of government, state ideology, strength of unions), and, of focal interest, variables 
indicating   a   policy   sending   states’   status as a Round 1 winner or perceived competition 
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frontrunner. These data are available through state and federal government websites and from 
prior research (e.g. Squire, 1997; Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner, 2010). 
 IMP/ICATIO1S A1D PO/IC< RE/E9A1CE 
RTTT   and   states’   policymaking behavior in response to it offer an opportunity to investigate 
policy diffusion and policy change in the context of the opportunity for, but not guarantee of, 
additional federal funding. This approach is distinct from compelling state policy change through 
sanctions and mandates, as was the case for states’ NCLB-related policy. While the U.S. 
Department of Education has previously employed competitive grants on a small scale, RTTT is 
the first large-scale federal competitive grant program in education and allows for an 
examination of competitive grants as a policy tool for the federal government to push (or, as 
McGuinn, 2012, suggests, give political cover to) states to make broad changes to their 
elementary and secondary education policies. Further, as Manna and Ryan (2011) explain, across 
all policy areas much of the literature investigating competitive grants focuses on state-
administered competitive grant programs for municipalities; RTTT is an opportunity to better 
understand competitive grants as a federal policy tool and as a potential influence on policy 
diffusion processes.  
Additionally, by comparing the results across three policy areas (teacher policy, college 
and career readiness policy, and persistently lowest achieving schools policy), we gain insight 
into the differential impact of federal attention to particular policy areas that had previously 
received varying state-level attention. While state-level college and career readiness policy had 
received considerable attention from non-governmental  organizations  (e.g.  Achieve)  and  states’  
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persistently lowest achieving schools policies were influenced by other federal non-competitive 
funding streams (e.g. NCLB and School Improvement Grants), prior attention to teacher 
evaluation and compensation policy had concentrated almost entirely on district-level policies 
through grants such as the   USDOE’s   Teacher   Incentive   Fund   and   the   Gates   Foundation’s  
Measures of Effective Teaching. The use of both the piecewise linear growth model and the 
directed-state dyad dependent variable enables these investigations. 
Additionally, while there is a reasonable amount of education policy research that 
examines the impact that federal education policy making has had on state education agencies 
(e.g. Furhman, Cohen, and Mosher, 2007; Manna, 2010), there is little that examines where 
states look for policy ideas in response to federal pressures or incentives. And, in the field of 
diffusion/emulation research, most education policy studies have focused on the diffusion of 
higher education policies (e.g. Cohen-Vogel, Ingle, Albee, and Spence, 2005; Doyle, 2006; 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton, 2006) or charter school/school choice policies. The lessons from 
these prior lines of research are applicable to the current study, but not necessarily transferrable. 
The goal of understanding these processes is to gauge the influence of a relatively small 
amount of federal spending on state policymaking; if states responded to the competitive grant 
program by adopting policies that were reflective of federal preferences, then it would be 
reasonable to label RTTT as   “successful”   in   achieving   state   cooperation   with   federal   policy  
agendas without the use of mandates.  If states adopted policies from other states, were these 
decisions related to the   states’   shared characteristics? Or did state decisions appear to be 
influenced by perceptions of other states’  frontrunner  status  or  by  the  announcement  of  the  first  
round winners? While, as Nicholson-Crotty and Staley (2012) state, it will be years before any 
evaluation can connect RTTT to student-level impacts, in the meantime, understanding state 
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policymaking processes helps to clarify whether states adopted policies informed by their unique 
contexts, which we expect to be more likely to be successfully implemented, or if policy 
decisions appeared to be driven more by competitive and financial concerns.  
 C+APTER OUT/I1E 
The chapters that follow will further unpack the theoretical model and methods proposed for this 
analysis. Though scholars have proposed a number of frameworks through which to examine 
state policy making, I suggest that theories such as punctuated-equilibrium and multiple streams 
are best for understanding the events that put policy changes on legislative or administrative 
agendas. This analysis focuses not on agenda setting but on policy adoption processes. 
Policy diffusion theory is uniquely suited to investigate policy adoption events. RTTT 
offers researchers a opportunity to study state policy making in a case where the reasons for 
state-level policy attention to the four assurance areas is somewhat straightforward; the federal 
government, in a year of shrinking state and local revenues, offered an opportunity for additional 
funding and gave states the political cover to implement policies that could be too politically 
onerous in the absence of that incentive. Unlike prior federal funding mechanisms, i.e. Title I 
funding, RTTT offered states neither the guarantee of funding nor mandates for the specific 
policies they would be required to pass. Though widely misreported and misperceived to have 
these mandates, there was only one absolute requirement for states to receive funding5–that state 
                                                 
5 It was widely perceived that states with charter school caps could not win the competition. In fact, states such as 
Arizona, with lenient charter school laws did not receive funding while states with charter school caps won awards. 
Massachusetts, which caps the number of charter schools at 120, finished first in the second round of the 
competition. 
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regulations allow the linking of teachers and principals to   their   students’   achievement.   This 
absence of federal mandates, coupled with the compressed timeframe for applications, presents 
an opportunity to use diffusion theory to understand rapid education policy change.  
Chapter 2 discusses theories of policy change, focusing significant attention on policy 
diffusion theory and prior diffusion research findings. These findings guide the selection of the 
independent variables for this analysis. Chapter 3 details the methodology for the analysis, 
beginning with a review of the methods and models used in prior diffusion research. I then 
introduce the dependent and independent variables, data, and the piecewise linear growth model, 
with particular attention to the dyadic dependent variable. The chapter concludes with a check of 
model assumptions and a discussion of limitations of this study. 
The first findings chapter, Chapter 4, delves into the policies states adopted and the 
context for those adoption decisions. I present qualitative vignettes describing the political and 
legislative processes in five states during the first two rounds of RTTT. These short studies of 
states, drawn from state media sources, offer both a view into state processes and a frame for the 
quantitative findings from the growth model, which are presented in the second findings chapter, 
Chapter 5. These findings are discussed first for each time period in each policy area, and then 
more broadly, making comparisons of the findings among teacher policy, college and career 
readiness policy, and persistently lowest achieving schools policy across the two time periods 
analyzed. Finally, I conclude by noting the significant findings of the study and suggesting the 
significance of these findings for state and federal policymaking.  
  14 
 T+EORETICA/ MODE/S FOR U1DERSTA1DI1* STATE PO/IC< C+A1*E 
A1D FI1DI1*S FROM PRIOR RESEARC+ 
As McLendon and Cohen-Vogel (2008) explain in their review of education policymaking in the 
U.S., three theories (multiple streams, punctuated equilibrium, and policy diffusion) are best 
suited to understand systemic education policy formulation and change at the state level. But 
while these theories are prominent in the broader policy and political science fields, they have 
been underutilized in framing research on education policy change.  
In examining Race to the Top, it will be important to understand policy change at the 
state level in order to identify the markers of success for the federal program. The stated purpose 
of Race to the Top is to encourage states to make significant education reforms and to foster 
innovation in state education policymaking in the short term in order to propel student 
achievement in the long term. Did Race to the Top inspire or coerce states into making policy 
changes, and, if so, were those changes influenced by internal state characteristics, e.g. union 
strength, economic conditions, external organizations, and ideology, which led to the 
development of innovative policies mindful of those characteristics? Did state policy changes 
appear to be borrowed from other states that were perceived as education leaders or innovators? 
The education system in the United States is, to adopt a phrasing from Manna (2008), fractured 
both horizontally and vertically; education governance in each state may be somewhat unique, 
shaped   by   the   state’s   history,   characteristics,   politics,   interest   groups   and   culture. Questions 
  15 
about the origin of state policies are relevant because each state’s   context  may   influence   the  
implementation and success of the adopted policy in the long term.  
Briefly, punctuated-equilibrium and multiple streams theories are characterized by 
Sabatier  (2007)  as  appropriate  to  “describe  policy  change  within  a  given  political  system  or  set  
of  institutional  arrangements”  and  by  McLendon  and  Cohen-Vogel (2008) as best to understand 
the process through which an issue makes it onto politicians’   and   policymakers’   agendas.    
Multiple   streams   theory   focuses   on   three   “streams”   of   activity   in   government:   the   problem  
stream; the policy stream; and the politics stream. Changes to the policy agenda occur when an 
event (or series of events) leads to these  streams’  convergence,  which  creates  an  opportunity  for  
a problem to be linked to a policy solution in a political environment conducive to change 
(Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 2007). Punctuated equilibrium theory posits that policymaking in 
established policy areas remains relatively static over long periods of time, punctuated by short 
bursts of intense change. These bursts of significant change occur when advocates in a policy 
arena succeed in finding an appropriate and receptive policymaking venue and in defining (or 
redefining) the image of their issue in a manner that is broadly appealing and that encourages 
politicians to associate with the issue (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007). Finally, policy 
diffusion theory suggests policies diffuse among states when states seek to copy policies 
perceived to be successful elsewhere, act in response to resource competitions with other states, 
or react to citizen pressure (Berry and Berry, 1997, 2007).  
The following chapter will explore these theories in greater depth, focusing most 
intensively on the theoretical framework chosen for this analysis, policy diffusion theory, and the 
findings from the policy diffusion literature relevant to examining horizontal and vertical 
diffusion processes.  
  16 
 T+EORIES OF A*E1DA SETTI1* A1D PO/IC< C+A1*E  
 Multiple Streams Theory 
Kingdon’s  (1984)  multiple  streams  theory,  also  known  as  the Revised Garbage Can framework, 
focuses on explaining why some issues rise to prominence or take on an air of urgency for 
policymakers while other issues remain relatively obscure. In addition to explaining how policy 
agenda change occurs, the theory offers an explanation of the actors and the processes that match 
a policy problem to a policy solution, or, as Kingdon explains, when a policy solution, promoted 
by a policy entrepreneur, seeks a policy problem.    The  theory’s  name,  multiple  streams,  refers  to  
Kingdon’s  conception  of  the  policymaking  field  as  comprised  of  three  streams  running  through  
government, operating relatively independently.  
The problem   stream   “contains”   the   problems   that   have   been   selected   and   defined   by  
policymakers as worthy of action or attention. The politics stream is conceived of as the political 
context in which policymakers work and includes public opinion, interest group politics, 
elections, and prevailing national or state ideology. And the policy stream consists of the policy 
proposals developed by special interest groups or experts in specific policy areas. At times when 
there is little attention to a policy issue area,   “policy   solutions”   in   the   policy   stream   are,  
essentially, solutions without problems.  As Kingdon describes the process, only when these 
three streams converge is there the possibility for policy change to occur. A political event, an 
event that shifts public opinion, or successful advocacy by a strong special interest groups leads 
to the linking of a problem and a solution in a receptive political environment. McLendon and 
Vogel (2008) offer a particularly sharp summary of Kingdon and other garbage can theory 
scholars:   “agenda   setting   [is   a]   collection   of   choices   looking   for   issues,   problems   looking   for  
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decision situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for problems to which they may 
become the answer, and politicians looking for pet problems or policies by which they may 
advance  their  careers”  (p.  33). 
Multiple streams theory is most often utilized to understand the process through which a 
problem and a solution make it on to the policy agenda. Zahariadis (2007) describes the theory as 
flexible and capable of incorporating variation in agenda and policy processes and able to 
account for the multiple perspectives that influence these processes. And because it is 
particularly well-suited to understanding policymaking under time constraints (policy 
entrepreneurs, as described above, are lying in wait for a opportunity to promote their pet 
project), it may seem appropriate to look at state level policymaking in response to the Race to 
the Top program through the multiple streams lens. However, as McLendon and Cohen-Vogel 
(2008) and Zahariadis (2007) explain, it has proved most useful in understanding the emergence 
of an issue and in analyzing single policy cases. This proposed research is intended to investigate 
where state policymakers looked for the policies they adopted and is not focused on the process 
that  brought  education  issues  to  state  policymakers’  attention. 
 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
The punctuated-equilibrium framework for understanding policy change is most closely 
associated with the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Within this framework, 
policymaking is not conceived of as an incremental process of slow, progressive change, but, 
rather, as a system that supports the creation of policy monopolies that ensure long periods of 
stasis. When these monopolies are disrupted, for example as a result of political or social change, 
issues within the policy area are subject to increased attention; this leads to a short burst of rapid 
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policy activity and change, after which the policy area returns to a state of equilibrium (True, 
Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007; McLendon and Cohen-Vogel, 2008).  As a result of policy 
change, new policy monopolies may take hold, acting much like the previous policy monopoly. 
Critically, the punctuated-equilibrium  framework  defines  “venues”  and  “images.”  True,  
Baumgartner,  and  Jones  (2007)  describe  the  spaces  in  which  policymaking  occurs  as  “venues;;”  
they can exist at any level of government and overlap across levels of government.  Each venue 
is  understood  to  have  its  own  dominant  policy  monopoly,  protecting  the  status  quo.  “Images”  are  
described   as   “a   mixture   of   empirical   information   and   emotive   appeals   […],   in   effect,  
information–grist for the policymaking process”   (p.161).  When  a  new  actor  disrupts   the  status  
quo in a policy venue, or a policy image can be compellingly redefined, punctuated-equilibrium 
theory suggests there will be rapid   policy   change.   Scholars   propose   that   the   U.S.’s   unique  
patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions, multiple levels of government, and many executive, 
judicial, and administrative agencies within those levels creates the perfect context in which to 
observe this iterative cycle of change and stasis (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True, 
Baumgartner, and Jones, 2007). 
However, much like multiple streams theory, the punctuated-equilibrium framework may 
be better suited to explanations of agenda setting rather than for understanding why 
policymakers adopted particular policies in pursuit of Race to the Top funding. This is not to 
suggest that punctuated-equilibrium and multiple streams theories are not appropriate for 
understanding the federal development of the Race to the Top criteria and, for example, the 
change in approach toward underperforming schools that accompanied the Obama 
administration’s  move  into  the  Department  of  Education.  Rather,  the  proposed  study  is  focused  
on state-level policymaking decisions to adopt particular policies drawing data from multiple 
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time points, and operates under the assumption that the potential for additional federal funding at 
a time when states were beginning to feel the effects of an economic recession was sufficient to 
place  the  Race  to  the  Top  proposal  and  education  policy  on  states’  agendas.   
 Policy Diffusion Theory 
Unlike the theories of state level policymaking described above, policy innovation and diffusion 
theory evolved specifically to address policy adoption, not to explain the process through which 
an issue makes it on to legislative agendas. In examining education state policymaking between 
the proposal of Race to the Top and the close of the second round of the initial Race to the Top 
competition, the primary agenda setting process occurred at the federal level. At the state level, 
Race to the Top very quickly drew significant attention as state governments recognized the 
opportunity to receive federal grant money, and the broad parameters for their attention had 
already been defined for them (Klein, 2009).  
During the year and a half span of the first two rounds of the competition, forty-three 
states made at least superficially significant education policy changes in multiple policy areas, 
e.g. to teacher policies, school leadership policies, college and career readiness definitions, and 
policies stipulating supports and consequences for low performing schools. Given the rapid pace 
of policy changes during this time period, the questions of interest are related to whether states 
looked outside of their borders for policy ideas, whether those new policies emulated those in 
other states or reflected federal preferences, and whether any diffusion that occurred was 
systematic and related to states’   similar characteristics or   perceptions   of   states’   education  
successes. These questions suggest the need for a framework suited for examining the adoption 
process; as such the remainder of this review will focus on policy diffusion and innovation 
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theory, detailing the basic framework, the development of the theory in public policy literature 
since the late 1960s, and the expansion and evolution of the theory. While studies of diffusion 
and innovation processes can be found in many disciplines, the focus will be on policy diffusion 
in the U.S. states. 
Walker (1969) is most often credited with initiating the application of individual and 
organizational theories and definitions of innovation and diffusion associated with Mohr (1969) 
and Rogers (1962, 2003)  to  explain  the  factors  associated  with  states’  adoption  of  new  programs  
and the spread of policies across states. Rogers (1962, 2003) defined  diffusion  as  the  “process  by  
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of the 
social  system.”  In  the  public  policy  context,  Walker  (1969)  defined  an  innovation  as  a  policy  that  
is new to the jurisdiction adopting it, regardless of whether it had been adopted in another 
jurisdiction previously, and defined diffusion as the spread of policies across jurisdictions. In his 
study, Walker (1969) investigated whether certain states were more likely to adopt new policies 
dependent on their level of development (the proportion of their population living in cities and 
the   state’s   level   of   industrialization),   availability   of   financial   resources,   and   residents’  
educational attainment, as well as if states were more likely to adopt policies similar to those in 
states with which the state shared socio-demographic, political, and economic characteristics.  
While  Walker’s  (1969)  and  Gray’s  (1973)  work  was  formative,  the  theory  expanded  both  
conceptually and methodologically with the  publication  of  Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  study  of  the  
diffusion   of   lottery   policies   across   states.   Berry   and   Berry’s   (1990)   work   found   that   earlier  
diffusion   research   models,   by   analyzing   “internal   determinants”6 and   “diffusion”7 separately, 
                                                 
6 Internal determinants models test for the likelihood of a state to adopt a new policy or program based on its socio-
demographic, political, and economic characteristics. These models assume no interaction or learning among states. 
  21 
failed to account  for  the  interrelatedness  of   the  states’  characteristics  and  the  likelihood  of  that  
states may look for policy solutions in states with similar characteristics and similar policy 
problems. They proposed a unified model of diffusion and innovation that could address the 
multiple influences on state policymaking decisions. As Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) explain, 
this unified model can address the three reasons why states may emulate one another: learning 
from other states evidenced by states borrowing policies perceived to be successful elsewhere; 
competition as states may borrow from other states in response to perceived economic threats or 
advantages; and coercive and normative pressure to conform to mandates from the federal 
government or to the best practices of other states. Additionally, their model takes into account 
the characteristics of states that may make them more likely to adopt new policies, available 
resources, obstacles to innovation, and the presence of other policies that may bias a state’s  
policymaking  behavior,  in  line  with  Mohr’s  (1969)  framework  and  Roger’s  (1962,  2003)  work.  
Subsequent research has built on this model and expanded it to better understand diffusion 
among states and between states and the federal government. 
 PO/IC< DIFFUSIO1 T+EOR< /ITERATURE  
 +istory of policy diffusion research 
As mentioned above, Walker’s   (1969)   and   Gray’s   (1973)   articles   propelled   more   widespread  
application of diffusion and innovation theory to public policy research. Both Walker (1969) and 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Pure diffusion models, known as Neighbor and Regional Diffusion models, assume that  geography  and  states’  
proximity  dictates  their  policymaking  behavior  without  taking  into  account  the  influence  of  states’  characteristics. 
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Gray (1973)   investigated   state   innovativeness,  which  Walker  measured  as   an   “innovativeness”  
score  derived  from  states’  order  of  adoption  of  88  policies,  and  Gray  measured  by  placing   the  
states in rank order by time of policy adoption in three issue areas. These early approaches were 
somewhat limited methodologically but were highly   influential.   The   integration   of   Mohr’s  
(1969)   and  Roger’s   (1962,   2003)   descriptions   of   diffusion   and   the   adoption   of   innovations   to  
policy research has driven policy diffusion research through the present day.  
The patterns of diffusion that Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) describe followed an S-
shaped pattern when plotted visually. When the elements of diffusion that Rogers (1962, 2003) 
described (an innovation, a communication system, a social system, and time) are present, we 
would expect to see a small number of states adopting the policy initially, followed by a steep 
increase as more states learn of the policy, perceive it to be a solution to a policy problem and 
adopt it, and, finally, a leveling off of the number of adopters as the number of potential adopting 
states decreases. 
Not  all  policy  diffusion  events  follow  this  pattern,  however,  and,  in  the  1980’s,  scholars  
began investigating variations to the diffusion patterns that Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) 
described. For example, neither Walker (1969) nor Gray (1973) fully explored instances of rapid 
diffusion (policy diffusion in the span of a couple of years, rather than a couple of decades) or of 
vertical diffusion (diffusion between cities and states or the federal government and states). 
Savage (1985) and Welch and Thompson (1980) investigated the impact of federal incentives 
and intense attention on a particular issue area. Their research confirmed some earlier findings 
but also demonstrated that diffusion could be understood as a rapid process, encouraged or 
discouraged by federal actions and incentives. Still, diffusion studies in the 1980s suffered from 
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the same methodological problems as earlier research by possibly confounding the effects of 
internal determinants with the impact of external forces.  
As discussed in the previous section, diffusion research benefitted methodologically and 
conceptually  from  the  publication  of  Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  study  of  the  diffusion  of lotteries 
across states. This paper initiated the use of event history analysis for understanding diffusion 
patterns and added a unified model to capture the likelihood of a state to adopt a particular 
policy. The authors integrated Mohr’s  (1969)  and  Roger’s  (1962,  2003)  frameworks  as  well  as  
Mahajan   and   Peterson’s   (1985)   classification   of   existing   innovations   (independent,  
complementary, contingent, substitutes). This unified model allowed researchers to investigate 
both internal determinants and the influence of external pressures jointly, better capturing the 
effect of these phenomena to understand state policy adoption behavior, addressing one of the 
common criticism of findings of earlier diffusion studies.  
Berry   and   Berry’s   (1990)   work   initiated   a   tremendous expansion of policy diffusion 
research. Researchers have utilized increasingly complex methodological and conceptual 
innovations to capture the factors that may influence vertical and horizontal policy diffusion and 
the complex temporal patterns that policy adoptions may follow during those diffusion events. 
These  methodological  developments  allowed  for  the  exploration  of  jurisdictions’  motivations  to  
adopt policies similar to those previously adopted by other governments (c.f., Berry, 1994; 
Boehmke and Witmer, 2004, Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson, 2004), the influence of 
communication networks and policy entrepreneurs on policy diffusion (c.f. Balla, 2001; Mintrom 
and Vergari, 1997; Mohker, 2010) the mechanisms that may influence the adoption process (c.f. 
Shipan and Volden, 2008; Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005), the role of federal action in a policy 
area on diffusion processes (c.f., Allen, Pettus, and Heider-Markel, 2004; Karch, 2006; McCann, 
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Shipan, and Volden, 2010) and the directionality of policy diffusion (c.f. Shipan and Volden, 
2006). Specifically within the field of education research, scholars have most often investigated 
the diffusion of charter school legislation across states (for example, Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; 
Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005; Wong and Langevin, 2007), of merit-based college scholarships 
(Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn, 2010; Ness and Mistretta, 2010), and structural reforms (Mohker, 
2010). 
Methodologically, scholars have refined and further specified Berry and Berry’s  (1990)  
model to further account for the multiple influences on the diffusion process. For example, 
Boehmke and Witmer (2004) created a model to better understand the differences between 
horizontal diffusion processes driven by social learning as states adopt policies as a result of 
perceived policy success in other states and processes that are the product of states adopting a 
policy in reaction to the perception of an economic threat from other states. Further, Berry and 
Baybeck (2005) and Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel (2011) explored interstate competition by 
modeling policy diffusion using geographic information systems (GIS) to understand how 
population distribution throughout a state influences policy adoption and diffusion processes. 
Shipan and Volden (2008) and Maske and Volden (2011) modeled the mechanisms that drive 
diffusion processes among states, among cities within a state and between cities and states. In 
another important methodological paper, Buckley and Westerland (2004) introduced models to 
better understand time dependence in state-level policy diffusion. And, perhaps most importantly 
for this dissertation research, Volden (2006), Boehmke (2009), and Gilardi (2010) employed the 
directed state-dyad dependent variable to parse the direction of policy adoptions, i.e. does state A 
borrow a policy from state B. 
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In  sum,  since  Walker’s   (1969)  and  Gray’s  (1973)   influential  studies  of  policy  diffusion  
among U.S. states, research has addressed an increasing number of diffusion scenarios and 
expanded beyond  looking  for  correlates  of  states’  likelihood  to  adopt  new  policies  to  address  the  
“why”  of  diffusion.  These  conceptual  developments  have  come  in  conjunction  with  the  growth  
of quantitative models to capture the complexities of horizontal and vertical diffusion and the 
mechanisms   that   may   influence   diffusion   processes.   In   particular,   Berry   and   Berry’s   (1990)  
introduction of event history analysis has allowed for the more precise specification of policy 
diffusion, integrating the previously distinct models of internal determinants and geographic 
proximity. The following section will explore the mechanisms and processes that this research 
has illuminated.  
 Diffusion processes and mechanisms 
This section will address the types of policy diffusion researched and the mechanisms identified 
as  driving  those  processes.  As  described  earlier,  prior  to  Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  work,  scholars  
analyzed models of internal and external influences on state policy adoption separately. As these 
horizontal and vertical diffusion processes were conceptualized as distinct, vertical diffusion 
models will be discussed separately. While models of horizontal diffusion share some 
characteristics with vertical diffusion models, vertical diffusion has not received as much 
attention as horizontal diffusion, and even fewer studies have examined the effects and 
interaction of both horizontal and vertical diffusion processes. Finally, in addition to a further 
description of the types of diffusion examined in previous research, this section will describe the 
mechanisms (and motivations) for diffusion identified by Shipan and Volden (2008) and Berry 
and Berry (1997, 2007).  
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 +orizontal diffusion models  
Horizontal diffusion refers to the diffusion of policies among governments at the same level in 
the governance hierarchy, i.e. from city to city or from state to state. This cluster of models 
includes internal determinants, isomorphism, national interaction, neighbor or regional diffusion, 
and leader-laggard models (Berry and Berry, 1997, 2007).   
  Internal determinants 
Internal determinants models, in their pure form, assume that each state adopts policies for 
reasons that can be entirely explained by factors internal to the state; models are constructed to 
account for economic, political, and socio-demographic factors within a state that the researcher 
believes contribute to the likelihood a policy adoption. Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) state that 
this pure form is unrealistic, supposing that there is no communication between states about 
policy   ideas   or   policy   problems.   They   suggest   that   “internal   determinants   models   must  
acknowledge that, when a state adopts a policy new to the American states, media coverage and 
institutionalized channels of communication among state officials make it likely that knowledge 
of   a   policy   spreads   to   other   states”   (p.   232).     There are few recent examples of pure internal 
determinants models in research. However, Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) suggest a less stringent 
form of the model which assumes that while states may communicate with other states, policy 
adoption decisions are motivated  primarily  by  states’ internal conditions and characteristics and 
not motivated by competition with or learning from other states’  policies. 
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 Isomorphism models 
Isomorphism models   build   on   the   assumption   that   states’   policy   adoption   decisions   are  
influenced by information from other states that are similar in political, socio-demographic and 
economic factors (Berry and Berry, 1997, 2007). These models propose that states learn about 
policies by looking to similar states, doing so to gain information about policy success in under 
conditions similar to their own. Research suggests that shared ideology between states may be a 
particularly important in these models, as politicians look to other states not only to understand 
policy success but also electoral ramifications (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson, 
2004). Isomorphism models also may address instances of rapid policy diffusion similar to those 
investigated by Savage (1985). He suggests that that policy changes may occur as states attempt 
to  “emulate  virtue”  in  other  states;;  policymakers  adopt  policies  because  other  states  are  doing  so,  
not for reasons that are clearly tied to economic or political advantage (e.g. adoption of seat belt 
laws).   
 1ational interaction models 
National interaction models assume that, through formal and informal national networks or 
organizations, such as the Education Commission of the States or National Governors 
Association, state policymakers interact and share policy ideas. Interactions between officials 
from states that have adopted a policy and officials from states that have not are believed to 
increase the likelihood that non-adopting states will adopt a policy. Further, the likelihood that a 
state   will   adopt   a   policy   is   assumed   to   increase   with   every   additional   state’s   adoption   of   the  
policy, regardless of the geographic proximity of the adopting and non-adopting states (Berry 
and Berry, 1997, 2007). As Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) explain, pure national interaction 
models rest on the assumption that all state actors are essentially the same, that all non-adopting 
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states are equally likely to adopt a policy, and that interactions between officials are random. 
However, these assumptions ignore the fundamental differences between states and state 
officials, and assuming, for example, that policymakers from Oregon are just as likely to interact 
with officials from Alabama (and adopt a policy that Alabama has adopted) as are officials from 
Mississippi to interact with and get ideas from policymakers from Alabama. Given the 
demographic, cultural, and economic differences across states, this is a somewhat difficult 
assumption to support. Nonetheless, the national interaction model is significant in that it serves 
as a counterbalance to the assumption of that states that share a border or a geographic region 
will only look to geographically proximate states for policy ideas, as is assumed by the neighbor 
or regional diffusion models discussed below. 
 1eighbor or regional diffusion models 
Neighbor or regional diffusion models are used to represent the regional effects or impact of 
states   sharing   a   border   on   states’   policy   adoption   behavior.  While   national   interaction  models  
assume random interaction and similar effects of interactions among all states, neighbor or 
regional diffusion models focus on the impact of states that share a border or a region on policy 
adoptions (Berry and Berry, 1997, 2007). For example, regional or neighbor models can be used 
to   evaluate   the   impact   of   other   states’   adoptions   on   policymakers’   decisions   to   adopt   lottery,  
gambling, or tax or incentive policies (for example, Berry and Berry, 1990, 1994; Boehmke and 
Witmer, 2004; Ness and Mistretta, 2010). These models tend to focus on the effects of learning 
and competition on policy decisions.  
Karch (2006) notes that research examining regional or neighbor diffusion effects makes 
the assumption that sharing a region or a border makes states more likely to adopt policies from 
one another. And while this assumption may hold for policies that concern economic competition 
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tied to geographic proximity, such as a lottery, it may not hold for policies, even economic 
policies, that are perceived to have national implications, such as a corporate tax or incentive. 
Volden (2006) and Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty and Peterson (2004) found that neighbor and 
regional effects in the policy areas they examined (Children’s  Health  Insurance  Program  policies  
and lottery, education, and criminal sentencing policies, respectively) were better explained by 
bordering   states’   economic,   demographic,   and cultural similarities.  State policymakers were 
more likely to adopt policies that they perceived as successful in state contexts similar to their 
own, regardless of location. 
 /eader-laggard models 
Leader-laggard models assume that certain states can be identified as leaders in a policy area and 
that  states  are  more  likely  to  look  to  “leader  states”  for  policy  ideas.  By  making  the  assumption  
that leader states influence other states by virtue of their leadership, these models tend to 
discount the effects of interstate competition and isomorphic pressures on state policymaking 
(Berry and Berry, 1997, 2007). However, leader-laggard models are not incompatible with 
regional diffusion models; some researchers have chosen to integrate the two models, identifying 
leader states within regions (for example, Walker, 1969).  
Research employing leader-laggard models requires an a priori prediction of the expected 
leader state or states, else, without a specification of leader states or the characteristics of 
expected leader states, these models are not empirically testable. Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) 
suggest that these models can be conceptually distinct from other models and fully testable when 
the researcher has as an a priori assumption about the hierarchy of states on a given 
characteristic. Further, leader-laggard models are very similar to vertical diffusion models, with 
the federal government acting as the  “leader  state.”   
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As discussed above, research prior to 1990 tended to analyze the horizontal diffusion 
models in isolation. Researchers would focus either on internal determinants of policy adoptions 
or on diffusion within a geographic region, ignoring the possibility that the policy diffusion 
could involve an interaction between state characteristics, isomorphism pressures, and regional 
or neighbor influences, or that the effects of these interactions could be different across policy 
areas. While it may  be  a  reasonable  assumption  that  New  York’s  adoption  of  a  less  stringent  beer  
and wine sales law would impact   New   Jersey’s   decisions   about   its   beer   and   wine   laws, the 
assumption would not hold if New Jersey were replaced with Arizona in that scenario. 
Alternately, while the passage of a beer and wine sales policy may not influence the policies of 
geographically distant states, plausible scenarios can be constructed in other policy areas where 
there   would   be   national   effects   of   a   state’s   policy   adoption.   For Race to the Top related 
policymaking, it is possible that state policymakers looked to states that were socio-
demographically, economically, and ideologically similar for policy ideas, regardless of 
geographic proximity8. It is also possible that states looked solely to the federal government for 
policy ideas, in keeping with a vertical diffusion model. 
 9ertical diffusion models 
Vertical diffusion models can be used to test diffusion effects across levels of government. For 
example, they can be employed to  understand   the   influence  of   city’s  policies  on   state  policies  
(e.g. Shipan and Volden, 2008) or of the federal government on state policymaking (e.g. Welch 
and Thompson, 1980; Karch, 2006; Karch, 2010). Vertical diffusion models employ many of the 
                                                 
8 In fact, during the model building process discussed in Chapter 3, the variable indicating whether states shared a 
border was so highly insignificant that it was dropped from the final models. 
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same analytic methods and independent variables to capture state characteristics as horizontal 
diffusion models, and Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) note that vertical diffusion models are 
conceptually similar to leader-laggard models, assigning the role of leader to the higher 
government. Still, researchers have considered other manifestations of vertical policy influence, 
for example investigating the influence of city level policy adoption on state policy action. 
Shipan and Volden (2008) investigated the effect of city adoptions of anti-smoking regulations 
on state adoptions of anti-smoking policies. Additionally, some research has investigated the 
effect of federal action on state-to-state diffusion processes (McCann, Shipan, and Volden, 
2010).  
When the federal government takes coercive action, vertical diffusion models are 
somewhat uninteresting, as Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) note. More interesting models of 
vertical diffusion investigate the influence of the higher government when the direct rewards are 
not obvious or when the policy messages are somewhat opaque. For example, Karch (2010) 
investigated the effect of different types of policy action at the federal level regarding stem cell 
research and the different impacts each of those actions had on state-level policy adoption 
behavior.  
Additionally, scholars have investigated state-level policy diffusion when policy choices 
are somewhat constrained by federal guidelines, e.g. welfare (TANF) reforms implemented in 
the mid-1990s   (Lee,   2009)   and   changes   in   policies   related   to   states’   implementation   of   the  
Children’s   Health   Insurance   Program   (CHIP)   (Volden,   2006). Research on both TANF and 
CHIP policies bear on research of Race to the Top related policy behavior, as all three involve 
federal grantmaking and the influence of federal grants on   states’   behavior.   Regardless   of  
whether effects of federal action on state-level policymaking were detected, the findings have 
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federal policy implications. Had the states made policy changes reflecting federal policy 
preferences, there would be evidence to support the continued use of federal grants and, 
specifically, of competitive grants as a federal policy tool.  Conversely, if there were no evidence 
of  changes  in  states’  behavior  or  of  any  substantive  movement  toward  federal  policy  preferences,  
the usefulness of this type of federal grant-making for the purpose of influencing states would 
need to be considered. 
Many of the models in the above discussion of horizontal diffusion models were 
developed to understand the correlates of state policy diffusion. Particularly prior to 1990, most 
diffusion research treated the state as the unit of analysis. Since the shift to using the policy as 
the  unit  of  analysis,  some  researchers  have  begun  to  investigate  states’  motivations  for  adopting  
policies similar to those adopted by other states and whether certain policy attributes appear to 
influence   states’   likelihood   to   adopt   policies.   The   next   section  will   review   the   still   somewhat  
limited research into diffusion mechanisms and policy attributes, which should be understood as 
components of all the models discussed above. 
 Policy diffusion mechanisms and policy attributes 
While it may be interesting to explain the state characteristics that influence the likelihood of 
state adoption of policies and the spread of policies across states, exploring underlying 
mechanisms of the diffusion process and the influence of policy attributes on that process begins 
to  address  the  “why”  of  policy  diffusion.  In  other  words,  given  all  possible  policy  choices,  why  
do states choose to adopt a new policy when there are other options, including doing nothing? 
This section   will   introduce   the   limited   research   on   the   “why”   of   policy   diffusion,   and,   while  
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these mechanisms are described in isolation, they should be understood as acting and interacting 
to impact policy diffusion. 
Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) discuss three reasons why states may emulate the policies 
of another state: learning, competing, and conforming. They describe learning as a product of 
state  policymakers’  desire  to  find  new  ideas  to  pressing  policy  problems.  By  borrowing  existing  
policies in other states, policymakers can simply the process of finding new information. 
Emulation may allow for shortcuts or information about the ramifications of policy adoption 
given a similar set of conditions. Competing, or competition, captures the tendency of states to 
borrow from other states when there is the perception that doing so will offer economic 
advantage or will avoid competitive disadvantage. For example, when a state reduces social 
benefits, bordering states may feel pressure to reduce benefits as well, fearing that failure to do 
so would result in an influx of beneficiaries moving to the state with the best benefits. This 
pattern has held for research into the diffusion of lottery and gambling policies, social benefit 
reforms, and corporate tax and incentive programs (Lee, 2009; Berry and Berry, 1990; Baybeck, 
Berry, and Siegel, 2011). Additionally, Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) discuss the pressure that 
states may feel to adopt policies for which other states or the federal government advocate.  
Berry and Berry make   a   distinction   between   “coercive”   pressures   and   “normative”  
pressures   (which   Savage   [1985]   described   as   “emulation   of   virtue”).   Coercive   pressures   are  
associated with federal mandates. For example, the No Child Left Behind Act mandated that any 
state not implementing an achievement testing and reporting system would risk the reduction or 
elimination of federal Title I funding. While Title I funding comprises a relatively small 
proportion   of   states’   education   budgets,   states   complied   with   the   law   rather than face the 
consequence of losing the funding on which many schools relied. It is important to note, 
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however, that not all federal action is coercive; RTTT had no explicit   threat  attached  to  states’  
policymaking decisions. Similarly, the federal stem cell policy actions Karch (2010) researched 
were not mandates and had no negative or positive financial impact on states.  
“Normative”  influences  can  be  understood  as  the  isomorphic  pressure  that  states  may  feel  
to conform to the norms of other states when there is no clear negative or positive implication for 
policy adoption. National professional networks (e.g. National Governors Association, Council 
of Chief State School Officers) and national advocacy or lobbying groups (e.g. the National 
Council of La Raza, the American Federation of Teachers) may contribute through the spread of 
information about policies and by increasing the normative pressure on states to adopt policies 
that are being adopted in other states (Balla, 2001, Mohker, 2010). 
These motivations for state adoptions are similar to the mechanisms described and 
investigated by Shipan and Volden (2008) with data on anti-smoking policy adoption behavior, 
primarily at the city level, (though their framework has been applied to state-level policymaking 
as well).   They   describe   four   diffusion   mechanisms   that   may   influence   governments’   policy  
adoption behavior: learning; economic competition; imitating; and coercion. The authors 
describe learning as fundamental to the belief that states can act as policy laboratories. States can 
observe policies, the implications of their passage, and the courses of implementations in other 
states and use that information to make decisions about adopting particular policies in their own 
state.  A   policy’s   diffusion   rate   is believed to accelerate as more governments adopt it, giving 
non-adopting governments the opportunity to observe the effects of the policy in more diverse 
contexts. Economic competition is discussed as the prospective evaluation in which 
policymakers engage in order to understand the negative or positive economic impact of a policy 
were it to be adopted. An expectation of negative economic consequences given the experiences 
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of other jurisdictions, for example, would reduce the likelihood of policy adoption. The imitation 
mechanism fits with the leader-laggard horizontal diffusion model and vertical diffusion model 
discussed in the previous section; some jurisdictions are regarded as leaders and other 
jurisdictions look to those governments for policy ideas. For example, California has been 
regarded as a policy leader in environmental policy, often serving as the leader even for the 
federal government. Shipan and Volden (2008) define coercion similarly to Berry and Berry 
(2007) as mandates or threats that lead states or municipalities to adopt particular policies. 
Finally, the authors test these mechanisms conditionally and temporally to understand if the 
effects of these mechanisms are mediated or moderated by characteristics of the jurisdiction and 
by time since the first or a significant prior adoption.  
In addition to the examination of the mechanisms of diffusion, researchers have begun to 
revisit   underexplored   aspects   of   Berry   and   Berry’s   (1990)   unified   model   of   diffusion.  
Specifically, Maske and Volden (2011) analyzed a sample of criminal justice policies passed 
between 1973 and 2003 in U.S. states to understand how the learning and competition 
mechanisms  were  influenced  by  Roger’s  (1962,  2003)  typology  of  the  attributes  of  innovations  
(relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, observability, and trialability). While their 
research is preliminary, it highlights the need to understand the multiple influences on state 
policymaking behavior and policy diffusion processes.  
Much of the research investigating diffusion mechanisms focuses on the effect of 
economic competition, though there is increasing research attempting to understand the process 
through which policymakers learn about policy success and failure in other states. The diffusion 
of gambling and lottery laws in the late 20th Century and the early 21st Century have offered 
scholars clear examples of diffusion tied to the perception that the failure to copy legislation in a 
  36 
nearby state will be economically disadvantageous. However, several researchers have 
investigated  the  effect  of  policymakers’   learning  on  the  diffusion  of  particular  policies  in  areas  
not obviously related to economic motivations using qualitative methods. For example, Volden 
(2006) interviewed state officials in order to understand their decisions to adopt CHIP policies 
similar to those in other states. And Cohen-Vogel, Ingle, Levine, and Spence (2007) questioned 
state  officials  about  their  states’  adoption  (or  non-adoption) of state merit-aid policies for higher 
education. Further,  Maske  and  Volden’s  (2011)  recently  published  work  should  push  the  field  to  
further explore the influence of policy attributes and the effects of interactions between attributes 
and the mechanisms that Shipan and Volden (2008) and Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) describe. 
 FI1DI1*S FROM PRIOR +ORI=O1TA/ A1D 9ERTICA/ PO/IC< 
DIFFUSIO1 RESEARC+ 
As discussed above, of the three most often used theories of state-level policymaking, policy 
diffusion and innovation theory is uniquely suited to the proposed investigation. While other 
theories can be employed to understand policy agenda setting, diffusion theory serves to explain 
policy adoptions. During the application period for Race to the Top, the most interesting 
questions  are  not  why  education  policy  made  it  onto  states’  agendas,  as  the  potential  grants  were  
most likely sufficient to attract state lawmakers’   attention,  but,   rather,  why   the   states  opted   to  
adopt particular policies. Were these decisions based on observations of successful policies in 
other   states,   driven   by   federal   education   priorities,   or   were   they   rooted   in   the   state’s   prior  
educational reforms? The answer may offer clues about expected outcomes as states implement 
reforms and can offer some evidence of whether a competitive grant program is a sufficient 
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federal policy tool to encourage states to enact reform policies in line with federal policy 
preferences. Much of past federal education policymaking has relied on formula grants and 
mandates (e.g. Title I/ No Child Left Behind or Special Education funding) to drive state reform, 
but the RTTT competitive grant model may be a less overtly coercive option if it achieves some 
measure of success. While policy diffusion theory cannot evaluate long-term educational 
outcomes, it can be employed to understand state educational policy decisions and the role of 
federal preferences and state conditions in those decisions.  
The  following  sections  will  review  researchers’  findings  from  policy  diffusion  studies  of  
horizontal  and  vertical  diffusion  processes.  Since  Walker’s   (1969)  study  of   the  diffusion  of  88  
policies across the U.S. states, research on policy diffusion has expanded in volume and scope. 
Nonetheless, the field is still somewhat young with a relatively small literature base. This is 
particularly true of studies that specifically address education policy diffusion. Most education 
policy diffusion research has focused on either the diffusion of charter school–school choice 
laws or merit scholarship programs (e.g. Cohen-Vogel, Ingle, and Spence, 2007; Mintrom and 
Vergari, 1998; Ness and Mistretta, 2010; Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005). McLendon and Cohen-
Vogel (2008) confirm this paucity of education policy diffusion research, suggesting that there is 
a need for research that draws on policymaking theories from the political and policy sciences 
and that applies these theories to the study of education policymaking. 
The diffusion research focused on education policy suggests that there are lessons from 
the broader policy diffusion literature that may be applied to research on education policies. 
Thus, this review is broad in its focus, examining studies conducted in other policy areas. 
Particular emphasis was placed on studies that examined vertical or vertical/horizontal diffusion 
and studies that examined social welfare policies (e.g. health care). Social welfare policies may 
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share characteristics with education policies, particularly in regard to the history of federal 
intervention in state policy, which has been changing over the last 20 years. Though the presence 
of federal influence (and, explicitly, a vertical diffusion process) may not be the focus of the 
research, the hope was that the selection of diffusion research in similar policy areas would 
increase  the  applicability  of  studies’  findings  to  education  policy  research.   
Finally, though the theoretical underpinning of horizontal and vertical diffusion research 
is the same, these lines of research are reviewed separately in part to highlight vertical diffusion 
studies. Race to the Top program is a federal program, thus it is important to consider the effect 
that the potential for federal funding may have ensured that the federal government was the 
primary source of information for state policymakers. That said, it is also plausible that state 
policymaking was entirely driven by horizontal diffusion processes; the federal government did 
not require specific policies, other than the aforementioned requirement that states allow the 
linking of student and educator data, thus suggesting that states may have looked for more 
specific policy ideas from other states. 
 9ertical and vertical/horizontal diffusion studies 
The majority of policy diffusion research focuses on the diffusion of policies among states and 
ignores (or treats as a nuisance) federal action in the policy area under study. A few scholars, 
Karch (2006, 2007, 2010), in particular, have explicitly addressed the role the federal 
government may play in influencing the policy spread among the states. This section addresses 
the findings of research that has directly investigated vertical diffusion as well as those studies 
that may be more focused on horizontal diffusion but, nonetheless, address vertical diffusion 
effects. 
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 Studies that focus explicitly on federal action have investigated both the effects of 
federal incentives on state behavior (Welch and Thompson, 1980; Savage, 1985) and the impact 
that more subtle forms of federal intervention (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel, 2004; Karch 
2006,  2010)  can  have  on  states’   likelihood   to   adopt  policies   in   line  with   the  wishes  of   federal  
policymakers, while controlling for internal and external factors found to be significant 
influences  on  policymakers’  behavior  in  the  horizontal  diffusion  literature.   
The  researchers’  accounting  of  both  subtle  and  overt  policy  cues  is  particularly  relevant  
for investigating the effects of the Race To The Top program because while federal actors 
(Congress, the President, and the Department of Education) gave states clear messages about the 
policies  that  would  bolster  a  state’s  application,  there  was  no  negative  incentive  in  the  program  
for states that did not alter their policies and there was no absolute promise of a grant if a state 
were to change its policies to reflect the federal agenda. Further,  RTTT’s  attention  in  each  of  the  
three policy areas examined in this study ranged from central (teacher policy) to broader and 
somewhat peripheral (college and career readiness policy).  
The competitive grant process operates in an area somewhat between the overt 
incentives/disincentives that Welch and Thompson (1980) and Savage (1985) found to have 
positive statistically significant effects on the speed with which policies diffuse and the more 
subtle expressions of federal preferences investigated by Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 
(2004),   Karch   (2006,   2010),   and  McCann,   Shipan,   and  Volden   (2010).   Researchers’   findings 
suggest that states are more likely to be influenced by the expression of federal policy 
preferences in federal legislation if those preferences are clear and unambiguous. In the absence 
of clear federal messages, however, state and policy attributes, (the actions of neighboring states, 
internal state characteristics, policy complexity), have a greater influence on state policy 
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adoption behavior. Subtle policy messages communicated through Congressional hearings or 
through the absence of action in a policy area receiving national attention largely fail to influence 
state behavior except where federal action interacts with state-level conditions that make receipt 
of   federal   messages   more   likely   (e.g.  McCann,   Shipan,   and   Volden’s   [2010]   finding   that   the  
professionalism  of  a  state’s  legislature  influences  the  likelihood  of  state  action  in  response  to  the  
introduction of federal legislation). 
A second set of studies sits between research focusing explicitly on vertical diffusion and 
the larger horizontal diffusion literature. These horizontal/vertical studies tend to control for 
federal intervention or national attention to a policy area, rather than using federal action as the 
independent variable(s) of interest. Broadly, these studies find similar effects as those discussed 
above. Interestingly, though, Daley and Gerand (2005) find that there is no effect on hazardous 
waste clean up policies for the amount of money a state receives from the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency. This finding may be a product of their measure, which encompassed all EPA 
funding to a state, not just the funding related to hazardous waste remediation, or it may be 
indicative of a lack of clear policy preference signals from the EPA.  
Most of the studies discussed above employed event history analysis or a similar form of 
regression to investigate the effects of the focal and control independent variables on the 
dependent variable. As with many other diffusion studies conducted after the publication of 
Berry and Berry (1990), the dependent variable is constructed by coding the presence or absence 
of a policy in a state in a given year.  Many of these studies also included a dichotomous, 
categorical, or count independent variable(s) to capture federal events, e.g. coding a variable for 
the years before federal action as 0 and the years after federal action as 1 in order to capture the 
effect of federal intervention or including a lagged count of the number of bills introduced in 
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Congress. The two studies discussed that use less statistically complex methods (Welch and 
Thompson,  1980;;  Savage,  1985)  were  conducted  prior  to  Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  proposal of 
event history analysis and a unified model of policy diffusion. 
 +orizontal diffusion studies 
While research into the effects of vertical policy diffusion, between cities and states or between 
the federal government and states, is somewhat limited, far more studies have examined the 
diffusion of policies among states, absent any influence from federal or city policymakers. This 
section will focus on the research and findings from studies that have addressed horizontal 
diffusion. As Berry and Berry noted in 2007, since 1990 over 40 studies have been published 
using event history analysis to investigate horizontal policy diffusion among states in the U.S. As 
such, I paid to the content and impact of the studies I chose to review here; my emphasis is on   
formative policy diffusion studies prior to 1990 (e.g. Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973), formative or 
methodologically important studies published since 1990 (e.g. Berry and Berry, 1990; Volden, 
2006; Boehmke, 2009), and studies that addressed the adoption of education policies (e,g. Wong 
and Langevin, 2007; Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn, 2010; Mohker, 2010). And, while interesting 
research has been conducted   using   data   for   the   diffusion   of   “morality”   policies   (e.g.   abortion  
restrictions and gay rights), I made the decision to exclude that line of investigation from this 
review because there is evidence that morality policymaking may be subject to a unique set of 
political influences that do not apply to non-morality policy areas such as education policy 
(Mooney and Lee, 1999). 
As stated previously, the primary division in horizontal diffusion research is between 
studies published prior to Berry and Berry’s  (1990)  application  of  event  history  analysis   to   the  
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study of policy spread among states and those published after this important work. Prior to this 
paper, most diffusion used multiple regression analysis, a dependent variable constructed by 
ranking states’   innovativeness,   and   analyzed   the   two   influences   on   state-level policy diffusion 
processes—adoptions  driven  by  a   state’s   regions  or  neighboring  states’  policymaking  behavior  
and state policymaking behavior driven primarily by internal characteristics—separately. As 
Berry and Berry (1990, 2007; 1994) and countless other scholars have confirmed, this approach 
ignores the possibility that state policy adoption is driven by a mix of internal and external 
factors as well as the interactions between them. Further, the reliance on OLS regression limited 
the form of the dependent variable, forcing researchers to make compromises that constricted 
research questions and hypotheses. Many of these studies relied on cross-sectional data and 
assumptions about states’   “policy   innovativeness”   given   their   place   on   a   chronological   list   of  
state adopters. Research since 1990 has employed increasingly more complex event history 
analysis models (see Buckley and Westerland, 2004; Volden, 2006, Boehmke, 2009) and, most 
recently, multilevel models, (e.g. Gilardi, 2010). In doing so, scholars have extended the field 
beyond looking for the correlates of the diffusion of a particular policy to investigate the 
underlying factors that influence the diffusion of a particular policy when there are policy 
alternatives (e.g. Volden and Cohen, 2007) and the mechanisms that drive diffusion (e.g. Shipan 
and Volden, 2008). Nonetheless, several of these pre-1990 studies, while somewhat limited 
methodologically, greatly influenced the conceptual development of the policy diffusion field. In 
particular, Walker (1969) and Gray (1973) developed theories of policy diffusion and conceptual 
reasoning for the variables that influence diffusion processes that persist in diffusion research 
through the present. 
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Across the studies reviewed, there is broad agreement about many of the internal state 
factors that appear to influence the likelihood that a state will adopt the policy under study. 
Political variables, including state government ideology and party unity across policymaking 
institutions, appear to influence the likelihood that states will adopt the focal policy (Walker, 
1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry, 1990; Renzulli and Roscingo, 2005; Volden, 2006; Volden 
and Cohen, 2007; Wong and Langevin, 2007; Boehmke, 2009; Doyle, McClendon, and Cohen, 
2010;;  Mohker,   2010).   Both   the  mean   personal   income   for   residents   of   a   state   and   the   state’s  
economic health have significant, consistent effects across studies (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; 
Berry and Berry, 1990; Renzulli and Roscingo, 2005; Volden, 2006; Volden and Cohen, 2007; 
Wong and Langevin, 2007; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Boehmke, 2009; Doyle, McClendon, and 
Hearn, 2010; Mohker, 2010). Additionally, the effect of interest group strength or institutional 
ties to interest groups on state policymaking are largely consistent and significant in the expected 
directions; of the articles reviewed, only Mohker (2010) failed to find an effect for the strength 
of higher education in her study of the spread of P-16 councils across states (Balla, 2001; 
Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Boehmke, 2009; Doyle, McLendon, and 
Hearn, 2010; Mohker, 2010).  
However, researchers do not uniformly find consistent support for the  influence  of  states’  
geographic proximity on the likelihood of diffusion (Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 1990; 
Balla, 2001; Boehmke, 2004; Renzulli and Roscigno, 2005; Volden and Cohen, 2007; Wong and 
Langevin, 2007; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Doyle, McLendon, and Hearn, 2010). There are three 
plausible explanations for these inconsistent findings. First, in his influential policy diffusion 
study, Walker (1969) found that the effect of geographic proximity on the likelihood of policy 
diffusion between states had begun to decline in the latter half of the twentieth century. Given 
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the increasing opportunities for information exchange between state officials, there are increased 
opportunities for policymakers to learn about policies from states with which they do not share a 
region or a border but do share similar demographics, ideology, or needs. Also, there is the 
chance that geographic proximity matters for certain types of policies but not for others. For 
example, while Berry and Berry (1990) found a neighbor effect on the likelihood of state 
adoption of a lottery, Volden (2006) did not find a similar effect on the likelihood that states 
would   adopt   similar  Children’s  Health   Insurance   Program   policies.   In   these   cases,   states  may  
believe there will be a loss of potential revenue for failure to adopt a lottery when a neighboring 
state has done so, whereas state policymakers are not likely to feel the same competitive 
pressures with neighboring states when adopting health insurance assistance policies. Distinct 
characteristics of certain types of policies and the different pressures on state governments that 
these policies promote may be producing the inconsistent findings for geographic effects across 
studies. Finally, there is the possibility that states that share a region or a border have a socio-
economically and ideologically similar population and share a similar set of policy problems; the 
findings   of   a   regional   effect   may   be   the   result   of   states’   similarities,   not   their   geographic  
closeness, and a problem of model misspecification. 
 SUMMAR< 
In summary, my decision to use a directed-state dyad form of the dependent variable, details of 
which are discussed in a subsequent chapter, is guided by prior research questions, prior research 
findings, and recent methodological innovations. Anecdotally, we can observe that states adopted 
or altered policies from March 2009 to August 2010; the directed state-dyad dependent variable 
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allows for the conceptually interesting investigation of whether states moved towards or away 
from the policies of other states during this time period and the characteristics of state pairs that 
appear to influence the likelihood of either outcome.  
Particularly important for this research are prior findings from horizontal diffusion 
research of significant effects   for   states’   political and ideological characteristics and the 
influence of issue interest groups in  influencing  states’  policymaking  behavior  and  likelihood  of 
policy adoption. For example, political and ideological considerations appear to have influenced 
states’  decisions  to  apply  for  RTTT  grants;;  Texas  and  Alaska  declined  to  participate  in  RTTT,  
citing opposition to federal influence and federal spending (Dillon, 2010). Additionally, the 
program perceived as pushing reforms typically associated with Republicans (e.g. tenure reform 
and stringent teacher evaluation) was designed by a Democratic administration. The effect of this 
may have pulled both Democratic and Republican state governments in interesting ways and 
impacted the influence of state teachers’  unions.  Democratic  state  governments  may  have  been  
caught between the perceived preferences of a newly elected Democratic president and their 
traditional   alliances   with   teachers’   unions.   Republican   state   governments   may   have   struggled  
with their preference  for  the  Obama  administration’s  policies  and  their  political  base’s  animosity  
towards the president.  Political party governance, teachers’ union strength, and state ideology 
may   have   been   important   factors   in   the   “spread”   of   education   policy   during   the RTTT 
competition.  
Further, while somewhat less developed than the literature on horizontal diffusion 
processes, prior vertical diffusion research suggests that the effects of RTTT on state 
policymaking behavior may be different among teacher policy, college and career readiness 
policy, and persistently lowest achieving schools. Each area was associated with different levels 
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of attention and specificity from the federal government and organizations outside of 
government. 
In light of the findings of prior research discussed in this chapter, Chapter 3 will set forth 
the methods, hypotheses, and variables selected for the analysis of RTTT-related, state-level 
policy change.    
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 MET+ODS 
The above literature review suggests fruitful avenues for policy diffusion research and, in 
particular, for the analysis of horizontal and vertical diffusion processes in the context of the 
competitive process used to award states RTTT funds. While prior studies have largely relied on 
event history analyses to examine diffusion processes, the necessity of simultaneously modeling 
horizontal diffusion and federal diffusion pressures during the RTTT competition suggests the 
use of a model that can both account for the dependencies inherent in state dyads observed 
multiple times and track the variation in state policymaking as a result of federal pressures.  The 
piecewise linear growth model used for this analysis was chosen in order to address these needs. 
While this method of analysis is not common in the diffusion literature, a few recent studies have 
begun to employ multilevel methods of modeling diffusion processes (e.g. Gilardi, 2010), and 
my decisions about the independent variables and the form of the dependent variable, a measure 
of policy distance between directed state dyads, were informed by and grounded in the evolving 
methodological approaches used in diffusion analyses over the last 45 years. 
This chapter will first explore the methods employed and independent variables included 
in past diffusion studies, with particular attention paid to the theoretical and empirical reasons for 
the inclusion of control and focal variables and to the form and construction of the dependent 
variable in diffusion studies.      I  will   then   return   to   the   study’s   research   questions,   discuss   the  
construction of the dependent variable for this analysis, detail data used for the control and focal 
  48 
independent variables, and discuss corresponding hypotheses. The chapter will conclude with a 
description of the final estimated models and an explanation of the interpretation of specific 
variable coefficients, a check of model assumptions, and a discussion of the limitations of this 
study. 
 TESTI1* DIFFUSIO1 MET+ODS USED I1 T+E A1A/<SIS OF PO/IC< 
DIFFUSIO1 
The diffusion research literature is divided into two clearly delineated methodological periods, a 
testament  to  the  impact  that  Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  unified  model  of  diffusion  and use of event 
history analysis has had on research in the field. Early diffusion research employed cross-
sectional or time-series regressions and factor analysis to investigate internal determinants and 
national or regional diffusion, respectively. The distinction between the methods used to 
investigate internal determinants and geographic diffusion patterns is important because it 
highlights the separation of internal factors and from geographic factors in these analyses. The 
following sections will discuss the best known of the early studies of diffusion, Berry and Berry 
(1990)’s  event  history  analysis,  and  additional specifications of diffusion and innovation analysis 
models that subsequent researchers have proposed and tested. 
 Early diffusion and innovation studies :alker () and *ray () 
Two prominent early diffusion studies, Gray (1973) and Walker (1969) employ linear regression 
approaches,   constructing   dependent   variables   to   capture   states’   innovativeness   and   including  
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variables   thought   to  be  related   to  states’  propensity   to  adopt  new  policies.  Walker   (1969)   tests  
states’   internal   characteristics   by constructing an innovativeness score for each state. For 88 
policies, he counts the number of years between the first and last adoption and uses that to give 
each state a score corresponding to the percentage of the total diffusion time that had elapsed 
prior  to  the  state’s  adoption.  (The  last  state  to  adopt  a  policy  and  states  that  had  not  adopted  the  
policy were given a score of 1.000.) The innovation score is calculated by subtracting the 
average of this number for all issue areas from 1.000; he states, “The larger the innovation score, 
therefore, the faster the state has been, on  the  average,   in  responding  to  new  ideas  or  policies”  
(p.883). He then tests the correlation of  states’   innovation  scores  with economic, demographic 
and political factors that prior research suggested would be related to innovation, including state 
government and individual economic well-being, percent of the population illiterate, percent of 
the population residing in urban areas, party competition for state offices, and legislative 
professionalism.  
In   a   separate   analysis,   Walker   (1969)   conducts   a   factor   analysis   based   on   states’  
innovation scores to group states into regions for the analysis of regional diffusion effects. Gray 
(1973), in her study of three policy areas, conducts two distinct analyses to understand the role of 
diffusion and innovation on state policymaking in each area. She builds a regression model to 
understand diffusion as a function of the proportion of states that had adopted a policy and the 
interaction between adopting states and those that had not adopted the policy. To quantify 
innovation she ranks the order in which states adopted policies and uses Spearman rank order 
correlations to understand the stability of rank order as a measure of innovativeness within each 
issue area.  
  50 
These methodological approaches were problematic because the researchers separated the 
analyses of internal characteristics and geographic diffusion; this separation rested on the 
assumption either that states are not influenced by external factors such as other   states’  policy  
decisions or that a state’s  internal  characteristics  (e.g.  demographics,  ideology,  economic  status)  
had no bearing on its decision as to whether to adopt a policy. Subsequent researchers have 
demonstrated the hazard of analyzing internal determinants and geographic diffusion effects in 
isolation (see Berry, 1994; Mooney, 2001). Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) argue that internal 
determinants models often include independent variables intended to capture state characteristics 
measured at a single time point for a process that, in many cases, spans many years, ignoring 
both the changes in state characteristics and the differential impact of state characteristics on the 
policymaking process over time. Tests for geographic diffusion are similarly biased. Berry and 
Berry (1997, 2007) report that for any policy adoption process that follows the expected curve of 
cumulative adoptions, results will support both national and regional diffusion though the pattern 
may be better explained by state internal characteristics and changes in these characteristics over 
the course of the adoption period under investigation.  
Nonetheless, while these earlier works may have had methodological flaws that limit the 
usefulness of their findings, they made significant conceptual contributions, particularly in 
highlighting the work of innovation and diffusion scholars in other fields and for political 
scholars and adapting and applying that work to empirical tests of policy adoption patterns. 
 Event history analysis %erry and %erry () 
As mentioned above, Berry and Berry (1990) added a significant analytical tool to the 
investigation of policy diffusion across governments with their introduction of a unified 
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conceptual and analytical model of policy diffusion and innovation. They explain that the 
dependent variable in the event history analysis method they employ is the hazard rate, the 
probability that an individual (or policymaking entity) who is at risk of experiencing the event 
will do so during a particular time period. To illustrate in a typical policy diffusion study context, 
if the time unit were a year, the hazard rate would be the probability that a state that had not yet 
adopted a policy would do so during a given year. As Berry and Berry (1990) state, hazard rate is 
an unobserved variable. In the event history analysis method they propose, the dependent 
variable used for estimating effects is coded 1 in the time period that the individual (state) 
experiences the event (policy adoption) and is coded 0 otherwise. If the event can only be 
experienced once, as would most likely be the case with the adoption of a specific policy such as 
in the example above, the individual is no longer included in the risk set in time periods 
subsequent to that in which they experienced the event. In their analysis, Berry and Berry (1990) 
use a discrete time model, but event history analysis can be used to analyze continuous events 
and repeated events.  
In a data set constructed for a discrete time event history analysis, each case would 
include the dummy coded dependent variable, the observation of the adoption/non-adoption 
event for the state in a given time period, and independent variables to capture the internal 
determinants of innovation and the effects of geographic diffusion. This model jointly analyzes 
the effects of state characteristics and the impact of neighbor, regional, or national adoptions on 
the  state’s  adoption  of  a  particular  policy  and  allows  for  the  variables  that  represent  internal  and  
external influences to vary over time (Berry and Berry, 1990). Thus, the event history analysis 
model addresses the two criticisms of the separate models discussed earlier. Each case captures 
the characteristics of the state in that particular year and does not assume that these 
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characteristics are fixed over time, and the inclusion of variables representing geographic 
diffusion in a model with state characteristics decreases the likelihood of finding a misleading 
significant neighbor or regional diffusion effect (Berry and Berry, 1990; Berry, 1994).  
Coefficient  estimates  of  the  independent  variables  in  this  model  offer  “information  on  the  
predicted  impacts  of  these  variables  on  the  propensity  of  states  in  the  risk  set  to  adopt  the  policy”  
(Berry and Berry, 1997, 2003, p. 243). These estimates can be used to understand the effect of 
specific variables (e.g. state financial resources, mean educational   attainment   for   the   state’s  
residents,   state   ideology)  on   the  state’s   likelihood   to  adopt   the  focal  policy,  controlling  for   the  
other  variables  in  the  model,  and  can  also  offer  researchers  “predications  of  the  probability  that  a  
state with any specified combination of values on the independent variables will adopt the policy 
in   a  given   year”   (Berry   and  Berry,  1997,  2003,   p.   244).  This  predictive   information   about   the  
probabilities of internal and external effects on the likelihood of policy adoption can be more 
useful than information about the correlations of isolated characteristics with past adoption 
events, as was the case with earlier investigative methods.  
In addition to their methodological contribution, Berry and Berry (1990, 1997, 2007) 
encapsulated prior diffusion and innovation research (e.g. Mohr, 1969; Rogers, 1962, 2003) in 
the general form of their model: 
ADOPTi,t=⨍  (MOTIVATIONi,t, RESOURCES/OBSTACLESi,t, OTHER 
POLICIESi,t, EXTERNALi,t )  
 
MOTIVATIONi,t encompasses independent variables for the motivation that state 
policymakers have for adopting a new policy or remaining with the status quo. Motivation 
factors could include the severity of the policy-related problem in the state, demographic or 
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social characteristics of the state that would encourage or discourage the passage of a policy, and 
ideological factors or public opinion. RESOURCES/OBSTACLESi,t captures the conditions in the 
state  related  to  capacity  or  lack  of  capacity  to  adopt  a  new  policy,  such  as  the  state’s  budgetary  
status, legislative resources and opportunity to learn of policy solutions (commonly referred to as 
legislative  professionalism),   and   religiosity  or   educational   attainment  of   the   state’s  population.  
Adopting the work of Mahajan and Peterson (1985) modeling innovation diffusion, Berry and 
Berry (1990) include the OTHER POLICIESi,t set of variables to account for the effect of prior 
policy enactments which could supersede or enable future policy adoptions in an issue area. 
Finally, EXTERNALi,t represents external diffusion pressures as a result of geographic proximity 
or national interaction with previously adopting states. This broad framework has been refined 
by subsequent researchers to capture the effects of significant policy-relevant events, of the 
distribution of populations in a state, of interest group strength, of policy entrepreneurs, and of 
policymakers’  ties  to  professional  networks  on  the  likelihood  of  states’  policy  adoption.   
 E[tensions of %erry and %erry’s () event history analysis model 
Many of the specifications and alternative models have been proposed by researchers following 
Berry and Berry (1990) in order to understand the role of specific policy characteristics or to 
model more complex policies and diffusion processes. This work has underscored the 
importance of considering all of the methodological strategies available to investigate diffusion, 
e.g. logistic regression, event count models (Boehmke and Witmer, 2004), directed dyad event 
history models (Volden, 2006; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008), Cox repeated event models (Jones 
and Branton, 2005), multilevel models (Gilardi and Füglister, 2008, Gilardi, 2010) and the 
possibilities for constructing independent variables to capture motivation, resources and 
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obstacles, and external pressures across multiple contexts and policy areas. This section will 
review some of those specifications, modifications, and alternative models, focusing on those 
most relevant to the study of state education policy changes during the Race to the Top (RTTT) 
application period. 
 Alternative forms of the E+A model 
The general event history analysis model with modifications allows for more complex 
specifications of the dependent variable than Berry and Berry (1990) specified, which Jones and 
Branton (2005), citing Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), describe as binary time-series cross-
sections (BTSCS), reflecting the construction of the dependent variable as binary (adopt or not 
adopt) for the years of the diffusion period. Many researchers, as Jones and Branton (2005) note, 
have, due to the binary form of the dependent variable and the interpretation of it as the 
probability that a state will adopt a policy during a given time period, used logit or probit 
models. These specifications, however, assume a distributional shape of the hazard rate and, 
specifically, that over time the probability of a state adopting a policy remains the same. Jones 
and Branton (2005) analyze and compare models that include time and time transformation 
variables in the model in order to demonstrate the importance of the time specification, an 
approach that Gilardi and Füglister (2008) and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) also suggest. 
They propose the use of the Cox duration model, asserting that it does not have an assumption 
about the distributional form of the baseline hazard rate, and that it can be employed for research 
questions that involve the adoption of multiple components as well as for research into policy 
areas where there may be repeated adoption events within a single state (Jones and Branton, 
2005). Other researchers have suggested adding independent variables to count the number of 
previous adoptions if the assumption that the odds of an event occurring increase proportionally 
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with each additional occurrence holds (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998, cited in Gilardi and 
Füglister, 2008; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).  
These adjustments have been introduced to address problems with the Berry and Berry 
model that emerged as researchers sought to investigate more complex diffusion processes. 
Nonetheless,  these  extensions  to  Berry  and  Berry’s  model  have  remained  somewhat  constrained  
by the research questions and policy areas the model was proposed to investigate—a single 
policy adoption event in a policy area dominated by state level processes (e.g. passage of lottery 
or state tax). The questions proposed in this dissertation necessitate modeling repeated changes 
to policy components, not just a single policy change, and the simultaneous investigation of 
federal and state diffusion  pressures  and   the   impact  of  changes   in  states’  knowledge  of  federal  
preferences on their policymaking behavior.  The directed dyad form of the dependent variable 
proposed by Volden (2006), discussed below, can address some of these requirements through a 
dependent   variable   that  measures   states’   changes to policy components within broader policy 
areas.  
 Directed dyad form of the dependent variable in diffusion studies 
In addition to modifications to allow for modeling multiple or repeated events, the general event 
history analysis model Berry and Berry proposed has been adapted to allow for the inclusion of 
information about the direction of policy adoptions in cases where the research question suggests 
the need to understand which policy diffused or  the  state  from  which  another  state  “borrowed”  a  
policy. Volden (2006) used directed dyad event history analysis to investigate whether states are 
more  likely  to  emulate  the  “successful”  Children’s  Health  Insurance  Program  policies  found  in  
other states, employing a directed dyad approach drawn from international relations literature. 
The directed dyad dependent variable in diffusion studies, as explained by Volden (2006) and 
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Gilardi and Füglister (2008), allows for the researcher to look at a pair of governments during the 
time period of interest, rather than a single government, and to determine whether the first state 
had  “emulated”  the  second  state, capturing the movement toward or away from a particular type 
of policy or  a  particular  state’s  policy.  For policy passed during the first two rounds of RTTT, 
the directed state dyad dependent variable enables measurement of multiple state education 
policy changes on a number of policy indicators. For example, the directionality of the dependent 
variable enables the exploration of whether states were more likely to adopt policies similar to 
the   first   round   winners’   policies   through the inclusion of an independent variable indicating 
whether the first round winners, Tennessee and Delaware, were the second state in the dyad.   
As Gilardi  and  Füglister  (2008)  explain,  “the  goal   is   then  to  detect  systemic  patterns  in  
increased similarities and to estimate the influence of various factors on the decisions of states to 
introduce policy changes that move them closer  to  other  states”  (p.  419).  The  directed structure 
of the dependent variable can take on more complex forms, rather than indicating the single 
adoption event of one policy, as Volden (2006) demonstrated, with the dependent variable 
reflecting multiple policy components and distances between states with respect to those 
components9 and, if data is available, relatively short time units. For the research questions this 
study proposes, the ability to measure changes to policy components and to understand whether 
states were moving their policies towards states with which they shared characteristics or to align 
with perceived federal preferences is more critical than knowing simply whether a state passed a 
particular policy. For example, knowing that a state passed a teacher evaluation policy is less 
interesting than knowing whether the evaluation policy passed had requirements similar to those 
                                                 
9 For  a  more  detailed  description  of  Volden’s  (2006)  coding  rules  and  analysis,  see  Volden (2006) p. 300 
and Gilardi and Füglister (2008) p. 421. 
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in policies enacted previously in states with right to work laws and, thus, politically weaker 
teachers’  unions.  
The final part of this section exploring methods used to investigate policy diffusion 
processes will detail independent variables identified by prior diffusion research to capture state 
characteristics and external influences on state policymaking. This prior research informed the 
selection and construction of the independent variables included in the final models for this 
investigation. 
 Independent variables 
Berry  and  Berry’s  (1990)  initial  model  included  independent  variables  integrating  Mohr’s  (1969)  
and  Roger’s   (1962,   2003)   theories   of   innovation   diffusion;;  motivation   to   adopt,   resources   and  
obstacles to adoption, other policies that could impact the adoption event, and external diffusion 
effects were included through variables measuring, for example, state economic health, state 
population,  state  ideology  (using  Berry  et  al.’s  [1998,  2010]  measure  of  state  ideology),  and  the  
proportion of neighboring states that had adopted the policy. Many of these variables that 
researchers consistently include in diffusion analyses incorporate the same state characteristics 
indicators that Walker (1996) investigated.  
The inclusion of additional independent variables has extended the model to capture more 
complex or policy area specific diffusion processes. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) included 
measurements of the presence of a policy entrepreneur and of the extent to which state policy 
entrepreneurs engaged with internal and external policy networks in order to investigate the role 
of policy entrepreneurs and policy networks in the introduction and adoption of charter school 
legislation.  Similarly,  Balla  (2001)  included  variables  to  account  for  interest  groups’  strength  and  
for the  extent  state  officials’  participation  in  a  policy  relevant  national  professional  organization  
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in order to understand the influence these national organizations on passage of HMO regulatory 
legislation. Other researchers investigating policy diffusion across states have added state 
education governance and leadership (Moehker, 2010); amount of spending on education (Wong 
and Langevin, 2007); Congressional attention variables represented by a count of hearing days in 
a policy area (McCann, Shipan, and Volden, 2010); dummy variables indicating passage of 
legislation (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel, 2004); and national media attention as a count 
variable representing the number of national news stories focusing on a policy area (Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson, 2004).  
Diffusion researchers have also added independent variables to test hypotheses about 
specific diffusion trajectories. For example, Mooney (2001) attempts to clarify regional diffusion 
effects by adding dummy or count variables representing time in addition to variables to capture 
the number of neighbors of the focal state that had adopted the policy and a quadratic term, 
allowing for curvilinear effects. He finds that the inclusion of the quadratic term captures the 
effect of neighbor adoptions as it changes over time, exerting a positive influence early in the 
diffusion period that decreases over time as more states adopt the policy. Similarly, researchers 
have constructed independent variables in attempts to capture learning processes and the 
increasing weight that some state characteristics may have over time (Berry and Berry, 1997, 
2007;;   Gilardi   and   Füglister,   2008).   Regardless,   Berry   and   Berry’s   (1990)   conceptual   and  
theoretical model, if not their particular specification of EHA, has persisted in part due to its 
flexibility in accommodating an array of research questions and foci across policy areas. And 
while this research uses a hierarchical piecewise growth model rather than an event history 
analysis, it is grounded in the theory of state policy diffusion Berry and Berry (1997, 2007) 
illuminated. 
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 PROPOSED A1A/<SIS I19ESTI*ATI1* RTTT STATE-/E9E/ 
PO/IC<MAKI1* 
 
 Piecewise linear growth model for RTTT analysis 
As previously stated, the proposed analysis will employ a piecewise linear growth model using a 
directed state dyad dependent variable measuring state policy distance. This method was chosen 
because it allows for the investigation of the diffusion of multiple policies, can address nuanced 
questions about the spread of policy components, and can model changes in state policymaking 
trajectories before and after the release of final federal program guidance and the announcement 
of Round 1 winners. In order to address my research questions, I attempt to detect systemic 
patterns in the likelihood of states to adopt policies similar to those of other states or to change 
their policy making behavior in response to federal actions in three policy areas: teacher policy 
(e.g. evaluation, retention, compensation and licensing policies); college and career readiness 
policy (e.g. the alignment between high school assessments and post-secondary requirements, 
reporting between secondary and post-secondary institutions); and persistently lowest achieving 
schools policy (e.g. school turnaround models, state powers to take over poorly performing 
schools).  
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The piecewise linear growth model was chosen over the event history analysis model for 
two primary substantive reasons. First, the multilevel model can address the dependencies 
inherent in the dyadic form of the dependent variable. Specifically, states appear in dyads at the 
same   time  point   representing   both   policy   “sending”   states,   also   referred   to   as   the  B   state   in   a  
dyad,  and  policy  adopting  or  “receiving”  states,  or  the  A  state  in  a  dyad. Further, the same dyads 
are observed at multiple points during the 18-month period. By nesting time points (level 1) in 
dyads (level 2) I seek to address these dependencies. 
Secondly,   the  research  questions  necessitate  comparing  changes  in  states’  policymaking 
trajectories before and after the release of federal program guidance, in November 2009. In the 
first time period in this analysis, prior to the release of final guidance, considerable discussion in 
the education press focused on the importance of charter school legislation. When the final 
guidance and scoring rubric were released, states learned that they would be judged on both their 
charter   school   law  and   the   their   state’s   “innovative”  district schools and that states could earn 
partial points even if they retained caps on charter schools or did not equalize funding for charter 
schools. The emphasis on teacher and school leader policy increased in the final program 
guidance, however. The change in information available to states about federal policy emphasis 
and preferences, and the potential for that change to impact the pace and focus of state 
policymaking, suggests the use of the piecewise linear growth model to understand changes in 
state policymaking overall and differences in the impacts of independent variables in each time 
period. 
In a directed dyad event history analysis, the dependent variable is usually dichotomous 
and is constructed to capture increased similarity in state policies, not a singular observable 
adoption event or, more specifically, the  likelihood  of  state  A’s  policy in time t moving toward 
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state  B’s policy in time t-1. I have adapted this to capture more subtle changes in state policies 
than can be expressed through a dichotomous variable, using a continuous policy distance 
measure. (The procedure I used to construct dependent variables for each of the three policy 
areas is discussed in detail below.)  Though this allows for the detection of smaller policy 
movements, reflecting the multiple changes states made to policies during the 18 month span of 
the first two rounds of the RTTT competition, the dependent variable is still understood to be a  
function of independent variables capturing state characteristics, geographic proximity, and 
internal and external influences, in line with prior diffusion studies.  
I will now return to the research questions put forth in Chapter 1 and, given the above, 
discuss the data for this analysis, describe the procedure for the construction of the dependent 
variable, and detail the control and focal variables to be included in the models for each policy 
area and corresponding hypotheses. 
 Research 4uestions 
1. Is there evidence that states adopted policy ideas from other states? (horizontal 
diffusion)  
a. Did states look to states with which they shared demographic, political, or 
economic characteristics?   
b. Did states adopt policies similar to those in states perceived to be favorites 
to win the competition (i.e. states initially selected to receive Gates 
application assistance)?  
c. Did states that did not win Round 1, but who applied to round 2, adopt 
policies similar to those in Tennessee and Delaware in the second time period, 
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after the release of federal guidance and, in part, after their announcement as 
Round 1 winners?  
2. Did state policymaking change in response to significant federal actions (i.e. the 
release of final program guidance in November 2009)? (vertical diffusion) 
3. Were there differences in state diffusion patterns across the three policy areas 
included in this study (teacher and school leader policy, college and career readiness 
policy, lowest-performing schools policy)? 
a. Among policy areas, were there differences in the policymaking 
trajectories and influences of independent variables in each time period?  
 
 State selection 
Across RTTT rounds 1 and 2, 46 states and Washington DC applied for funds; only Alaska, 
North Dakota, Texas and Vermont chose not to apply for funds in either round. (A full list of the 
states, the round(s) in which they applied, their final rank, and grant award status are listed in the 
Appendix). I chose to include all states, with the exception of Hawaii. Excluding Hawaii from a 
diffusion analysis is common because policy diffusion theory suggests that the proportion of a 
state’s   neighbors   who   have   previously   adopted   the   policy   can   influence   a   policy   adoption  
decisions. Though geographic proximity is not expected to have played an important role in 
education policy adoptions in the three policy areas, the precedent for excluding Hawaii suggests 
it not be included. Additionally, the education governance system in Hawaii is unique; the entire 
state is one school district, which suggests that education policy adoption processes may be 
fundamentally different from other   states’   processes.   Additionally,   Washington   DC   was  
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excluded from the analysis. Washington is both a city and has a governance system that is 
distinct not only from states, but also from other cities. The District of Columbia is under the 
jurisdiction  of   the  U.S.  Congress,  which  has   assigned  governance   for   the   schools   to   the  city’s  
mayor. Given the unique contexts and governance structures in Hawaii and Washington, DC, 
they were excluded from the analysis, leaving 45 states as potential adopters or adoptees. 
 
 Policy areas selection  
The four assurance areas for RTTT, established in ARRA, guided the selection of three policy 
areas in which to examine state policy diffusion–college and career readiness, teacher and school 




Table  RTTT assurance/policy areas 
 
Adopting standards and assessments that prepare students to 
succeed in college and the workplace to compete in the global 
economy;  
College and Career Readiness 
Building data systems that measure student growth and 
success, and inform teachers and principals about how they 
can improve instruction;  
State Longitudinal Data 
Systems 
Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective 
teachers and principals, especially where they are needed 
most;  
Teacher and School Leaders 
Turning around our lowest-achieving schools  Lowest-performing schools 
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Of these four areas, I chose to investigate all but the second, state longitudinal data 
systems, because that area had the most restrictive federal criteria, and the data-related issues for 
which the states had the most latitude (e.g. the use of student performance data for decisions 
about professional development or teacher evaluation) could be captured within the other three 
areas. A review of state applications confirms this; states discussed the use of data extensively 
outside of the data section of their applications. Additionally, the selection of these three areas 
offers the opportunity to compare policy areas in which state policy had been subject to varying 
levels of attention from other federal programs or outside groups. RTTT was somewhat unique 
in its focus on state teacher policy related to compensation, tenure, and evaluation, as most 
previous attention had been focused on district teacher policy. States’ college and career 
readiness   policies   had   received   significant   attention   from   groups   such   as   Achieve   and   states’  
persistently lowest achieving schools policies had been the subject of another federal grant 
program (School Improvement Grants) also funded by the American Reinvestment and Recovery 
Act. 
 Time periods for analysis 
Over the course of the first two rounds of RTTT, there were five significant federal actions: the 
passage of ARRA (February 2009); the release of draft federal program guidance (July 2009); 
the release of final federal program guidance (November 2009); the announcement of RTTT 
Round 1 grantees (March 2010); and the announcement of RTTT Round 2 grantees (August 
2010). State policy changes were recorded at each of these five time points and during the model 
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building process I determined that dividing the analysis into two time frames, from March 200910 
to November 2009 and from December 2009 to August 2010, best fit the data in addition to 
serving as the best conceptual match for the research questions. 
 Dependent variable data collection and construction 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the directed state dyad form of the dependent variable is 
most appropriate for the analysis of diffusion patterns of policies or policy areas with multiple 
components and is better suited to address the research questions in this analysis than a non-
dyadic indicator variable. In his analysis of state changes to   Children’s   Health   Insurance  
Program (CHIP) policies, Volden (2006) used the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
website to construct a dataset of state polices on 6 CHIP characteristics states were likely to have 
modified in the years following program initiation. There was no comparable education dataset 
with indicators of state policy change available for the time periods required for this analysis. 
However, the Education Week EdCounts policy indicators available through the Editorial 
Projects in Education website (http://www.edweek.org/rc/2007/06/07/edcounts.html?intc=thed) 
provided a baseline measure of state policies and indicators that could be used to construct a 
dataset   similar   to   Volden’s   using   state   legislation   and   policy   documents   found on states 
education departments, legislatures, and secretaries of states websites. Of the 250 indicators 
available in the EdCounts database, 52 were selected based on their relevance to the three policy 
areas selected for this investigation. (The use of Education   Week’s   indicators in education 
                                                 
10 The month lag is to allow time for state legislatures time to respond to ARRA. 
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research is not without precedent–see, for example, Desimone, Smith, Hayes, and Frisvold, 
2005). These indicators are listed in the Appendix. 
Following a process informed by Volden (2006), Gilardi and Füglister (2008), Boehmke 
(2009) and Gilardi (2010), the dependent variable was constructed in the following steps: 
1. Using  the  Education  Commission  of  the  States’  State  Policy  Database,  states’ 
legislatures’  and  all  state  policies  during  the  time  period  of  interest  were  cataloged and 
full  text  of  legislation  and  administrative  policies  were  downloaded  from  legislatures’  
websites  or  secretaries  of  states’  registers  (1485  documents). 
2. Bills and Policies were coded on indicators used by Education  Week’s  Ed  Counts  
database to characterize state policies. (College and Career Readiness – 13 indicators, 
Teacher policy – 25 indicators, Persistently Lowest Achieving Schools – 13 indicators). 
The  codes  were  both  dichotomous  (e.g.  “State  passed  PD  standards”)  and  continuous 
(e.g.  “Years  state  pays  for  induction/mentoring).    (A  full  list  of  these  indicators  can  be  
found in the Appendix.)  
3. Dates on which bills were signed into law or policies were adopted were used to 
place passage/adoption in one of 4 time periods. 
4. Each  state’s  status  on  each  indicator  was  aggregated  at  each  time  point,  based  on  
the policies adopted or bills enacted since the previous time point. For example, if at 
Time 1 a state did not have professional development (PD) standards, the indicator for 
that state at that time point would be coded 0. If between Time 1 and Time 2 a state 
passed statewide PD standards, the indicator for that state at Time 2 would be coded as 1, 
recording the policy change on that indicator between the two time points. This procedure 
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resulted  in  a  file  with  cases  for  each  state’s  status  on  each  policy  indicator  at  each  time  
point. (45 states with 5 time points for each state, or 225 cases). 
5. In order to calculate the dyadic dependent variable, the Euclidean distance 
between each  state’s  policies  in  each  time  point  to  every  other  state’s  policies  in  the  prior  
time point was calculated using SPSS. As the dependent variable is directed, each state 
could be both a policy adopting, or receiving, state or a state from which a policy or 
policy component could be adopted. (For example, the comparison of State A to State B 
would yield the following over all time points: [Distance Time 0 (baseline): At0  Bt0, 
Bt0  At0], [Distance Time 1: At1  Bt0, B t1  At0], [Distance Time 2: A t2  Bt1, Bt2  
At1], [Distance Time 3: A t3  Bt2, B t3 At2], [Distance Time 4: A t4  Bt3, B t4  A t3.])  
(Distance between 45 states and all other states at each time point, 9900 observations). 
6. Cases representing time points when State A in the dyad had not adopted any new 
policies since the prior time point were dropped from the data set. Dropping these 
observations ensured that states were included as potential adopting states only when they 
were  “at  risk”  of  adopting  from  another  state11. To use North Carolina and New York as 
examples, if, between Time 1 and Time 2, NC changed its policies and NY did not, the 
observation for NC t2NY t1 would remain in the dataset, the observation for NY t2NC 
t1 would not, because at Time 2, having made no policy changes,  NY  was  not  “at  risk”  for  
adopting a policy or policy component from any other state. (College and Career 
                                                 
11 This approach to account for time periods when states had made no policy changes is adopted from Boehmke 
(2009). 
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Readiness Policy – 3,948 observations, Teacher Policy – 5,100 observations, Persistently 
Lowest Achieving Schools – 3,446 observations)12.  
 
As Volden (2006), Gilardi and Füglister (2008) and others have discussed, there are 
multiple ways to proceed in order to calculate the distance between state-dyads for each time 
period in order to code the dependent variable. Volden (2006) compared the results from two 
methods of calculating the distance between state pairs (absolute number of changes toward state 
B of the dyad and, in order to account for dependence among indicators, a factor analysis of the 
indicators followed by a calculation of the Euclidean distance between states) and found little 
difference in the coefficients for independent variables.  
 RESEARC+ +<POT+ESES A1D I1DEPE1DE1T 9ARIA%/ES 
In order to address the research questions posed above and with consideration of the findings of 
past diffusion research, as discussed in Chapter 2, this section will propose research hypotheses 
and discuss the independent variables included in the final model. Where not otherwise 
indicated, it should be assumed that predicted directions of coefficients and hypotheses apply 
across the three policy areas. 
Research Question 1a. Did states look to states with which they shared demographic, 
economic, or political characteristics?   
                                                 
12 Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming made no changes to their policies 
on any of the indicators across any time periods, thus they are included in the analysis as states from which other 
states could potentially adopt, but not as potential adopters. 
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 State demographic characteristics variables and hypothesis 
Prior diffusion research has identified a number of state characteristics that may impact 
the likelihood of states to adopt policies from one another, and I include these variables in the 
model both as controls and, more substantively, to understand whether the effect of these 
characteristics changed over the course of the competition. The first set of these variables tests 
the   demographic   similarity   of   the   states   in   the   dyad   or   the   effect   of   either   State   A’s  
characteristics  or  State  B’s  characteristics.  State population ratio was constructed to measure the 
comparative populations of two states in a dyad by taking the ratio of the population of the larger 
state in the dyad to the population of the smaller state in the dyad. If states were adopting 
policies from similarly sized states, the coefficient for this variable should be negative. 
Difference in diploma rate captures the difference between the two states in the rate of high 
school completion for adults over the age of 25. If states were adopting policies from states with 
different rates of high school completion, we would expect this coefficient to be positive.  
H1a: State demographic characteristics hypothesis: If state policymaking proceeded 
during RTTT in predictable ways, states will be more likely to adopt policies similar to 
those in states with similar populations and to adopt policies from states with higher high 
school diploma rates. The effect of following states with higher diploma rates should be 
most pronounced in College and Career Readiness policy where high diploma rates 
would serve as a marker of successful policy. 
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 State economic characteristics variables and hypothesis 
In  order  to  capture  the  effect  of  the  relative  wealth  of  the  two  states’  populations  and  the  general  
economic health of the state in 2009 and 2010, I include Difference  in  states’  per  capita  income  
and Change in general revenue from prior year in State A. If states were adopting from states 
whose populations had similar incomes, we would expect the coefficient for difference in income 
to be negative. I expect a positive coefficient for the variable measuring the increase or relative 
stability   of   the   adopting   state’s   general   revenue;;   states   with   more   stable   revenues   or   greater  
increases in revenues, particularly given the state of the national economy at the start of 2009, 
may have been less likely to move in the direction of other less economically healthy states. 
Further, these states may have been less likely to change their laws quickly in pursuit of the 
relatively small RTTT grants. 
 
H1b: State economic characteristics hypotheses:  States will be more likely to adopt 
policies from states with which they share economic characteristics across both time 
periods. 
 State political characteristics and ideology variables and hypotheses   
Particularly given the politically sensitive nature of teacher evaluation policies, ideological and 
political   variables   may   have   influenced   states’   policy   decisions   over   the   course   of   the  
competition and may have done so in unexpected ways. While RTTT was created and 
administered by a Democratic Obama administration, and was funded by with the contentious 
ARRA, the teacher policies associated with RTTT had found favor across traditional ideological 
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lines. In order to capture these phenomena, I include Difference in state ideology and Unified 
Republican government, Unified Democratic government. Difference in state ideology is the 
absolute   difference   in   states’   ideology   scores   using   Berry   et   al’s   (2010)   measure   of   state  
ideology, which assigns each state a score on a 0 (more conservative) to 100 (more liberal) scale 
based  on  a  number  of  factors  including  the  voting  record  of  the  state’s  Congressional  delegation  
and the election margins of Congressional and statewide candidates. Prior diffusion research 
finds that the more distance  between  states’  ideology,  the  less  likely  they  will  be  to  adopt  similar  
policies. This suggests that the coefficient for this variable should be positive–as the distance 
between   states’   ideologies   increases,   the   distance   between   their   policies   should also increase; 
however, this prediction may not hold in the context of teacher policies, generally, and RTTT, 
specifically. The Unified Republican government and Unified Democratic government dummy 
variables   capture   whether   or   not   the   governors’   offices and both houses of state legislatures 
across both states were held by Republicans or Democrats, respectively. Based on prior research 
we  would  expect   that   if  governors’  offices  and   legislatures  across  both  states   in   the  dyad  were  
held by the same party, policies would be more likely to diffuse between them, and we would 
expect that the coefficients of these variables would be negative. Particularly in state dyads held 
by Democrats, there is reason to expect that this prior relationship may not hold; Democratic 
governors and legislatures were, in some respects, pulled in two directions by RTTT. While the 
program was associated with a Democratic president and some prominent Democrats were 
proponents of dramatic reforms to teacher evaluation and tenure policies, these reforms were 
largely opposed   by   teachers’   unions,   which   are traditional Democratic allies and political 
supporters. These politically complicated relationships were not limited to Democratic 
officeholders, though. In Florida, for example, Governor Charlie Crist, facing defeat by a strong 
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challenger from his ideological right in the Republican primary for U.S. Senate, chose to veto 
teacher evaluation legislation–a  move  which  won   him   support   from   the   state’s   teachers   union  
and their allies for his run as an independent in the Senate generally election. 
Finally, I include indicator variables for the process through which the potential adopter 
state (State A in the dyad) selects the Chief State School Officer (CSSO). States select their 
CSSO through statewide elections (14 states), appointment by the governor (10 states), or 
appointment by the State Board of Education (24 states). (See Appendix E for a full list of states 
and selection processes.) I expect that states with elected CSSOs will be less likely to make 
policy changes towards other states in the politically contentious policy areas, i.e. teacher and 
persistently lowest achieving schools policy, particularly during the second timeframe, yielding a 
negative coefficient in Time 2. 
H1c: Same party hypothesis: States will be more likely to adopt policies from 
governments with which they share a political party in the first time period. In the second 
time frame, Democratic governments will be less likely to emulate other democratic 
governments, particularly in the teacher policy area. 
H1d: Government ideology hypothesis: There is evidence (e.g. Dillon, 2010) that usual 
ideological lines were crossed in the pursuit of new teacher evaluation and low 
performing schools policies, and states will be more likely to emulate policies similar to 
those in ideologically similar states in time 1 but less likely to emulate states with similar 
ideologies in Time 2 in those two policy areas. I do not expect ideology to have a 
significant effect on college and career readiness policy. 
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H1e: Chief State School Officer hypothesis: Elected CSSOs will be less likely to move 
towards the policies in states with appointed CSSOs, particularly in Time 2 in the teacher 
and persistently lowest achieving schools policy areas. 
 Education and interest group strength variables 
The  complicated  political  relationships  and  influence  of  teachers’  unions  on  political  processes  
necessitates   the   inclusion   of   variables   to   measure   unions’   relative   strength, Teachers’   Union  
political contributions (State A) and Right to work state (State B). Teachers’   Union   political  
contributions in   the   adopting   state   is   calculated   for   each   year   by   dividing   the   year’s   political  
contributions from teachers and teachers unions within each state, as tallied by the Center for 
Responsive Politics, by the total number of K-12 students in the state in order to standardize the 
measure across states. We would expect that as teachers unions contributions increase, the state 
would move further away from the general trend towards more prescriptive policies for teacher 
evaluation, placement and retention decisions if RTTT-related policymaking followed previously 
identified diffusion patterns. The second variable, Right to work state, indicates the status of the 
dyad’s  policy  sending  state’s  right-to-work  laws;;  states  without  strong  teachers’  unions  may  have  
passed more prescriptive laws earlier than states with stronger union protections and, thus, may 
have been more likely to be emulated by other states, yielding a negative coefficient. 
Further, I include a proxy for the relationship between state and local education policy 
authorities, Percent of local school funds from the state (State A). States where more education 
funding originates in state government may have been more likely to adopt policies similar to 
those in other states following the general trend towards convergence around a common set of 
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policies governing teachers, yielding a negative coefficient. States with greater influence over 
districts may have been better politically positioned to pass these policies. 
H1f: Teachers’  union strength hypothesis:  I  expect  the  effect  of  teachers’  union  strength,  
as measured by union contributions to political campaigns and lobbying efforts, to be 
strongest in the teacher policy area; states with teachers unions making greater 
contributions will be less likely to emulate the policies of other states.  
H1g: Right to work hypothesis: States with right to work laws will be more likely to be 
emulated by other states, particularly in teacher policy in the second time period. 
H1h: Local control proxy hypothesis: States where a greater percent of local education 
spending is funded by the state will be more likely to adopt policies similar to those in 
other states in teacher policy and lowest achieving schools policy. I do not expect an 
effect in college and career readiness policy. 
 
Research Question 1b: Did states adopt policies similar to those in states perceived to be 
favorites to win the competition?  
  ³/eader´ states variables and hypotheses 
In July 2009, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation offered 15 states grants and technical 
assistance in order to support their applications for RTTT grants (Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, 2009). The states selected for these grants were perceived to be leaders in the 
competition; not only would they have access to money and assistance to support their 
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applications, but the Gates Foundation, in their announcement, stated that their selections were 
based  on  the  Foundation’s  investigation  of  the  states’  capacity  to  pilot  and  scale  reform,  thereby  
giving the 15 states a stamp of approval. Under pressure, Gates extended technical assistance to 
all states, but the perception that they had anointed the front-runners remained. This variable is 
intended to test whether other states were more likely to adopt policies in the select 15 (McNeil, 
2009). 
Gates Foundation selected states – This will be tested through an indicator variable, 
coded  1   if   the   potentially   emulated   state   in   the   dyad,   state  B,  was   included   in  Gates’   original  
grant and assistance recipient cohort, and 0 if state B in the dyad was not part of that original 
cohort. This coefficient is expected to be negative, particularly in the second time period as states 
were facing increasing pressure to win awards. 
H1i: Frontrunner state hypothesis: States were more likely to adopt policies from states 
included  in  the  Gates  Foundation’s  initial  selection  to  receive  funding  and  technical  
assistance to prepare a RTTT application. 
Research Question 1c: Did states that did not win Round 1, but who applied to round 2, 
adopt policies similar to those in Tennessee and Delaware after the announcement of 
their Round 1 awards?  
 
RTTT Round 1 awards to Delaware and Tennessee were announced on March 4, 2010, in 
the second timeframe, leaving other states ample time to adopt policies from these two states in 
time for the deadline for Round 2 applications and the announcement of Round 2 winners, June 
1, 2010 and August 24, 2010 respectively.  
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Round 1 winner emulation  – This dichotomous variable will indicate if the emulated 
state in the dyad was one of the Round 1 winners. This coefficient is expected to be negative in 
Time 2, particularly in the teacher policy area. However, because Tennessee and Delaware were 
both involved in national college and career readiness campaigns prior to the RTTT competition 
and moved quickly in response to SIG funding for persistently lowest achieving schools, it 
would not be unexpected to see a significant negative effect for this variable before the 
announcement of their grants in these two policy areas. 
H1j: Round 1 winner emulation hypothesis: Adopting states were more likely to adopt 
policies from Tennessee and Delaware after the announcement of Round 1 awards across 
all three policy areas, but particularly in the teacher policy area. 
 Influence of federal actions variables and hypothesis 
Research Question 2: Did state policymaking change in response to significant federal 
actions (e.g. the release of final program guidance, the announcement of round 1 
winners)? 
Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel (2004) and earlier work by Welsh and Thompson (1980) found 
that federal grants to states typically push states towards adopting policies in line with federal 
preferences. It may be that state policy making was solely a response to federal funding. 
However,  the  Department  of  Education’s  RTTT final notice inviting states to apply for funding 
indicated that states would be judged more favorably for legislation that had been signed into law 
than for promises of adoption contingent on receipt of the grant, but made clear that there was, 
nonetheless, no explicit requirement that states pass new legislation (Race to The Top Fund; 
Final Rule, 2010). Further, but for some overlap between the four assurance areas and the 
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published requirements for School Improvement Grants, a non-competitive grant program for 
states also funded by the ARRA, the USDOE resisted giving direction on specific legislative or 
policy actions that states were expected to take13. Additionally, the size of the RTTT grants ($20-
75 million each for sixteen small states up to $350-$700 million each for the four largest states – 
spread over four years) was not large by state and local education spending standards. For 
example, while the state of New York ultimately received $700 million (Medina, 2010), the 
2009-2010 budget for the New York City Schools alone was $18.5 billion (NYC Schools, 2009). 
Similarly, while Tennessee received $502 million in RTTT funds, the 2009-2010 general fund 
budget for Memphis City Schools was approximately $875 million (Memphis City Schools, 
2009). 
This suggests that Allen, Pettus, and Heider-Markel’s  (2004)  findings  are  not  necessarily  
applicable to RTTT, as state policy makers may not have viewed RTTT in the same way that 
they would have a pure incentive program. Evidence of this perception can be found in Texas, 
the most prominent state to decline to submit a RTTT application where the state was unwilling 
to make legislative changes for competitive RTTT funding (Dillon, 2010), but did make the 
limited policy changes necessary to receive non-competitive School Improvement Grant funds 
(Texas Education Agency, 2010). States may have been signaled to make policy changes by the 
USDOE and RTTT but were not compelled nor explicitly told to do so in order to receive the 
grants.  
While Allen, Pettus, and Heider (2004) and others focused their attention on diffusion 
from the federal government to states, McCann, Shipan, and Volden (2010) investigated both 
vertical (federal to state) and horizontal (state to state) diffusion in response to federal policy 
                                                 
13 States were expected to specify a method of identifying their lowest performing schools and to compel those 
schools to adopt one of four school turnaround models (see School Improvement Grants; Final Notice, 2010). 
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activity. Their federal policy activities (salience and information measured by congressional 
hearings and proposed legislation) did not involve grants to states, but their findings may, 
nonetheless, be applicable if not perfectly transferrable. RTTT did not act solely as a grant 
program,  but  also  as  a  signal  of  the  USDOE’s  policy  preferences  for   the  reauthorization  of  the  
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Klein, 2010). McCann, Shipan and Volden 
(2010) found that federal activity conditionally impacted state policy making activity. States with 
more professional legislatures or those that had strong economic interests in the area of the 
legislation were more likely to enact legislation. Additionally, they found that federal-level 
attention to an issue did not impact horizontal diffusion.  
The use of the piecewise linear growth model and the inclusion of the indicator for 
Round 1 winners are intended to investigate whether federal preferences influenced state 
policymaking trajectories by analyzing the period before the release of final federal guidelines 
and the period after the release of federal guidelines, i.e. before and after the states had clear 
signals of federal preferences. If states were attuned to federal actions and federal preferences, 
we would expect the slope intercepts for Time 1 and Time 2 to change and that the impact of the 
independent variables in the model will change between the two time periods. Further, we would 
expect the impact of the Round 1 winner variable to be significant in the second timeframe. 
These effects should be particularly clear in the teacher policy area, as this was the policy area 
most clearly linked to the RTTT initiative. College and career readiness policies have been 
generally changing across states since the mid-2000s due to the work of national organizations 
such as Achieve and the National Governor’s  Association.  Persistently lowest achieving schools 
policies may have started changing early in the 18-month period as a result of the School 
Improvement Grants program.  
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Hypothesis 2a: Federal influence hypothesis: Federal actions are expected to impact state 
policymaking behavior. The effects of focal and control variables are expected to change 
between the two time periods, particularly in the teacher policy area.  
Research Question 3: Were there differences in state policymaking or policy emulation 
behavior across the three policy areas included in this study (teacher and school leader 
policy, college and career readiness policy, lowest-performing schools policy)? 
 Differences in effects on diffusion processes across policy areas variables and 
hypotheses 
In analyzing the three policy areas separately I would like to better understand whether there 
were differences, given political and economic constraints, in where states looked for policy 
ideas across college and career readiness, teacher, and persistently lowest achieving schools 
policies. Though the three policy areas all have potential political and economic costs, the 
teacher policy area may have been the most politically fraught. College and career readiness may 
have some costs associated with it, as schools and higher education institutions had a stake in the 
states’  approach  to  assessing  and  ensuring  post-secondary readiness, but would, presumably, not 
engender the same potential opposition from teachers’  unions that teacher and policy changes 
may have invited. Similarly, while persistently lowest achieving schools policies changes may 
have increased financial costs, the groups most impacted by these policies do not typically have 
political organizations on par with those of teachers’  unions.  
H3a: Differences across policy areas – The effect of the independent variables, 
particularly  those  capturing  teachers’  union  strength,  the  impact  of  federal  preferences,  
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and political and ideological impacts, will be different across the three policy areas. 
There will, generally, be more movement in the teacher policy area, as this garnered the 
most attention from the education and mainstream press.  
 Additional state level variables and hypotheses 
In addition to the above, I include two control variables found to influence state policy diffusion, 
Legislative professionalism (State A) and Geographic proximity. Geographic proximity takes a 
value of 1 if the states in the dyad share a contiguous border. Prior diffusion research has 
identified   states’   geographic   proximity   as   a   potential   influence   on   states’   policy   adoption  
processes, though this finding has not been consistent across policy areas, particularly when 
federal   policymakers’   attention   is   focused   on   an   issue   (Berry   and   Berry,   1990;;   Grossback,  
Nicholson, Crotty  and  Peterson,  2004).  I  do  not  expect  states’  geographic  proximity  to  influence  
RTTT-related policy adoptions; the strongest effects for geographic proximity have been found 
in policy areas in which states are in direct competition with neighbors for revenues or are 
motivated to encourage or discourage population movement across state borders, as is the case 
for gambling and tax policy, but such effects have not been observed for education policy. 
Legislative professionalism (State A) is the adopting state’s  score  on  Squire’s  (2007)  measure  of  
legislative professionalism, which captures the resources available to state legislatures to 
research  and  generate  new  policy,  e.g.  the  length  of  legislative  sessions,  legislators’  pay  and  job  
status outside of legislative duties, and the  size  and  budgets  of  legislators’  offices.  Prior research 
has found significant effects for legislative professionalism (McCann, Shipan, and Volden, 2010; 
Volden, 2006), and I anticipate Legislative Professionalism to have varying effects across the 
span of the competition; states with more professional legislatures may have been better 
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positioned to pass legislation more quickly earlier in the competition, and smaller, less 
professional legislatures may have been better able to reach consensus around more politically 
contentious policy issues later in the competition. 
Legislative professionalism hypothesis: States more professional legislatures will have 
been less likely to emulate the policies of other states, particularly during the second 
timeframe. 
Geographic neighbor hypothesis: Geographic proximity is not expected to have an effect 
on the likelihood of policy adoption between states. 
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Table  Independent variables descriptions/coding and sources 
 
Variable Description / Coding Source 
State Demographic Characteristics: 
   
State population ratio (A & B) Population ratio of the two states in 
the dyad. Calculated by dividing the 
population of the larger state by the 






Difference in HS diploma rate (A 
& B) 
The difference in the percent of the 
state’s  population  over  the  age  of  25  






State Economic Characteristics: 
   
Difference in per capita income 
(A & B) 
The difference in the per capita 
incomes of the two states in the 





Percent change in state general 
revenues from prior year (A) 
Percent increase or decrease in state 
revenues from prior year for State A 
of the dyad. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
state websites 
State Political Characteristics: 
   
Unified Republican government 
(A & B) 
Dummy = 1 if, for both states in the 
dyad, the governor and both houses 




Unified Democratic government 
(A & B) 
Dummy = 1 if, for both states in the 
dyad, the governor and both houses 




Difference in state ideology (A 
& B) 
For the two states in the dyad, the 
difference in scores on Berry, 
Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and 
Klarner’s  (2010)  updated  measure  of  
state ideology. 
 
Berry, Fording,  
Ringquist, Hanson, 
and Klarner, (2010) 
  83 
Chief State School Officer 
elected (A) 
Dummy = 1 if the Chief State 






   
Gates Foundation frontrunner 
(B) 
Dummy = 1 if state B in the dyad 
received initial funding and 
assistance from the Gates 
Foundation for their application. 
 
Gates Foundation 
Round 1 winner (B) Dummy = 1 if state B in the dyad 
won round 1 RTTT funding 
U.S. Department of 
Education 
 
Union influence and local control of education expenditures: 
   
Teachers’  union  contributions, 
per pupil (A)  
Education interest group spending in 
state A of the dyad. Calculated by 
dividing  each  state’s  total  interest  





Right to work law (B) Dummy = 1 if state B in the dyad 
does not have a right to work law. 
 
State websites 
Percent of local education 
spending financed by state (A) 
Percent  of  state’s  total  per  pupil  
expenditure financed by the state 
government for state A in the dyad. 
National Center for 
Education Statistics 
   
Additional State Level Influences: 
   
Legislative professionalism (A) Legislative professionalism for state 
A in the dyad. 
 
Squire (2007) 
Geographic Neighbor (A & B) Dummy = 1 if the two states in the 
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 PIECE:ISE /I1EAR MODE/ OF STATE PO/IC< C+A1*E  
 Model building process and final model 
The final model of state policy change in the three policy areas was built using HLM6 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon, 2004). Working with the data for Teacher Policy, I 
attempted to find the best fitting model for time at level 1. The unconditional linear growth 
model yielded a deviance statistic of 7216.245 with 4 estimated parameters. The deviance 
statistic for the quadratic growth model was 6769.575 with 7 estimated parameters. A chi-
squared test for goodness of fit suggested that the quadratic growth model was a better fit for the 
teacher data, 𝜒2=846.43, p≤0.001,  df=3. Further, the intercept of the slope of the quadratic term 
was significant, β02=-0.102, se=0.004, p≤0.001.   
However, the negative sign of the coefficient for the intercept of the quadratic slope and 
consideration of the possible impact of the release of final federal guidance on state 
policymaking behavior led me to test for the fit of a piecewise growth model14, breaking the time 
trajectory  into  two  pieces.  The  first  “piece”  of  time  models  the  trajectory  of  state  policy change, 
either toward or away from other states, through the month of the release of final federal 
guidance, November 2009; the second  “piece”  models  the  trajectory  of  state policy change from 
December 2009 through the announcement of Round 2 grant recipients. (See Table 3, below).  
Tests for the model fit yielded a deviance statistic of 6727.774 with 7 estimated parameters. The 
chi-squared test for model fit between the quadratic growth model and a piecewise growth model 
                                                 
14 Additionally, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) suggest the examination of a piecewise growth model when there is a 
conceptual reason for wanting to compare the differences in growth trajectories during two time frames, which was 
the case for these data. 
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found that the piecewise growth model was a significantly better fit for the data, 𝜒2=41.226, 
p≤0.001,  df=015. Finding that the data best fit this form of the piecewise linear growth model is 
important unto itself; this offers evidence that state policymaking behavior was distinct before 




Table  MaMor Round  and  RTTT time points 
 
February 2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act passed 
(announced RTTT and established four assurance 
areas) 
July 2009 Draft RTTT guidelines released by the USDOE 
November 2009 Final RTTT guidelines published by the USDOE 
March 2010 Round 1 Awards Announced (Delaware and 
Tennessee) 




After determining the best way to model time at level-1, I began the model building 
process for level-2, adding covariates in sets, starting with the unconditional model and adding, 
in sequence, variables for demographic characteristics (Difference in per capita income, 
Difference in HS diploma rate), economic characteristics (Difference in per capita income, 
Percent of local school funds from state (A), Change in general revenue from prior year (A)), 
political characteristics (Difference in state ideology, Unified Republican government (A & B), 
Unified Democratic government (A & B)), diffusion theory-related motivation and capacity 
                                                 
15 This form of the piecewise model fit significantly better than other attempts to model time, i.e. dividing up the 
time  points  into  smaller  pieces  or  including  time  indicators  to  configure  the  time  points  into  different  time  “chunks.”  
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(Legislative professionalism (A), Geographic neighbors), Front Runner status (Gates 
“frontrunner”   state   (B),   Round   1   winner (B)),   Teachers’   union   strength   (Right to work (B), 
Teachers’   union contributions, per student (A)), and selection of CSSO (CSSO elected (A)). 
Finally, I opted to remove Geographic neighbor as a level-2 predictor across the intercept, Time 
1 and Time 2 slopes and to delete Difference in per capita income as a predictor of Time 1 and 
Time 2 slopes for parsimony and best model fit. Additionally, I tested for different 
configurations of time at Level-1, including quadratic terms; the model using Time 1 (March 
2009-November 2009) and Time 2 (December 2009-August 2010) best fit the data. 
I then repeated this model building procedure for the college and career readiness policy 
and persistently lowest achieving schools policy data, progressively adding sets of variables until 
all were in the model and then removing variables to achieve the best model fit. Though each 
policy area model best fit the data with a slightly different configuration of covariates, I made the 
decision to use the model for teacher policy for the college and career readiness and persistently 
lowest achieving schools policy areas. Though this sacrifices best fitting a model for each set of 
data, my overriding interest was in preserving comparability across the three policy areas and in 
testing the full set of covariates. In this analysis, as detailed below in the checks of model 
assumptions and the findings, the substantive interest was in changes states made to their teacher 
policies, both because RTTT was somewhat unique in its focus on state-level teacher policy and 
states appeared to concentrate their focus on teacher policy. 
 Final model and interpreting the coefficients 
The model building procedure detailed above yielded the following final model, which was used 
to understand policy change in the three policy areas (teacher policy, persistently lowest 
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achieving schools policy, and college and career readiness policy. The model below highlights 
the focal dependent variables for this analysis. (See Appendix H for the full model.) 
Level 1: 
State Dyad Policy Distance = π00  + π10(Time 1 [March 2009 – November 2009])i + π20 
(Time 2 [December 2009 – August 2010])i + e0i 
 
Level 2: 
π00 = β00 (Intercept) Initial status  
+ β004 Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β006 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β007 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β008 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])I  
+ β012 (Round 1 winner [B])i+ β013 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])I  






π10 = β100 (Intercept) Growth Time 1  
+ β104 (Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β106 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β107 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β108 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])i 
+ β112 (Round 1 winner [B])i + β113 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])i 




∑ + r1i 
 
π20 = β200 (Intercept) Growth Time 2  
+ β204 (Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β206 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β207 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β208 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])i 
+ β212 (Round 1 winner [B])i+ β213 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])i  




∑ + r2i 
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 Directed dyad dependent variable and interpretation of the 
coefficients  
In interpreting the model and the effects for the dependent variables, it is important to understand 
the advantages of using the directed dyad form of the dependent variable to capture state policy 
change. First, by using a measure of the distance between state policies, I am able to track state 
changes not just on a single policy, as has been common in much of the prior research on state 
policy change, but, rather, multiple policy indicators. The policy distance measure that forms the 
dependent variable for this analysis tracks the distance of state policies on a set of policy 
components. This is a more sensitive measure of whether states are truly adopting similar 
policies. For example, a teacher evaluation policy that requires districts to evaluate teachers 
annually, mandates the inclusion of student growth on statewide standardized assessments in that 
evaluation, and links the evaluation findings to teacher compensation is fundamentally different 
than a state law requiring that districts evaluate teachers annually but which does not mandate 
that the evaluation incorporate specific measures or link teacher compensation to the outcome of 
the evaluation. Nonetheless, these policies both fall under the umbrella of teacher evaluation. 
The use of the set of policy characteristics, or indicators, is intended to capture these nuances.  
The use of the directed form of the directed dyad dependent variable allows even more 
fine-grained analysis of state policy change. As detailed above, the directed dyad looks at pairs 
of states and allows for the examination of the direction of policy movement. For example, 
between Time 2 (November 2009) and Time 3 (March 2010), Illinois changed its teacher 
policies. Without the directed dyad, it would be difficult to understand the characteristics of the 
states Illinois may have emulated; for example, in the directed dyad for one case we see that 
Illinois moved its policies towards a state that had been selected as a Gates Frontrunner state, 
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Georgia (Time 2 distance = 4.359, Time 3 distance = 4.000), and away from a state that had not 
been initially selected to receive a Gates Foundation application preparation grant, Iowa (Time 2 
distance = 3.606, Time 3 distance=3.873). Meanwhile, at those same time points, Iowa had not 
changed   its   policies,   and  Georgia   had   actually  moved   its   policies   away   from   Illinois’,   as   this  
distance is measuring Illinois policies at Time 3 v. Georgia policies at Time 2 and Georgia 
policies at Time 3 v. Illinois policies at Time 2. (The construction of the dependent variable is 
described in more detail above). I can detect the movement towards the Gates Frontrunner state 
through the inclusion of an indicator variable (Gates Frontrunner State) that takes a value of 1 
when Georgia, or any other Gates selected state, is the second (policy sending) state in the 
directed dyad. Similarly, I have included variables that capture characteristics for the first (policy 
adopting) state in the dyad. 
 Interpreting the fi[ed effects coefficients 
Given the somewhat unusual form of the dependent variable, it is important to understand the 
interpretation of the signs of the coefficients for the focal independent variables highlighted in 
the final model, above. I focus first on the state politics variables, most of which are measures of 
states’   political   and   ideological   similarities,   and   then   on   the   union   and   frontrunner/Round   1  
winner variables, which are constructed to measure the impact of characteristics of either the 
policy sending (A state) or policy receiving state (B state). 
As explained more extensively in research hypotheses and independent variables section 
above, Difference in state ideology is the distance  between  states  on  Berry  et  al  (2010)’s  measure  
of state ideology. This coefficient for this would be negative if states are adopting policies 
similar to states that are more ideologically distant. So, for example, if the policy adoption 
patterns of many states in Time 2 were similar to the Illinois and Georgia example in the prior 
  90 
section, we would expect this coefficient to be negative in Time 2, as Difference in state ideology 
between Illinois and Georgia is 43.046, well above the mean for this variable (M = 16.074). If 
Illinois were adopting policy from a more ideologically similar state, e.g. Iowa (Difference in 
state ideology for Illinois and Iowa is 4.198), and many other states were making similar changes 
towards policies in ideologically similar states, we would expect the coefficient to be positive. 
Same Unified Republican Government and Same Unified Democratic Government are 
similarly constructed to indicate whether the two states in the dyad have governments controlled 
by the same political party. They are dichotomous variables, taking a value of 1 when both states 
in the dyad share this unified party-control characteristic, and captures whether states are 
adopting policies from governments controlled by the same political party. If states are adopting 
policies from states controlled by the same political party as  controls  their  governor’s  office  and  
state legislature, we would expect this coefficient to be negative. (The distance between the 
states’  policies  decreases  and  the  indicator  variable  is  1.)  For  states  under  split  party  control,  this  
variable never takes a value of 1 for a dyad in which they are a state (e.g. a Democratic 
Governor, a Democratic-controlled State Senate, and a Republican-controlled State House).  
Elected CSSO is an indicator variable identifying policy adopting states (i.e. State A or 
the first state in the dyad) as having an elected Chief State School Officer. (States with appointed 
CSSOs form the reference group.) It is a reasonable assumption that CSSOs who must face 
statewide reelection would be less likely to take politically riskier policy positions, particularly in 
teacher policy, than CSSOs who are appointed. Education interests have a much clearer Election 
Day target in an elected CSSO than they would for a governor who appoints the CSSO, as a 
much  broader  range  of  state  issues  influences  a  governor’s  election. The Elected CSSO variable 
takes on a value of 1 if the first state in the dyad elects its CSSO, and if its coefficient were 
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positive, it would indicate that CSSO-electing states are adopting policies more distant from 
other states, as compared to states with an appointed CSSO.  
Teachers’ union contributions, per student, in dollars in State A, as explained above, and 
acts   a   proxy   for   the   influence   of   a   state’s   teachers’   union   on   state   policymaking,   as   political  
spending is often associated with political strength. This is a standardized measure (the total 
contributions divided by the number of K-12 students in the state) and has a mean value of 3.17 
dollars. By capturing the political contributions for the first state in the dyad the coefficient for 
this variable will yield information about  the  ability  of  state  teachers’  unions  to  influence  policy  
during   this   time   frame.   If   teachers’  unions’  contributions  appear   to   impact   state  policymaking,  
this coefficient will be significant. If the coefficient is positive, it indicates that as teachers’  
unions’  contributions  increase  a  state  is  less  likely  to  adopt  policies  similar  to  other  states.  The  
effect of this variable may be particularly informative for teacher policy. A negative coefficient 
would  suggest  that  increasing  teachers’  unions’  contributions did not deter states from adopting 
policies similar to other states at a time when states were generally converging around more 
prescriptive evaluation policies incorporating measures of student growth. 
The two indicator variables included to understand whether states were adopting policies 
similar to those in states that were either designated as Round 1 winners or RTTT “frontrunners,”  
by virtue of their selection to receive a Gates Foundation grant to assist in the preparation of their 
application, are constructed in similar ways. If the B state in the dyad, i.e. the state from which 
policy is adopted, was a Gates selected state or was a Round 1 grantee, Gates “frontrunner”  
state or Round 1 winner will take a value of 1, respectively. (In fact, only Tennessee was both a 
selected as a Gates grantee and a Round 1 winner.) The interpretation of both of these variables 
is similar. If states are largely adopting policies from states selected to receive Gates Foundation 
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grants, the sign of the coefficient for the Gates Frontrunner State will be negative as the policy 
distance between other states and the Gates Frontrunner states is narrowing and states are 
moving more towards the policies in the Gates grantee states than they are towards the policies 
of states that were not selected to receive Gates grants. For the Round 1 Winner variable, if states 
are generally adopting policies more similar to those of Tennessee and Delaware, the two states 
that won RTTT Round 1 grants, the coefficient for the variable will be negative, indicating states 
are moving more towards the policies of the states that won RTTT Round 1 than towards the 
policies of states that did not win Round 1. If both variables are negative and significant in 
Round 2, we will have evidence that other states were more likely to adopt policies from states 
that were thought to be most reflective of federal preferences or explicitly chosen as exemplars 
by the federal government. 
Together, the variables discussed in this section are intended to measure the influence of 
politics  and  federal  preferences  on  states’  policymaking  decisions. The use of the directed dyad 
dependent variable allows the inclusion of independent variables that measure the influence of 
characteristics of policy adopting states, of policy sending states, or of both states in the dyad to 
understand the numerous factors that may have influenced state policy decisions during the first 
two rounds of RTTT.  
 Assessing model assumptions 
In order to assess the assumptions of HLM with the final models, Level 1 and Level 2 residual 
files were examined for each of the three policy areas.  
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 Assumptions checking for the model for teacher policy  
An examination of the level-1 residuals file (see Figure 50. Teacher policy, plot of level 1 
residuals / Time 1) suggests that though the model meets the assumption of normal distribution 
of level 1 variance, there is a slight positive trend in the plot of level-1 residuals and predicted 
values, which suggests that there may be additional variables that could be included in the model 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). However, this finding for level-1 is not necessarily surprising 
since Level-1 models time and does not include any explanatory variables. The test of 
homogeneity of level-1 variance indicates that this model meets the assumption, 𝜒2=122.213, 
p>0.500, df=741. 
The level 2 residuals file suggests that while there may be some deviation from 
multivariate normality, the covariates included in the model meet assumptions of linearity. In 
addition, the model appears to meet the assumption of heterogeneity of level-2 variance (See 
Appendix G). The deviation from multivariate normality may be the product of outliers inherent 
in a study of states. California, the most populous state included in this analysis, for example, is 
significantly larger than Wyoming, the least populous state, and the vast differences between 
these two states are not limited to population. Though these differences may make them and any 
dyads in which they are either the policy sending state or the policy receiving  state  “outliers,”  in  
that they are very distinct from other states, California and Wyoming cannot simply be excluded 
from the analysis. As noted below, to address this deviation from multivariate normality, I will 
interpret the results for the final estimation of fixed effects with robust standard errors. 
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 Assumptions checking for the model for persistently lowest achieving 
schools policy 
For the model as applied to persistently lowest achieving schools, the level-1 residuals file 
suggests that the model nearly meets the assumptions of linearity. The plot of level 1 residuals 
and predicted values shows a slight positive trend, similar to that observed in the model of 
teacher policy. A check of the assumption of homogeneity of level-1 variance indicates that the 
model meets the assumption for the persistently lowest achieving schools data, 𝜒2=32.595, 
p>0.500, df=295. 
Assessments of level 2 assumptions show that there is a more apparent deviation from 
multivariate normality than for teacher policy. The deviation from multivariate normality 
indicates that there are explanatory covariates missing from the final model, perhaps not 
surprising since the model was built to best fit the data for teacher policy. For substantive 
reasons, however, I chose to use this model. First, teacher policy is of primary interest in the 
analysis because state-level policy related to teachers was most likely to be influenced directly 
by RTTT. As explained more extensively in the second findings chapter, though there had been 
significant efforts prior to RTTT to influence college and career readiness and persistently lowest 
achieving schools policy at the state level by both outside organizations (e.g. Achieve) and the 
federal government (e.g. NCLB), RTTT somewhat uniquely targeted state level teacher policy. 
Recent efforts to influence teacher policy have focused primarily on districts, as is the case for 
grants  by   the  Gates  Foundation,  American  Federation  of  Teachers,   and   the  USDOE’s  Teacher  
Incentive Fund. Further, in order to preserve the ability to compare the results for the covariates 
of interest across policy areas, it was necessary to use the same model across the three policy 
areas. The potential for substantive findings outweighed the understanding that the final teacher 
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model would not be the best fitting model for persistently lowest achieving schools policy or for 
college and career readiness policy.  
Similar to the findings for the model applied to the teacher policy area, the level-2 
covariates do not appear to violate the assumptions of linearity, aside from a few inherent 
outliers. To address these violations of assumptions, I will interpret the results with robust 
standard errors. Finally, the model appears to meet the assumption of heterogeneity of level-2 
variance (see Appendix G). 
 Assumptions checking for the model for college and career readiness 
policy 
Plots of the level 1 residuals suggest that the model very nearly meets the assumption of linearity 
at level; the plot of level 1 residuals and level 1 fitted units shows a very small relationship. The 
histogram of level 1 residuals suggests an approximately normal distribution (See Appendix G). 
The test of the assumption of homogeneity of level-1 variance indicates that the model meets the 
assumption for the college and career readiness data, 𝜒2=60.427, p>0.500, df=383. 
Scatterplots of level 2 covariates against the level-2 residuals for the model with all other 
covariates suggests that the model meets the assumption of linearity at level-2. Similar to the 
data for persistently lowest achieving schools, there does seem to be deviation from multivariate 
normality at level-2. 
Because there is some evidence of a violation of assumptions, particularly in multivariate 
normality at Level-2 for college and career readiness policy and persistently lowest achieving 
schools policy, I will report the results with robust standard errors, which is appropriate given the 
large number of level 2 units and the stability of the standard errors across results reported with 
and without robust fixed effects (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Across all policy areas and all 
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models, results were substantively the same for the final estimation of fixed effects with and 
without robust standard errors. 
  /IMITATIO1S 
Though attempts will be made to address the problems with the assumption of level 2 
multivariate normality by interpreting the estimations of fixed effects with robust standard errors, 
this study has limitations that cannot be addressed through any estimation or model building 
process. Perhaps most prominently is the form of the dependent variable in the analysis.  Unlike 
research in international relations where there is an observable event represented by the 
dependent variable, in this analysis I am attempting to model unobserved phenomena–one  state’s  
imitation  of  another  state’s  policy idea and the influence of federal preferences on state policy. 
Though prior research has justified the use of the directed state-dyad dependent variable for 
policy diffusion studies, the assumptions that there is a process to be modeled and that 
unobservable processes can be captured quantitatively.  
Qualitative researchers, including GAO researchers investigating RTTT state-level policy 
change, have shown that there are limits to the conclusions we can draw from event history 
models.  Interviews with policy makers suggests that they may not perceive policy change as a 
diffusion process that can be modeled by state characteristics and external influences. 
Nonetheless, just as there are limitations to quantitative methods, qualitative research on 
diffusion processes  are  limited  by  policy  makers’  ability  to  recall  events  or  their  willingness  to  
recall events. For example, in the U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO] (2011) study 
of RTTT, only 6 states reported policy changes to be competitive for RTTT, yet a review of 
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policies passed in the 18-month period under examination in this study reveals at least 13 
additional states specifically mentioned RTTT in the first versions of education bills they passed, 
suggesting that the recollections of  GAO’s  interviewees  may not have been accurate. 
In addition these issues, Boehmke (2009) has shown that the directed state-dyad event 
history analysis on which this analysis is based may be biased toward finding diffusion processes 
when, in fact, the observed   phenomenon   is   states’   convergence   around   a   single   policy.   He  
suggests a simple correction–dropping states that have the same policy in a time period because, 
by having the same policy, there is no risk that they will emulate one another within that time 
period. Gilardi and Füglister (2008) suggest that this may not be a problem for analyses of policy 
areas where the dependent variable represents a mix of policy characteristics, such as that which 
I examine. Further, the coalescence around a set of policy characteristics can be viewed as 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that clear indications of federal policy preferences in the 
context of a competitive grant program can move states to make substantive policy changes 
corresponding to federal preferences.  
 
The two following chapters will set forth the results of this research. The first findings 
chapter will explore what policy changes states made in the three policy areas during this time 
period, augmenting quantitative descriptive data with short case   studies   of   several   states’  
policymaking between the announcement of RTTT and the announcement of the final winners, 
drawing on national and prominent state media reports. The results of the piecewise linear 
growth models for the teacher, college and career readiness, and persistently lowest achieving 
schools policy will be presented in the second findings chapter.  
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 FI1DI1*S PO/ICIES E1ACTED A1D CO1TE;TS FOR STATES’ PO/IC< 
DECISIO1S 
In  order  to  understand  the  quantitative  model  of  states’ policymaking, it is helpful to know more 
about  states’  policy  decisions  and  the  state-level contexts in which those decisions were made. 
This chapter presents information about the policies states passed in the three policy areas 
(teacher policy, college and career readiness policy, and persistently lowest achieving schools 
policy) and presents short case studies of the political and policy environments in five states over 
the course of the competition. These case studies, drawn from state newspaper articles and 
politics news wires, offer more nuanced views that may help in understanding the results of the 
quantitative models presented in Chapter 5. 
 :+AT PO/ICIES DID STATES E1ACT" 
During the 18-month span of the first 2 rounds of RTTT, states made a number of significant 
changes in the three policy areas. States across the country enacted policies to implement 
statewide teacher evaluations, create individual and school-level pay for performance programs, 
change or remove teacher tenure protections, begin end-of-course testing, report the post-
secondary  remediation  needs  of  high  schools’  graduates,  require  all  students  to  develop  written  
individual graduation/post-secondary plans by the end of middle school, allow for state take over 
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of underperforming schools, increase charter school caps, and permit non-governmental 
organizations to takeover the academic and administrative responsibilities of schools, among 
many other provisions. In this study, only substantive policy changes were included in the 
analysis; bills or administrative policies that made small tweaks to language in the education 
code were not considered. In addition, the policy indicators used to code the policies further 
restricted   the  policies   included   in   the  data  set.  For  example,  Florida’s   law  requiring  schools   to 
designate   an   “Academic   Scholarship   Signing   Day”   with   comparable   fanfare   to   the   schools’  
“Athletic  Scholarship  Signing  Day”  ceremonies  would  fall  under  the  realm  of  college  and  career  
readiness policies, but was not included in the analysis. 
During the first time period of this analysis, March 2009 to November 2009, states passed 
21 teacher policy bills or administrative polices, 17 college and career readiness policies, and 14 
persistently lowest achieving schools policies. From December 2009 through August 2010, 
which spans the period after the release of federal guidance, the end of the first round 
competition, and the announcement of the first round winners through the announcement of the 
second round grantees, states passed 30 teacher policies, 31 college and career readiness policies, 
and 23 persistently lowest achieving schools policies. Maps showing the pattern of state 
adoptions are included below. 
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Figure  States enacting teacher policies  
March -1ovember  
 
  
Figure  States enacting teacher policies  
December -August  
 
Figure  States enacting college and career readiness 
policies March -1ovember  
 
 
Figure  States enacting college and career readiness 
policies December -August  
 
Figure  States enacting persistently lowest 
achieving schools policies  
March -1ovember  
 
 
Figure  States enacting persistently lowest 
achieving schools policies  
December -August  
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Figure  States enacting teacher policies 
March -August  
 
Figure  States enacting college and career readiness 
policies December -August  
 
 
Figure  States enacting persistently lowest 
achieving schools policies  March -August  
 
 
Figure  States enacting teacher college and career 
readiness or persistently lowest achieving schools 




While these figures capture which states passed policies in each of the three policy areas, 
an even more interesting story of state policymaking during this time emerges from state 
newspaper reports. In the following section, I delve into the reports from 5 states, Florida, 
Georgia, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Minnesota. These states were selected because they 
represented eventual grantees (Georgia, Florida), states that were initially selected to receive 
Gates application assistance grants (Georgia, Florida, and Minnesota), and states that put forth 
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significant effort but did not receive a grant (Colorado and Oklahoma). These vignettes offer 
insight into the contexts in which RTTT-related policymaking took place.  
 PO/IC<MAKI1* I1 T+E STATES 
To construct these small studies of on-the-ground education policymaking and politics, I 
conducted an extensive search of Lexis-Nexis  and  EBSCO  databases  using  the  keywords  “Race  
to the Top,”  “RTTT,”  “education,”  and  “Race  to  Top,”  downloading  all  articles  published  in  the  
states’   newspapers   between   February   2009   and   December   2010.   Where   there   were   gaps   in  
coverage, I consulted the websites of other sources of state news (e.g. press releases, news wire 
services). After removing the articles not relevant to education, I synthesized the newspaper 
articles into the articles below. In my analysis of the articles, I paid particular attention to 
mentions of stakeholder involvement, proposed and enacted legislation and legislative processes, 
and the broader political context in which the RTTT applications were developed. Finally, if the 
focus of much of these descriptions of state policymaking is on teacher-related policy 
(evaluation, compensation, and employment rules), it is a reflection of the magnitude of the 
attention lawmakers and the media gave to it. 
 Minnesota From frontrunner state to second round withdrawal 
Selected as a recipient for a Gates Foundation RTTT technical assistance grant to prepare its 
application, Minnesota was an early favorite to receive a RTTT grant. Over summer 2009, the 
state legislature passed a broad education reform bill that revised state standards, linked high 
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school exit exams to post-secondary requirements, changed accountability reporting rules– 
adding requirements to report school-level student academic growth, established coordination 
and  data  sharing  requirements  for  the  state’s  PK-20 systems, enacted a teacher performance pay 
program,  and  revised  the  state’s  charter school laws. In October 2009, the state legislature began 
hearings  on  the  state’s  proposal, and state education officials embarked on a tour of the state to 
gather  input  from  education  stakeholders  (“House  members,”  2009;;  “Minn.  education  officials,”  
2009). Between March 2009 and August 2010, the state passed 7 education bills, all but one of 
which focused on a small aspect of the education system. 
The  state’s  early  frontrunner  status,  bestowed  by  organizations  outside  the  state,  did  not  
account for the increasingly acrimonious relationship between the executive branch and the state 
teachers’   union   and   its   local   affiliates,   which  would   hinder   the   competitiveness   of   the   state’s  
Round   1   application   and   serve   as   a   block   for   the   state’s   Round   2   application.   For   the   state’s  
Round  1  application,  300  of  350  of  the  state’s  districts  and  115  of  the  state’s  150  charter  schools  
signed   letters   of   support   or  MOUs   in   support   of   the   state’s  Round   1   application,   but   only   12  
percent   of   the   state’s   local   teachers’   union   affiliates   signed   onto   the   state’s   proposal   (Bakst,  
2010;;  Boldt,  2010b).  Shortly  after  the  submission  of  the  state’s  Round  1  proposal,  the  governor  
was  quoted  referring  to  the  state’s  teachers’  union,  Education  Minnesota,  as  a  “choke point” for 
education reform   in   the   state,   adding   “[Democrats]   won’t   cross   them   and   about   a   third   of  
Republicans   are   under   their   spell” (Salisbury,   2010).   The   union’s   opposition   to   proposals   to  
place high performing teachers in low-performing schools, to allow alternative teacher 
preparation and certification programs in the state, and to closely link teacher evaluation, 
compensation, and employment decisions to student academic growth (Boldt, 2010a).  Upon 
hearing that the state was not selected as a finalist in Round 1, Governor Pawlenty’s  spokesman  
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commented,  “It’s  hard  to  race  to  the  top  with  an  anchor  tied  to  your  leg.  For  years,  the   teachers 
union has fought against any meaningful education reform (States News Service [MN], 2010). 
The  teachers’  union  and  its  supporters  in  the  legislature  countered  that  the  executive  branch  had  
done little to include representatives from local districts, teachers unions, or the legislature in the 
process (Boldt, 2010a; Johns, 2010a). 
In subsequent months, prior to the Round 2 application deadline in June 2010, 
relationships between educators and their unions, the legislature, and the Governor and 
Department of Education remained strained and characterized by periodic sniping. Following the 
state’s   Round   1   loss,   the   governor   proposed   education   legislation   to   allow   for   alternative  
certification programs, teacher and leader evaluation tied to student growth, performance pay for 
teachers tied to evaluation ratings, and tenure reform that would require teachers to reapply for 
certification   and   tenure   every   5   years.   The   governor’s   admonitions   that   the   state’s   education  
system  was   ‘a   relic’   and   threats   to   not   apply for a Round 2 grant did not win passage of his 
preferred legislation (Johns, 2010b). Some Democrats agreed to back the alternative licensure 
legislation but there was no significant push to pass evaluation or other reforms, and by mid-
April the governor opted to put forward his own comprehensive reform legislation. The 
comprehensive legislation proposed: 
 Aligning teacher preparation standards to K-12 student standards; 
 Adding requirements for teacher certification, including passing a basic skills 
test and learning to teach online courses; 
 Incorporating ISLLC standards into school leader licensure requirements; 
 Authorizing alternative certification program; 
 Creating a three tiered teacher licensure system;  
 Development of a statewide evaluation system for teachers and principals with 
50 percent of the evaluation dependent on student growth (35 percent from a 
student achievement growth measure and 15 percent from other measures of 
student achievement); 
 Requiring teachers and school leaders to have their tenure reviewed every 5 
years; 
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 Allowing  superintendents  to  assign  teachers  and  administrators  rated  “highly  
effective”  to  low  performing  schools;; 
 Permitting state takeover of low performing schools. 
 
In  the  governor’s  press  release,  he  specifically  cited  the reforms passed in states such as 
Maryland   to   improve   states’   RTTT   applications   (Hoppin,   2010;;   “Governor   Pawlenty  
introduces,”  2010).   
The governor stated that in order for the state to apply for Round 2 funding, legislators 
would have to pass the reforms within 3 weeks. As the deadline approached, media reported 
divisions   in   the   state’s   Democratic   legislators   over   the   reforms,   counter   proposals from 
Education Minnesota, and the decreasing likelihood that the legislation would pass. Provisions 
that would allow alternative certification programs were particularly problematic for the union 
and some lawmakers (Johns, 2010c; Patterson, 2010).  In mid-May, state media were reporting 
that the bill would not make it out of the state Senate (Draper, 2010) and when the legislature 
adjourned  without   passing   any   of   the   governor’s   education   legislation,   he   announced   that   the  
state would not apply for RTTT Round 2 funding (Boldt, 2010c). 
 Oklahoma 1ot a finalist in spite of significant policy changes 
Between March 2009 and August 2010, Oklahoma enacted 40 pieces of education legislation and 
adopted 3 significant education rules. These policies included changes in the length of the school 
year,   in   the  state’s  charter   school   laws,   in   reporting,  governance  and   remediation   requirements 
for low performing schools and districts, and in tenure and evaluation rules for teachers and 
school leaders. Much of the policy activity in the 2009 legislative session focused on college and 
career readiness initiatives, specifically creating a P-20 governing council and requiring high 
schools to report remediation and performance of their graduates in their first year of post-
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secondary matriculation; the bulk of the activity governing low-performing schools, modifying 
teacher and school leader evaluation, and removing caps on the number of charter schools in the 
state took place in May and June of 2010.  
Though not considered one of the early favorites to receive a RTTT grant, Oklahoma 
policymakers and statewide media were optimistic about the state’s  chances.  As  early  as  March  
2009 an editorial in the Oklahoman and an article in the Tulsa World reported the belief that the 
state’s  well-regarded early childhood education system would make the state a strong contender 
(“Stimulus  money,”  2009;;  Myers,  2009).  In  an  attempt  to  increase  the  state’s  viability,  a  group  of  
Oklahoma  foundations  hired  a  consulting  firm  to  rate  the  state’s  policies  relative  to  the  program  
requirements, raised money to support the development of the  state’s  application,  and  funded the 
creation   of   a   new   education   advisor   office   in   the   governor’s   office   to   guide   the   state’s  
application,   filled   by   the   former  Mayor   of  Tulsa,  who  had  been   involved   in   the   city   district’s  
application for a Gates Foundation Teacher Effectiveness grant (Hoberock,   2009;;   “Taylor  
named,”  2009). 
This optimism and efforts in the executive branch were not matched by education reform 
activity in the state legislature in late 2009 after the release of RTTT program guidance, in spite 
of ongoing media attention (Casteel, 2009; Eger, 2009). Though there had been discussion of 
altering   the   laws   restricting   the   number   and   location   of   the   state’s   charter   schools   and   a   few  
legislators had discussed funding teacher merit pay programs, most legislative action had taken 
place mid-year and had focused on P-20 coordination, data, and reporting systems, as mentioned 
above   (“Charter   schools,”  2009;;   “State   asked,”  2009).  Shortly   before   the   January   deadline   for  
Round 1 applications, the State Superintendent suggested that in order to be competitive, the 
legislature   would   need   to   take   action   (“Racing   ahead,”   2010).   The   state’s   application   was  
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submitted without significant legislative changes, suggesting instead that future legislation would 
draw significantly from the Tulsa Public School’s   unsuccessful   application   for   a   Gates  
Foundation Teacher Effectiveness grant (Eger & Myers, 2010). 
By the end of February, the Republican leadership in the state legislature introduced bills 
to enact a pilot performance pay program and to expand the   state’s   charter   schools   (Bisbee,  
2010; Eger, 2010a; Hoberock, 2010a). Several days after the pilot performance pay plan passed 
the House, however, the state learned that it had not been selected as a finalist for Round 1 of the 
RTTT competition (Rolland, 2010a).   The   significant   push   for   changes   to   the   state’s   laws  
governing charter schools and charter school authorization, teacher and school leader evaluation, 
compensation and continuing employment, and low-performing schools and districts came in the 
wake  of  the  April  announcement  of  the  state’s  34th place finish in RTTT Round 1 (Myers, 2010a; 
Hoberock, 2010b). During May and June 2010, the legislature passed and the governor signed 
reforms to:  
 Create the Oklahoma Teacher and Leader Effectiveness Evaluation System to 
rate the effectiveness of teachers and leaders and to allow for tenure and 
employment decisions to be made on the basis of those ratings, 50% of which 
would be based on measures of student achievement (35% student growth and 
15% other achievement measures); 
 Authorize a optional teacher pay for performance system based teachers ratings 
under the Oklahoma Teacher and Leader Effectiveness Evaluation System; 
 Remove the state cap on charter schools, recruit applications from nationally 
successful Charter Management Organizations (e.g. KIPP), and expand the 
organizations authorized to issue charters;  
 Direct the state Board of Education to adopt the Common Core standards by 
August 1, 2010; 
 Require  the  state’s  lowest  performing  schools  to  adopt one of four turnaround 
models. 
 
The process of passing teacher evaluation legislation was somewhat contentious, though 
significantly  less  so  than  in  other  states,  as   the  state’s   teachers’  union  supported  the  evaluation  
and compensation reforms, but local union  affiliates’  concerns  about   the  evaluation  system  led  
  108 
many  to  decline  to  sign  onto  the  state’s  RTTT  application  (Rolland,  2010b;;  Eger,  2010c).  State  
leaders were hopeful for a better showing in Round 2 of the competition (Eger, 2010b). In spite 
of a significant   increase   in   the   state’s   point   total   (almost   100   points   over   the   Round   1  
application) and place (from 34th to 20th), the state did not finish high enough to be selected as a 
finalist.  Second  round  reviewers  praised  the  state’s  reform  measures,  but cited the lack of support 
from   districts   and   local   union   affiliates,   which   was,   in   part,   a   result   of   the   state’s   significant  
legislative  actions  (Myers,  2010b;;  “Oklahoma  did  better.”  2010). 
 Florida Teacher compensation and tenure legislation teachers’ unions and 
Republican primary politics 
In August 2009, the Florida Department of Education opened a portal through which school 
districts   and   other   education   stakeholders   could   submit   ideas   for   the   state’s  RTTT  application  
and the state was selected to receive an application grant from the Gates Foundation (States 
News Service [FL], 2009a). This early progress suggested that   the  state’s  selection  as  a  RTTT  
grantee   was   somewhat   inevitable.   Over   the   following   year,   however,   the   state’s   political  
environment and relationships among its policymakers and education interests grew increasingly 
strained. 
The   first   indication   that   the   political   climate   in   Florida   could   interfere  with   the   state’s  
RTTT application process came in September 2009 when the Florida House Republican Caucus 
released a sniping statement accusing state Democrats of reversing their opposition to education 
reforms   they   had   long   opposed   in   order   to   boost   the   state’s   RTTT   application   (States   News  
Service [FL], 2009b). By December 2009, as the state struggled to find districts to sign onto the 
state’s  RTTT  application,  Republicans  accused  the  state  teachers’  union  of  “opposing  progress”  
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in an op-ed in the St. Petersburg Times (Weatherford, 2009) and Democrats in the state house 
released statements accusing   the   Florida  Department   of   Education   and   the   state’s   Republican  
Governor,  Charlie  Crist,  of  failing  to  make  minor  wording  changes  to  the  state’s  Memorandum  
of Understanding at the behest of reluctant districts.  
The acrimony continued, fueled in part   by   the   perception   that   the   state’s   application  
preparation progress was opaque and that districts were not told what the state would expect 
them  to  do  should  they  sign  onto  the  grant  (“Trust  but  verify,”  2010,  Sanders  and  Palka,  2010).  
The Superintendent of Pinellas County Schools expressed concern, representative of other 
districts   around   the   state,   that   regardless   of   whether   districts   supported   Florida’s   RTTT  
application or not, the state would mandate implementation of RTTT-related initiatives (Anton 
and  Matus,  2010).  In  addition,  the  state’s  teachers’  union  and  its  local  affiliates  also  felt  alienated  
from   and   uniformed   about   the   state’s   application   preparation   process.   In   December   2009,   the  
Florida Education Association issued a press release discouraging local unions from supporting 
the application,   referring   to   it   as   “fatally   flawed”   (Marshall, 2009). Ultimately, 59 of the 67 
districts   signed   MOUs   in   support   of   the   state’s   Round   1   application,   but   many   attached   an  
addendum to their MOU stating that they would rescind their signatures if they disagreed with 
the  state’s  final  plan.  Only  5  local  union  affiliates  supported  the  application.  The  head  of  the  state  
teachers’   union   asserted   that   the   Education   Commission’s   actions in pursuit of the grant had 
“‘Hurt  us  a  great  deal,  because  it’s  caused  a  lot  of  trust  issues’” leading the Chairman of the State 
Board  of  Education  to  respond  “‘You have too many teachers at the twilight of their careers who 
are simply not prepared to work as hard or as differently as is going to be required going 
forward’”  (Marshall  and  Solochek,  2010).   
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The  state’s  application  for  RTTT  funds  was  submitted  in  January  without  passage  of  any  
politically difficult education legislation. But in an increasingly important backdrop to the state’s  
RTTT application (and related education legislation) emerged as the U.S. Senate Republican 
primary  campaign  intensified.  Crist,  the  state’s  governor,  who  had  been  accused  by  some  in  the  
Republican party as being too moderate, was engaged in an primary race with Marco Rubio. 
Rubio criticized Crist for taking American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus money and 
for  leading  the  state’s  application  for  Race  to  the  Top  funds  (Bousquet,  2010).   
Shortly   before   the   announcement   of   the   state’s   selection   as a RTTT Round 1 finalist, 
Republican lawmakers filed legislation, SB6, to overhaul teacher evaluation, tenure, and 
compensation. The legislation would have eliminated teacher tenure, allowed only annual 
teacher employment contracts, and tied 50 percent of  teachers’  evaluation  and  compensation  to  
student scores on the statewide standardized assessment. Governor and candidate Crist expressed 
support for the legislation (Colavecchio, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2010a). The head of the Florida 
School Boards Association expressed concern about the bill and stated that he feared that it 
would   “’Do more to damage teacher morale than anything   I   have   seen   in   a   long   time’” 
(Colavecchio and Solochek, 2010). Also in March, the legislature passed a bill to overhaul the 
state’s   graduation requirements, putting in place a series of end-of-course assessments that 
students would be required to pass in order to receive their diploma. Teachers and school 
administrators expressed concerns that the change would be implemented too quickly, but 
governor Christ stated that he would sign it (Lankes, 2010). The following day, Delaware and 
Tennessee were announced as the RTTT Round 1 Winners. 
Not   surprisingly,   the   announcement   of  Florida’s  RTTT  Round  1   loss   elicited   opposing  
responses from the supporters  and  detractors  of   the  proposed  changes   to   the  state’s   tenure  and  
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evaluation   systems.  While   teachers’  unions   expressed  hope   that   the   loss  would  discourage   the  
bill’s  supporters, the sponsors  of  the  bill  characterized  the  state’s  loss  of  Round  1  funding as all 
the more reason to pass the legislation, stating that they believed passage of the bill would help 
the   state’s   Round   2   application   (“How   Florida   lost   this   ‘Race,’”   2010;;   Matus   and   Solochek,  
2010a). The Education Commissioner announced that the state will pursue a Round 2 grant, and 
Crist, citing the acrimony between teachers, the legislature and the Education Commissioner, 
took leadership over the Round 2 application. He appointed a RTTT working group comprised of 
a cross section of education stakeholders and announced a task force, including representatives 
from  the  state’s  teachers’  union, to develop a statewide teacher evaluation model. 
During the first week of April, SB 6 passed out of the Florida House education committee 
after an eight-hour hearing;;  the  Associated  Press  characterized  the  debate  as  “vehement,”  and the 
committee approved the legislation on a party line vote (Kaczor, 2010). Articles note both 
Governor Crist and former Governor Jeb Bush supported the bill (Bender, 2010a; Kaczor, 2010; 
Fitzpatrick, 2010b; Larabee, 2010). Over the subsequent weeks, a spirited debate commenced in 
the state’s newspapers’  Letters  to  the  Editors  and  Editorial/Opinion  sections  over  whether  Crist  
should veto the bill. Perhaps, more influentially, new polls suggested that he was trailing Marco 
Rubio in the Republican U.S. Senate primary by as much as 30 points. A Palm Beach Post 
article noted that there would be significant political advantages for Crist were he to veto the bill; 
though a veto would contradict his earlier support for the bill, the backlash would be mitigated 
somewhat by the significant support he   would   receive   from   the   state’s   teachers’   unions.   In  
reference  to  the  legislation,  a  reporter  wrote,  “It  appears  to  have  galvanized  more  Floridians than 
the  2007  property   tax   revolt  or   the  debate  over  Teri  Schiavo’s   feeding   tube   in  2003”   (Bender,  
2010b).  
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On April 16, Crist vetoed the bill and legislative supporters were unable to gather enough 
support to override his veto. Shortly thereafter, national Republicans, who had resisted taking 
sides in the primary, began endorsing Rubio, and Crist dropped out of the Republican Senate 
primary, declaring his intention to run as an independent. His political calculus appeared to have 
worked;;   the  states’   teachers unions decided to back both Crist and their traditional Democratic 
ally in the Senate campaign (Bender, 2010c; Larabee, 2010; Matus and Solochek, 2010b; Smith, 
2010; Whittenburg and Mullins, 2010). 
The  state’s  Round  2  RTTT  application,  with  a  revised  MOU  authored  by  Crist’s  working  
group, gathered more district and union support than had the Round 1 application. 65 of the 
state’s  67  school  districts  signed  onto   the  application,  as  did  54   local   teachers’  union  affiliates  
(States News Service [FL], 2010a). However, by the beginning of June, the St. Petersburg Times 
reported that  may  of  the  state’s  unions  made  side  agreements  with  districts  stipulating  that  they  
would be able to opt of some of the RTTT requirements if they could not be collectively 
bargained (Matus, 2010; McNeil, 2010; States News Service [FL], 2010b). And though their 
union supported the application, newspaper reports quoting teachers suggest that classroom 
teachers held onto a somewhat negative view of the grant and seemed broadly uninformed about 
the  states’  proposal  and  its  implications.  
When the second round RTTT grantees were announced in August 2010, Florida was 
among the winners. The results were not so positive for the governor or the unions, however. 
Crist ultimately lost his bid for the U.S. Senate to Marco Rubio. And Crist’s   successor   in   the  
governor’s  office,  Rick  Scott,  signed  legislation  very  similar  to  SB  6  into  law  in  2011. 
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 *eorgia A Republican governor champions RTTT 
In late March 2009, the Atlanta Journal Constitution published a front-page article mentioning 
RTTT, and from the start Georgia’s  Republican  Governor, Sonny Perdue, was a big supporter, 
referring to Race to the Top as ‘“Almost a Nixon Goes to China opportunity”’ (Badertscher, 
2009).      He   remained   active   in   the   state’s   application   process,   appointing   four   RTTT   “czars,”  
corresponding   to   each   of   the   federal   government’s   four   assurance   areas, who met every two 
weeks beginning in September (Diamond, 2009). Georgia was selected as an initial recipient for 
a Gates Foundation grant, and, outside of long-standing problems with its longitudinal data 
system which lacked the capacity to link students and teachers, the state appeared to be well 
positioned to compete for RTTT funds (Vogell, 2009). Over the summer of 2009, the state 
appeared to be making steady progress, passing, among other legislation, incentives for teachers 
working in high-needs areas (Swartz, 2009). Perdue was both enthusiastic and willing to push 
policy  changes  to  put  the  state  in  a  position  to  win  RTTT  funds,  stating  “‘Nobody,  except  Santa  
Claus,   is  going  to  give  you  money  for  nothing,  and  you’ve  got   to  be  good  to  get  Santa  Claus”  
(Badertscher, 2009). 
As the deadline for Round 1 applications approached, however, disagreements between 
education stakeholders emerged. Local school boards expressed reluctance to sign onto the 
state’s   application   because   they   had   been   given   little   information   about   the   state’s   plans,   the  
funding their districts would receive if they did participate, and were given just a few weeks, 
over the winter holidays, to make a decision. Board members and superintendents noted that 
timing gave them little opportunity to consult with the teachers who would be responsible for 
implementing the  state’s  plans  (Mauldin,  2009;;  Sparks,  Fetter,  and  Sellers,  2009).  Nonetheless,  
many  districts  agreed  out  of  fear  of  “‘leaving  money  on  the  table’”  (Sparks,  Fetter,  and  Sellers,  
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2009). 23 districts representing 41 percent of the students in the state opted to sign onto the 
state’s  application  (Mauldin,  2010). 
The lack of teacher representation was notable at the state level, as well. Perdue remained 
in  command  of  the  state’s  application  and,  through  a  spokesperson,  stated  that  because  Georgia  
was a non-union (right-to-work) state, he did not believe there was any need to involve the 
teachers’   association   in   the   state’s   application.   The   Georgia   Association   of   Educators   (GAE)  
declined to support the application. The State School Superintendent stated that, though she 
believed the state had a good chance to win funds, had she been in charge of the process, she 
would have sought the involvement of the GAE and the Professional Association of Georgia 
Educators in the application (Badertsher, 2009). The head of the GAE stated that he felt the 
application  had  been  developed  in  “‘relative  secrecy’”  which  curtailed  the  role  of  the  teachers’  
associations in the process (Jones, 2010a). 
In mid-January, Governor Perdue proposed an overhaul to the teacher evaluation and 
compensation system; neither   of   the   state’s   teacher   associations   had   information   about   the  
proposal  before  it  was  announced  (Torres,  2010a).   In  their   reporting  of  Perdue’s  proposal,  The 
Augusta Chronicle reported the widely held, though incorrect, belief that linking teacher 
evaluation and compensation to student achievement was a requirement in order to receive a 
RTTT  grant  (Baxter  and  Pettys,  2010).  In  a  statement,  the  governor’s  office  proposed  that  a  new  
teacher compensation system would cost less money because the state and its districts would no 
longer be required to give automatic pay increases to teachers for length of service or for earning 
advanced   degrees   (Brown,   2010).   The   governor’s   spokesman   also   asserted   that   teachers  
supported his proposed compensation and evaluation changes, a claim that the GAE questioned 
(Jones, 2010b). 
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The  governor’s  supporters  in  the  state  legislature  filed  legislation  to  overhaul  the  state’s  
teacher evaluation and compensation system and to criminalize cheating on the statewide 
assessment in early February 2010 (Torres, 2010b). Shortly after the legislation was filed, the 
GAE announced its opposition to the bill, expressing concern that the legislation lacked key 
details, failed to specify a source of funding for implementation, and relied on a nascent peer 
review evaluation model that had not yet been fully pilot tested (Capek, 2010). Discussion of the 
legislation  quieted  somewhat  through  the  beginning  of  March,  when  the  state’s  qualification  as  a  
RTTT Round 1 finalist was announced (Torres, 2010c). 
The   governor’s   reticence   to   involve   the   state’s   teachers’ associations   in   the   state’s  
application  may  have   resulted   in  Georgia’s   loss   in   the   first   round  of  RTTT,   in  which   the  state  
finished third, less than 11 points behind Round 1 grantee, Tennessee. The head of one of the 
state’s   teachers’   associations  noted   that   the  state   lost  points  because   the  application   lacked   the  
support of teachers (Badertscher, 2010; Torres, 2010d). Shortly thereafter, the state Schools 
Superintendent announced  plans   to   take  a  more  active  role   in  soliciting   the   input  of   the  state’s  
teachers  in  Georgia’s  Round  2  application  (Downey,  2010a). 
In the legislature, the bill promoted  by  Perdue   to  overhaul  Georgia’s   statewide   teacher  
evaluation and compensation system had, by the beginning of April, been relegated to a 
legislative study committee after failing to find sufficient support in the House Education 
Committee.  Further,  the  legislature  appeared  to  decline  to  fully  fund  the  state’s  proposal to give 
stipends to teachers teaching high needs subjects or working in high needs schools (Torres, 
2010d). Attempts to revive the bill by attaching its provisions to another bill were twice 
unsuccessful; on the last night of the legislative session, the original legislation’s   sponsor  
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attempted to find an additional bill to amend with the compensation and evaluation system 
provisions, but failed to do so (Torres, 2010e). 
As the state prepared its Round 2 RTTT application,   the   state’s   teachers’ union sent a 
letter to the USDOE   opposing   the   state’s   application   (Torres,   2010f)   and   the   State   School  
Superintendent announced her resignation (Sparks, 2010). Descriptions of the second round 
application notes its expanded description of professional development for school leaders and the 
inclusion of letters from additional education stakeholders and its continued inclusion of an 
overhaul  to  the  state’s  teacher  evaluation  and  compensation  system  (Torres,  2010g). 
Throughout the summer, Perdue continued to have both successes and challenges with 
education-related issues. The Chief of Staff for the Georgia Department of Education resigned in 
mid-June, and   the   governor’s   attempts   to   get   a   favored   candidate   on   the   ballot   for   State  
Superintendent failed after the candidate, who had been appointed as interim State 
Superintended, did not get the required number of signatures (Downey, 2010b). Further, his 
party’s   candidates   for   statewide   offices   (State   Superintendent   and   Governor)   did   not   share  
Perdue’s  enthusiasm  for  RTTT and declined to go on the record supporting it (Galloway, 2010). 
However, the state Board of Education did adopt the Common Core standards, an initiative on 
which Perdue was a co-chair (Downey, 2010c). And, at the end of the summer, when the Round 
2 RTTT winners were announced, the state was awarded 400 million dollars (Dillon, 2010). 
 Colorado From relative unity to divisive debate 
Almost from the moment RTTT was created in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, 
Colorado’s  Governor  Bill  Ritter  and  Lieutenant  Governor  Barbara  O’Brien  began  preparing  the  
state’s   application.  At   the   beginning  March   2009,   a   press   release   announced   the   creation   of   a  
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RTTT steering committee, headed by the Lieutenant Governor (States News Service [CO], 
2009a); by the end of the month, legislators had introduced legislation intended to boost the 
state’s  chances  of receiving a  RTTT  grant  (Ingold,  2009).  Embedded  in  the  state’s  annual  school  
funding bill were provisions to tie school funding to student performance and to require the 
state’s   high   school freshmen to complete individual graduation plans (Ingold, 2009). By early 
April, legislators and the governor announced four goals for education legislation during the 
2009 session, all tailored to RTTT: increasing the number of students designated college and 
career ready; establishing a PK-20 student data system; tying teacher effectiveness and 
promotion   to  student  academic   improvement;;  and  providing  more  support   to   the  state’s   lowest  
performing schools (Ashby, 2009a). The RTTT steering committee held its first meeting at the 
end of April. In contrast to other states, the meeting was open to the public and attendees were 
invited to serve on one of the four committees tied to the four assurance areas (Sherry, 2009; 
States News Service [CO], 2009b). 
The early legislation, released well before the draft program guidance in July 2009 or the 
final program guidance in November 2009, offers evidence that though states had an idea of the 
goals of RTTT, they were not well informed about the specific preferences of the USDOE. For 
example, in a debate about a provision in the annual funding bill that would have financially 
penalized  low  performing  schools,  state  Senators  maintained  that  the  rule  would  help  the  state’s  
chances for RTTT funding, while the state House and the Governor believed that it would not be 
beneficial (Ashby, 2009b). This   lack   of   information   did   note   slow   the   progress   of   the   state’s  
legislation, however. In early May 2009, Ritter signed nine education bills into law, including 
legislation to set up a statewide PK-20 data system that could link students to teachers and 
administrators, to close the gap across schools in teacher and administrator efficacy and 
  118 
experience, to set up a dual enrollment system for high school students to earn postsecondary 
credit,   to   standardize   the   requirements   for   the   state’s   alternative   preparation   programs,   and   to  
implement  the  federal  government’s  turnaround  models  for  persistently  lowest  achieving  schools  
(States News Service [CO], 2009c). And in June the Governor announced the Colorado STEM 
(Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) Network to promote STEM fields and STEM 
education (States News Service [CO],  2009d).  Colorado’s  political   leaders  were  so  engaged   in  
the RTTT work that when the draft federal guidance was released, The Denver Post referred to 
Lt.  Governor  O’Brien  as  an  “obsessive  follower”  of  U.S.  Secretary  of  Education  Arne  Duncan  
and   described   her   “poring   over   every   sentence   in   Duncan’s   speeches   for   clues   about   how  
Colorado can win a slice of the competitive  $4.35  billion  Race  to  the  Top  fund”  (Meyer,  2009a). 
The relative calm in Colorado around RTTT legislation, as compared to states like 
Florida and Georgia, lasted through mid-December when a State Senator announced his intention 
to introduce a bill   to   reform  the  state’s   teacher  evaluation,  compensation  and   tenure  system.  A  
letter  advocating  an  overhaul  of  the  state’s  teacher  policy  from  the  Denver  Area  Superintendent  
Council to the Lt. Governor and Education Commissioner that drew a quick and accusatory 
response   from   the   state’s   teachers’   union,   the   Colorado   Education   Association,   added   to   the  
increasingly  charged  atmosphere  in  the  state  (Meyer,  2009b).  The  state’s  political,  education,  and  
business leaders remained relatively united through the submission   of   the   state’s   Round   1  
application   with   135   of   the   state’s   178   school   districts   and   a   diverse   set   of   stakeholders,  
including the Colorado Education Association, signing onto the application (Coors and Schuck, 
2009; Dillon, 2010; Slevin, 2010; States News Service [CO], 2010a). In early January 2010, the 
state legislature quickly passed a new law to tie the evaluation of teacher training programs to the 
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classroom performance of their graduates, in   time   to   include   the   legislation   in   the   state’s  
application (Bartels, 2010).  
Following the late March announcement that the state failed to win a Round 1 RTTT 
grant,  much  of  the  criticism  of  the  state’s  application  from  within  the  state  focused  on  the  lack  of  
a teacher evaluation system (Coors and Isenberg, 2010;;  “Colorado  flunks,”  2010;;  Meyer,  2010a).  
Shortly after the state announced that it would apply for a Round 2 grant, Democratic State 
Senator and former high school principal Mike Johnston introduced SB191, a bill to tie 65 
percent of administrator evaluations and 50 percent of teacher evaluations to student growth and 
to link compensation, tenure, and continued employment to those evaluations (Malone, 2010; 
Meyer, 2010b). Within a few days, after the State Board of Education voted unanimously to 
support the   bill,   the   CEA   stated   that   it   would   not   support   the   state’s   second   round   RTTT  
application  because  it  would  be  linked  with  SB191  (“Ed  Board  backs  tenure  reform,”  2010).  The  
head of the Colorado Senate Republican Caucus released a statement accusing the union of 
throwing  a  “tantrum”  that  would  threaten  the  state’s  RTTT  application,  putting in jeopardy the 
potential $175 million in Round 2 funding (States News Service [CO], 2010b).  
After contentious debate in the State Senate, the bill passed relatively intact to the State 
House of Representatives. A Denver Post article noted that Democrats were split on the bill, 
which was introduced  by  a  Democrat,  while  Republicans  “loudly  approved”  (Meyer  and  Fender,  
2010a). The House Education Committee passed the bill on a 7-6   vote   after   an   “emotional”  
eight-hour hearing.  One  legislator,  describing  the  debate  in  the  House  said,  ‘“Nobody  wanted  a  
legislative  bloodbath,  but  we’re   going   to  play  our   cards”’   (Meyer,  2010c;;  Meyer,  Bartels,   and  
Fender, 2010). The bill passed by a narrow margin in the House and Governor Ritter signed it 
into  law  shortly  thereafter  (“Colorado  teacher-evaluation  bill  enacted,”  2010;;  Meyer,  2010d).   
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As  promised,  many  of  the  local   teachers’  union  affiliates  who  had  supported  the  state’s  
first round RTTT  application   did   not   support   the   state’s   second   application, and the Colorado 
Education Association withdrew its support (Meyer, 2010e). While the state was selected as a 
Round 2 finalist, they did not win a Round 2 grant. The lack of union support appeared to play a 
significant  role  in  the  state’s  loss  (O’Connor,  2010;;  Meyer  and  Fender,  2010b). 
 SUMMAR< 
This chapter was intended to be an introduction to the policies that states passed between March 
2009 and August 2010 in order to ground the quantitative results presented in the following 
chapter. The stories of state policy and political processes are interesting, and a few important 
themes emerge across the states. First, the speed with which states passed legislation was 
remarkable given the competing interests in state politics. For example, Colorado enacted a piece 
of legislation to hold post-secondary institutions accountable for the performance of their 
graduates  in  just  over  a  week  in  order  to  strengthen  the  state’s  RTTT  application.  The  speed  of 
state policy changes also led to inconsistencies and legislation was sometimes passed with little 
information   about   RTTT’s   parameters,   particularly   in   the   first   half   of   the   competition.   The  
importance of politics, but not necessarily political party, is also   notable.   While   Georgia’s  
Republican  governor  was  a  cheerleader  for  RTTT  in  spite  of  the  death  of  the  state’s  evaluation  
bill at the end of the legislative session, Minnesota’s  Republican  governor  withdrew his support 
in similar circumstances. Further, of the five states, only the two led by Democratic governors, 
signed more intensive teacher evaluation policies into law.  
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Finally, the focus on teacher policy in the second half of the competition, specifically 
policy governing teacher tenure, compensation, and evaluation, was significant. Teacher policy, 
more so than the other policy areas this study examined, served as a magnet for media and state 
policymakers’ attention.  
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 FI1DI1*S 4UA1TITATI9E RESU/TS FOR STATE PO/IC<MAKI1* 
DECISIO1S 
In this chapter, I present the results of my quantitative analyses, beginning by presenting 
descriptive statistics for and correlation coefficients among the independent variables included in 
the models. Subsequent sections will describe the results of the final growth models and the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. The discussion will begin with separate descriptions of the 
results for each of the models of teacher and school leader policy, college and career readiness 
policy, and persistently low achieving schools policy, followed by an exploration of findings 
across policy areas. The purpose is to demonstrate the ways in which policymaking processes 
and effects of independent variables area changed over the course of the competition in each 
policy area, and to explore differences in the effects of the independent variables across policy 
domains.  
 DESCRIPTI9E STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics for the states and state dyads in the dataset illuminate expected and 
unexpected differences and similarities among states that applied for RTTT grants. (Descriptive 
statistics for independent variables across all observations and for the state pair observations 
included in the Teacher Policy, College and Career Readiness Policy and Persistently Lowest 
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Achieving Schools Policy analyses can be found in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, 
respectively.)  
Not surprisingly, the largest difference in large to small state population ratio, 67.910, is 
between California and Wyoming; Arizona and Massachusetts, however, have roughly the same 
population  and  a  population  ratio  equal   to  1.  Kansas’s  and   Iowa’s   residents  have   the  same  per  
capita  income  while  Connecticut’s  and  Mississippi’s  have  the  most  different  per  capita  incomes,  
16,515 dollars a year. Rhode Island and Michigan are the most ideologically similar states; 
Massachusetts and Georgia are the most ideologically dissimilar. Only 1.5% of the state pairs in 
the final data have Republican governors and legislatures in both states, whereas Democrats 
control  the  governor’s  office  and  legislature  in  both  states  in  11.9%  of  the  state  pairs,  reflecting  
the strength of the Democratic victory in elections at the local, state, and federal levels in the 
2008 election. Georgia and Massachusetts form the state pair with the greatest difference in state 
ideology,  reflecting  Georgia’s  position  as  the  most  ideologically conservative state, with a score 
of  24.893,  and  Massachusetts’s  place as the most ideologically liberal state, with a state ideology 
score of 74.054. Michigan (61.288) and Rhode Island (61.266) form the most ideologically 
similar state pair. Additionally, prior research suggests that the state with the most professional 
legislature, California, should be best positioned to pass innovative policy and adopt policies that 
are most successful in other states, while New Hampshire, with the least professional legislature, 
has the least resources available through which their legislators can learn about policies in other 
states. 
Turning to variables related to education, a number of states have the same rate of adults 
25 years old or older who have a high school diploma, yielding some unexpectedly similar pairs 
of states with respect to this characteristic, e.g. Georgia and Nebraska, Kansas and Washington, 
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New Mexico and Wisconsin, and Nevada and Rhode Island. The proxy variable for the strength 
of local education interests, Percent of Local Funding from State, reflects the range of local 
funding strategies across the states. While local districts and schools receive over 75 percent of 
their funding from state sources in Arkansas, districts in Illinois receive less than 30 percent of 
their   funding   from   the   state.   Teachers’ unions in Oregon contribute the largest amount to 
political candidates and for lobbying, standardized by the number of public school students in the 
state,   spending   26.04   dollars   per   student;;   Mississippi’s   Teachers’   unions spend the least for 
political advocacy, 20 cents per student. Finally, fourteen Chief State School Officers are 
selected in statewide elections; all remaining states have school chiefs appointed by either the 
governor or the state board of education. Interestingly, in both states that won Round 1 grants, 
Tennessee  and  Delaware,  the  state’s  governor  appoints  the  CSSO.  Of  all  the  RTTT  Round  1  and  
2 grantees, only Georgia and North Carolina have CSSOs selected through a statewide election. 
(See Appendix E for a list of states and CSSO selection processes.) 
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Table  Descriptive statistics all observations across the three policy areas 
 
Variable Name N M SD Min Max 
State Population Ratio 9900 4.095 5.061 1.000 67.911 
Difference Per Capita Income 9900 4339.053  3418.604 0 16515 
Difference High School Diploma Rate 9900 3.748 2.619 0 11.4 
Difference State Ideology 9900 16.074  11.755 0.022 49.160 
Legislative Professionalism (A) 9900 0.185     0.119 0.027 0.626 
Unified Republican government (A & B) 9900 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Unified Democratic government (A & B) 9900 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Teachers’  Union  Contributions,  Per  
Student (A), in dollars 
9900 3.17 4.54 0.20 26.04 
Geographic Neighbors 9900 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Right To Work State (B) 9900 0.444 0.497 0 1 
Percent of Local Funding from State (A) 9900 49.348 10.232 29.878 75.973 
Percent Change General Revenue (A) 9900 2.193 4.076 -8.9 9.33 
Round 1 Winner (B) 9900 0.044 0.206 0 1 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  (B) 9900 0.311 0.463 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Elected (A) 9900 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed by 
Governor (A) 
9900 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed by 
State Board of Education (A) 
9900 0.489 0.4999 0 1 
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Table  Descriptive statistics teacher policy 
 
Variable Name N M SD Min Max 
State Population Ratio 5100 4.112 5.059 1.000 67.911 
Difference Per Capita Income, in dollars 5100 4390.61 3400.17 0 16515 
Difference High School Diploma Rate 5100 3.749 2.604 0 11.4 
Difference State Ideology 5100 15.808 11.697 0.022 49.160 
Legislative Professionalism (A) 5100 0.191 0.122 0.027 0.626 
Unified Republican Government (A & B) 5100 0.013 0.115 0 1 
Unified Democratic Government (A & B) 5100 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Teachers’  Union Contributions, Per Student 
(A), in dollars (B) 
5100 3.284 4.358 0.2 26.04 
Geographic Neighbors 5100 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Right To Work State (B) 5100 0.397 0.489 0 1 
Percent of Local Funding from State (A) 5100 49.448 10.720 29.878 75.973 
Percent Change General Revenue (A) 5100 1.758 4.094 -8.9 9.33 
Round 1 Winner (B) 5100 0.044 0.205 0 1 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  (B) 5100 0.310 0.463 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Elected (A) 5100 0.290 0.454 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed by 
Governor (A) 
5100 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed by State 
Board of Education (A) 
5100 0.488 0.500 0 1 
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Table  Descriptive statistics college and career readiness policy 
 
Variable Name N M SD Min Max 
State Population Ratio 3948 3.906 4.730 1.000 67.911 
Difference Per Capita Income, in dollars 3948 4181.79 3327.31 0 16515 
Difference High School Diploma Rate 3948 3.772 2.630 0 11.4 
Difference State Ideology 3948 16.173 11.931 0.022 49.160 
Legislative Professionalism (A) 3948 0.182 0.111 0.027 0.626 
Unified Republican government (A & 
B) 
3948 0.013 0.114 0 1 
Unified Democratic government (A & 
B) 
3948 0.134 0.340 0 1 
Teachers’  Union  Contributions,  Per  
Student (A), in dollars 
3948 3.27 4.59 0.20 26.04 
Geographic Neighbors 3948 0.095 0.293 0 1 
Right To Work State (B) 3948 0.433 0.496 0 1 
Percent of Local Funding from State (A) 3948 50.008 10.905 29.878 75.973 
Percent Change General Revenue (A) 3948 1.118 3.970 -8.9 9.33 
Round 1 Winner (B) 3948 .045 .208 0 1 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  (B) 3948 .311 .463 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Elected (A) 3948 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed 
by Governor (A) 
3948 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed 
by State Board of Education 
3948 0.488 0.4999 0 1 
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Table  Descriptive statistics Persistently lowest achieving schools policy 
 
Variable Name N M SD Min Max 
State Population Ratio 3446 3.972 4.919 1.000 67.911 
Difference Per Capita Income, in 
dollars 
3446 4447.97 3490.50 0 16515.00 
Difference High School Diploma Rate 3446 3.7024 2.552 0 11.4 
Difference State Ideology 3446 15.374 11.327 0.022 49.160 
Legislative Professionalism (A) 3446 0.199 0.119 0.027 0.626 
Unified Republican government (A & 
B) 
3446 0.015 0.120 0 1 
Unified Democratic government (A & 
B) 
3446 0.122 0.329 0 1 
Teachers’  Union  Contributions,  Per  
Student (A), in dollars 
3446 2.99 3.99 0.20 26.04 
Geographic Neighbors 3446 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Right To Work State (B) 3446 0.439 0.496 0 1 
Percent of Local Funding from State 
(A) 
3446 49.555 9.464 32.997 75.973 
Percent Change General Revenue (A) 3446 1.734 3.890 -8.9 9.33 
Round 1 Winner (B) 3446 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  (B) 3446 0.314 0.454 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Elected (A) 3446 0.291 0.453 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed 
by Governor (A) 
3446 0.199 0.399 0 1 
Chief State School Officer Appointed 
by State Board of Education (A) 
3446 0.488 0.4999 0 1 
 
 
A check of the intercorrelations of the independent variables included in the model 
suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue as the intercorrelations are low. All but three of the 
absolute values of the correlations are below 0.20; the largest correlation is between Chief State 
School Officer Appointed by Governor (A) and Chief State School Officer Elected (A) with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.319. 
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 MODE/ RESU/TS 
Subsequent sections will discuss the results of the final model in detail, discussing the findings in 
each of the three policy areas in the two time periods. I will then examine the findings across the 
three policy areas in an attempt to explicate similarities and differences in the effects of relevant 
variables, referring back to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. For all models, I ran state 
fixed effects models to control for state idiosyncrasies and as a check of the robustness of my 
findings; I will be discussing these results as relevant.  
Given differences in attention to each of these areas by both the federal government and 
non-governmental organizations between March 2009 and August 2010, it is reasonable to 
expect varying impacts. For example, while college and career readiness was an underlying 
theme  in  many  of  the  federal  government’s  communications  to  states  during  this  time,  initiatives  
such  as  Achieve’s  American  Diploma  Project  and  the  National  Governor’s  Association/Council  
of  Chief   State   School  Officers’  Common  Core   Standards   Initiative were focusing much more 
explicitly on this area and that focus may have changed the effects of focal and control variables 
on state policymaking. Additionally,   the   federal   government’s   School   Improvement   Grants  
program, while linked to RTTT in that states were encouraged to intertwine their SIG initiatives 
with their RTTT plans,  may  have  altered  states’  school   improvement   related  policymaking.  Of  
the three policy areas, teacher policy was the most explicitly linked to RTTT. While there had 
been increasing attention to teacher policy prior to RTTT, the attention given to teachers 
throughout the RTTT final guidance focused states on this policy area, as suggested by the 
vignettes about state policymaking in the previous chapter. This focus seems to have intensified 
after the release of final federal guidance in May 2009. As such, I begin with the results of the 
piecewise linear growth model for teacher policy. 
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A caution about the preciseness of the number attached to the dependent variable and to 
coefficients  and  their  interpretation  is  warranted.  “Policy  distance”  is,  without  context,  difficult  
to interpret and in the following sections the emphasis is on the significance of the predictor and 
the sign of the coefficient as these capture both the statistical importance of the predictor and the 
effect it has on state policymaking, either decreasing state policy distance (a negative 
coefficient), i.e. representing increasing policy similarity across the states in the dyad, or 
increasing state policy distance (a positive coefficient), i.e. suggesting that the policies of the 
states in the dyad are diverging.  In some cases, as described in Chapter 3, variables capture the 
characteristics of either the policy adopting state in the dyad, the A state, or the state in the dyad 
towards which the adopting state could have moved its policies, the B state. For A state 
variables, the coefficient   can   be   interpreted   as   “the   higher   the   adopting   state   on   this  
characteristic, the more likely their policy moved towards other states’  policies  (the  coefficient  
has a negative sign)  or  away  from  other  states  (the  coefficient  has  a  positive  sign).” For B state 
variables,   the   coefficient   can   be   understood   as   “the   higher   the   state   on   this   characteristic,   the  
more likely states are to move towards its policies (the coefficient has a negative sign) or away 
from its policies (the coefficient has a positive sign).” 
Finally, I present the model used for the analysis, as shown in Chapter 3. The full model 
and the results for all three models presented in a table can be found in Appendix H:  
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Level 1: 
State Dyad Policy Distance = π00  + π10(Time 1 [March 2009 – November 2009])i + π20 
(Time 2 [December 2009 – August 2010])i + e0i 
 
Level 2: 
π00 = β00 (Intercept) Initial status  
+ β004 Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β006 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β007 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β008 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])I  
+ β012 (Round 1 winner [B])i+ β013 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])I  
+ β014 (Elected CSSO [A])i  
+r0i 
 
π10 = β100 (Intercept) Growth Time 1  
+ β104 (Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β106 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β107 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β108 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])i 
+ β112 (Round 1 winner [B])i + β113 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])i 
+ β114 (Elected CSSO [A])i  
+ + r1i 
 
π20 = β200 (Intercept) Growth Time 2  
+ β204 (Difference in state ideology [A & B])i  
+ β206 (Unified Republican government [A & B])i + β207 (Unified Democratic government 
[A & B])i  
+ β208 (Teachers’ union contributions, per student [A])i 
+ β212 (Round 1 winner [B])i+ β213 (Gates “frontrunner” state [B])i  
+ β214 (Elected CSSO [A])  
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 Teacher policy 
Results for the unconditional model, with no predictors entered at level-2, suggest that there was 
significant variance across states in policy distance and that this significant variance continued 
across time periods. Both the level 1 intercepts and variance of level 2 slopes continued to be 
significant in the final model (r0i(un)=0.274, p≤0.001,   r0i(full)=0.249, p≤0.001;;   r1i(un)=0.032, 
p≤0.001,   r1i(full)=0.026, p≤0.001;; r2i(un)=0.104, p≤0.001,   r2i(full)=0.65, p≤0.001). Between the 
unconditional and final models, variance in the intercept was reduced by 9 percent (0.274-
0.249/0.274), variance in the slope of distance in Time 1 was reduced by 19 percent (0.032-
0.026/0.032), and, of particular interest, the variance in the slope of distance in Time 2 was 
reduced by 38 percent (0.104-0.065/0.104).  
 States’ teacher polices at the start of the competition 
As of the first time point, March 2009, a number of variables significantly explained distances 
between  states’   teacher  policies  and  many  of   these  significant   relationships are consistent with 
findings from prior diffusion research. States with higher levels of legislative professionalism 
had policies that were significantly different than policies of other states, β05=0.787, se=0.174, 
p≤0.001.   The   larger   the   distance   between   states’   ideology   index   scores,   the   more   distance  
between   states’   teacher   policies,  β04=0.005, se=0.002, p≤0.001.  And   the   greater   the   difference  
between   states’   per   capita   income,   the   closer   their   policies,   which   may   be   suggestive   of   the  
tendency of small states to move towards the policies of larger states, β02=-0.00002, 
se=0.000005, p≤0.001.   However,   at   the   initial   time   point,   states   pairs   that   had   unified  
governments under Republican or Democratic control tended to have policies that were more 
distant, β06=0.498, se=0.161, p≤0.05  and  β07=0.101, se=0.060, p>0.05, respectively, though only 
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the effect of Unified Republican government (A & B) was significant. It may be that the 
ideological context in a state matters more than political party when legislators make teacher 
policy.  
Of   the   focal   variables,   there  was   a   significant   finding   for   the   effect   of   teachers’   union  
political   contributions,   though   not   in   the   expected   direction.   States   where   teachers’   unions  
donated more to political campaigns and lobbying   efforts,   standardized   by   the   state’s   K-12 
enrollment, had teacher policies that were significantly closer to those other states, though the 
effect does not appear to be large, β08=-0.010, se=0.005, p≤0.05.  Though  this  was  not  predicted,  
there are a number of explanations for this finding. For example, it may have been that states 
with more politically active teachers unions had pushed for some of the less contentious policy 
components, e.g. state support for professional development, earlier than had other states. 
Further,  while  teachers’  unions  have  resisted  some  elements  of  teacher  evaluations  they  perceive 
to be punitive or unfair such as the inclusion of student growth in teacher evaluations or the 
dissolution of tenure protections, they have not categorically opposed all statewide evaluation 
systems. The indicator for Right to Work state was not significant, further supporting the idea 
that factors other than union strength may have exerted more influence on state policy prior to 
RTTT.  
Finally, it is also important to note the lack of significance of the variables representing 
the  status  of  policy  “sending”  states  in  dyads  as  Gates  Foundation  selected  frontrunner  states  or  
Round  1  Winners,  suggesting  that,  at  the  start  of  the  competition,  these  states’ policies were not 
significantly more likely to be emulated by other states. 
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 States’ teacher policy change in Time  March  through 
1ovember  
While  states’  relative  policy  distance  and  the  factors  related  to   that  distance  were,  for   the  most  
part, as we would expect at the start of the RTTT competition, prior to the release of federal 
program   guidance,   states’   policy   adoption   decisions   were   much   more   unpredictable.   Overall,  
during this time period, state policies were diverging, β10=0.557, se=0.064, p≤0.001,  suggesting  
that, though states were adopting teacher policy, they were not consistently adopting similar 
policies. Difference in per capita income (A & B), which was significant at the initial time point, 
was highly insignificant, but State population ratio (A & B), which was not significant at the 
start, had a significant negative relationship with the policy distance outcome measure, β11=-
0.004, se=0.002, p≤0.05,   indicating   that   the  more   different   in   population   size states were, the 
more likely they were to adopt policies from one another. Similarly, the coefficient for 
Difference in state ideology was negative, β14=-0.003, se=0.0009, p≤0.001;;   the  more  different 
states’  ideology, the more likely they were to have adopted policies from one another during this 
time period. We see similar patterns of relationships that were positive at the start of the 
competition reversing during this time period for Legislative professionalism (A),   β15=-0.299, 
se=0.106, p≤0.01, Unified Republican government (A & B),   β16=-0.166, se=0.046, p≤0.001,  
Unified Democratic government (A & B),  β17=-0.139, se=0.027, p≤0.001.   
Variables related to internal political forces specific to education yielded several 
significant results. States that had elected Chief State School Officers were more likely to adopt 
policies similar to those in other states, as compared to CSSOs who were appointed by either the 
Governor or the state Board of Education, β114=-0.086, se=0.024, p≤0.001. It may have been that 
an elected CSSO saw more political benefit in pushing legislators to move quickly on RTTT-
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related teacher policies. However, variables capturing the   strength   of   teachers’   unions   were  
significant but mixed. States were more likely to adopt policies more similar to those in states 
that had right to work laws, β19=-0.102, se=0.025, p≤0.001,  suggesting  that  states  may  have  been  
adopting policies from states that had less union friendly laws during this time period. However, 
the  amount  of  teachers  unions’  contributions  to  campaigns  and  lobbying  appeared  to  have  some  
effect,  as  states  with  higher  per  student  spending  by   teachers’  unions  were   less likely to adopt 
laws similar to those in other states, β18=0.008, se=0.003, p≤0.01.  
Finally, indicators capturing the tendency of other states to adopt policies similar to those 
in the frontrunner and first round RTTT winners remained insignificant, as would be expected 
given  the  prediction  that  the  influence  of  these  states’  policies  would  increase  in  the  later  part  of  
the competition. 
 
 States’ teacher policy change in Time  December  through 
August  
During the later part of the period under examination, states returned to adoption patterns 
observed at the beginning of the competition, reversing the directions of coefficients observed in 
Time 1 and largely conforming to findings from prior diffusion research. More notably, the 
intercept of the slope of Time 2, the mean change in state policy distance over this time period, 
shows   states   moving   significantly   and   somewhat   dramatically   towards   other   states’   policies,  
β20=-0.875, se=0.120, p≤0.001.  These  findings  suggest  that, though states were making adoption 
decisions for teacher policies consistent with expectations, they were also very quickly 
converging around a set of policy components. The exception to this was for states with elected 
  137 
CSSOs, which moved slightly less towards   other   states’   teacher policies than states with 
appointed CSSOs, β214=0.153, se=0.049, p≤0.01. 
The mixed significant findings for the effect of teacher union strength held in Time 2. 
While states tended to move away from the policies in states that had right to work laws, 
β29=0.225, se=0.050, p≤0.001,  the  buffer  of  teachers’  union  spending  against  the  general  trends  
towards more stringent teacher policies appears to have weakened in Time 2, β28=-0.013, 
se=0.005, p≤0.05.  The  mixed   findings  may  be   the   result   of   state-level political processes. For 
example, in Colorado, not a right to work state,  teachers’  unions  mounted  a  significant  lobbying  
campaign to prevent passage of state legislation weakening tenure rules and requiring student 
growth to be used as part of teacher evaluations; the bill ultimately passed (Banchero, 2010). 
Meanwhile, in Georgia, a right to work state, the state teacher association successfully lobbied to 
keep  the  Governor’s  teacher  evaluation  legislation  from  coming  to  a  full  vote  and  the  bill  died  in  
committee (Torres, 2010).  
Perhaps the most interesting significant findings are for the Gates   “frontrunner”   (B),  
β213=-0.106, se=0.044, p≤0.05, and Round 1 winner   (B),   β212=-0.317, se=0.085, p≤0.001,  
indicator variables, both of which had been insignificant at the start of the competition and 
through Time 1. Over the second time period, other states significantly moved towards the states 
in which policies were perceived to be or actually were favored by the U.S. Department of 
Education.   States’   move   towards   Tennessee’s   and   Delaware’s   teacher   policies   is   particularly  
important, providing evidence that once federal preferences were clearly expressed through their 
selection as Round 1 winners, other states adopted polices more similar to theirs. As a check of 
the robustness of these findings, I ran a state fixed effects model to control for the idiosyncrasies 
of   individual   state’s   policymaking   processes;;  while   all   other   significant   effects   disappeared   in  
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this model, the effects of Round 1 winner  (B),  β212(fe)=-0.357, se=0.009, p≤0.001, and the pattern 
of policy divergence in Time 1, β10(fe)=0.315, se=0.032, p≤0.001,   followed  by   a   narrowing  of  
policy distance in Time 2, β20(fe)=-0.667, se=0.322, p≤0.05,  remained  significant.  
In the teacher policy area, there were several notable findings, most generally in the 
general directions of state policymaking over the course of the grant, which indicated a 
divergence of state policy during the first time period followed by a sharp convergence during 
the second time period. These effects remained significant even in the state fixed effects models. 
Additionally, the changes in the signs of the coefficients across time periods is notable because it 
suggests, in line with prior vertical diffusion research, that clearer information about federal 
preferences  impacted  the  effects  of  states’  demographic,  economic,  and  political  characteristics.  
While state policymaking appeared somewhat haphazard in Time 1, states more closely 
conformed to expected diffusion patterns in Time 2. The influence of federal preferences is most 
evident in the effects for Round 1 winner (B) and Gates “frontrunner”   (B), both of which 
indicate that other states were adopting policies similar to those in states who had either won a 
grant or believed to be most in line with federal preferences. 
 College and career readiness policy 
Broadly, the results for the college and career readiness policy model suggest that states were, 
over the course of the competition, generally adopting similar policies. And while the set of 
variables for teacher policy showed significant effects for a number of variables in the model and 
explained almost 40 percent of the variance in the intercept of the slope for Time 2, I did not find 
similar results in the teacher policy area. A comparison of the variance components in the 
unconditional and final models suggests that while the final model reduced the variance of initial 
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status by 12 percent, (r0i(un)=1.744, p≤0.001,   r0i(full)=1.535, p≤0.001),   and the variance in the 
slope for Time 1 by 13 percent, (r1i(un)=0.053, p≤0.001,   r1i(full)=0.046, p≤0.001), there was 
slightly more variance in the intercept of Time 2, (r2i(un)=0.193, p≤0.001,   r2i(full)=0.201, 
p≤0.001),    and no change in level-1 error, (e0i(un)=0.053, e0i(full)=0.046). This is, perhaps, 
reflective of a number of issues specific to this model, (the model was built to best model teacher 
policy), and, broadly, to the college and career readiness policy area. Since the mid-2000s this 
policy area has attracted the attention of non-governmental groups (e.g. Achieve) and 
foundations (e.g. the Gates Foundation), and there are many variations in the relationship 
between K-12 and post-secondary  institutions  across  states  (e.g.  New  York’s  model  that  unifies 
K-12 and post-secondary governance). As would be expected, the state fixed effects model 
explains more variance, 63 percent of the variance in initial status, 66 percent of the variance in 
the slope of Time 1, and 87 percent of the slope in Time 2. However, the variance in initial 
status, distance rate in Time 1, and distance rate in Time 2 continue to be significant in the state 
fixed effects model. 
 States’ college and career policies at the start of the competition 
Nonetheless, there were some significant effects for the initial status and across the two time 
periods. State population ratio was significant, β01=-0.024, se=0.007, p≤0.01, indicating that as 
states’   population   ratio   increased,   their   policies   were   more   similar.   And   as   states’   legislative  
professionalism increased, their policies were somewhat dramatically more distinct from other 
states, β05=2.166, se=0.009, p≤0.001. (The intercept for initial status was β01=2.972, se=0.239, 
p≤0.001.)  The effect of Percent of local school funds from state (A) was significant, β010=-0.12, 
se=0.004, p≤0.001, and indicates that the more states contributed to the operations of their local 
schools, a proxy for the influence of state policymakers on local schools, the more similar the 
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state’s   policies   to   those   in   other   states.   The   effect   of   an   elected  CSSO  was   also   negative   and  
significant, β14=-0.569, se=0.098, p≤0.001. None of the political or ideology variables were 
significant. 
Effects for the variables related to union strength were similarly mixed. The effects for 
both Right to work state and Teachers’  union contributions, per student (A) were significantly 
positive, β07=0.054, se=0.009, p≤0.01 and β08=0.338, se=0.105, p≤0.001, respectively. While 
these results may seem inconsistent, in the context of college and career readiness policy, there 
may be plausible explanations. College and career readiness policy includes policies such as 
requirements for end-of-course and high school exit exams which may be both opposed by 
teachers unions, as they add to the testing regimen in schools. Right to work states may be less 
likely to be emulated by non-right to work states in policy areas that overlap with workforce 
policy, such as college and career readiness policy.  
Finally, states that were designated as recipients of the first round of Gates RTTT 
application assistance funding had policies that were significantly distant from other states, 
β013=0.353, se=0.099, p≤0.001.   Given   the   Gates   Foundation’s attention to college and career 
readiness, it is likely that these states had passed more college and career readiness policies prior 
to the start of the competition, which played a role in their selection by Gates to receive grants. 
 States’ college and career policy change in Time  March  to 
1ovember  
The effects in the state policy change trajectory for Time 1 were, generally, very similar to the 
effects observed at the start of RTTT. Though the intercept was not significant, β20=-0.133, 
se=0.0069, p>0.05, the sign of the coefficient suggests a general trend towards convergence. The 
effect of State population ratio suggests that during this time period, states were adopting 
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policies similar to states of similar sizes; as the difference in the populations of the states in the 
dyad increased, their policies diverged, β011=0.008, se=0.002, p≤0.001.  States’  economic  health  
also had an impact on state policymaking during this time period, β111=-0.007, se=0.003, p≤0.05, 
as states with a greater increase in their general revenues were more likely to adopt policies 
similar to those in other states.  
The variables capturing shared political party governing strength were also significant 
during this time period. While states that were governed by Republicans were adopting policy 
from other Republican dominated states, β16=-0.141, se=0.057, p≤0.05,   states   governed   by  
Democrats were not adopting policies from similarly Democratically-controlled states, 
β017=0.130, se=0.037, p≤0.001. Interestingly, in the state fixed effects model, the coefficient for 
Unified Republican governments (A & B) is negatively signed but is no longer significant, 
β15(fe)=-0.143, se=0.092, p>0.05, while the effect for Unified Democratic governments (A & B) 
continues to be significant but indicates that states governed by Democrats are adopting policies 
similar to those in states also controlled by Democrats, β16(fe)=-0.94, se=0.045, p≤0.05.   This  
suggests that a few states may be having a large impact on this coefficient, which is decreased 
once I control for them in the fixed effects model.  
Similar to the effects observed at the start of the competition, the effects of Percent of 
local school funds from state (A) and Teachers’  union contributions, per student (A), continue to 
be positive and significant, β110=0.007, se=0.003, p≤0.05   and   β18=0.006, se=0.002, p≤0.01. 
Right to work state (B) is not significant in the model without state fixed effects, β19=0.031, 
se=0.028, p>0.05, but is positive and significant in the fixed effects model, β18(fe)=0.094, 
se=0.038, p≤0.05. 
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Finally, the effect of a state having an elected Chief State School Officer is no longer 
significant, β114=-0.003, se=0.003, p>0.05. However, states are adopting policies more similar to 
those in Gates “frontrunner”   state   (B), β113=-0.062, se=0.027, p≤0.05.   The   effect   of   Gates  
selection is somewhat difficult to attribute in the context of college and career readiness policies, 
as alluded to above; these states were selected, in part, for their college and career readiness 
policies, so it may be that other states would have been moving towards their policies regardless 
of their Gates selection simply because they had more established policies in this area. The effect 
of this variable remains negatively signed in the state fixed effects model but it is no longer 
significant, β112(fe)=-0.020, se=0.027, p>0.05. 
 
 States’ college and career policy change in Time  December  to 
August  
The intercept of the slope in Time 2 supports the theory that over the course of the first two 
rounds  of  RTTT,  states’  college  and  career  readiness  policies  were,  generally,  converging, β113=-
0.062, se=0.027, p≤0.05.  The  coefficient  for  State population ratio also suggests that states were 
adopting policies from states with larger population size differences, β21=-0.022, se=0.006, 
p≤0.001,  in  contrast  to  the  positive  sign  for  this  coefficient  in  Time  1. The only other significant 
effect in Time 2 is for Right to work (B) which is also negatively signed, suggesting that, unlike 
in Time 1 and at the start of RTTT, states are adopting college and career readiness policies more 
similar to those in right to work states over the course of the second half of the competition, 
β29=-0.299, se=0.114, p≤0.01. The negative effect for Right to work (B) holds in the state fixed 
effects model, β28(fe)=-0.235, se=0.089, p≤0.05.  While  not  significant  in  the  model  without  state  
fixed effects, Difference in state ideology is significant during Time 2 in the state fixed effects 
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model, β23=0.008, se=0.003, p≤0.01;;   this   suggests   that   as   the   difference   in   states’   ideology  
increases, their polices are diverging. 
The results for the college and career readiness policy area, while not as dramatic as those 
in the teacher policy area, suggest that, across states, there is a general convergence towards 
similar college and career readiness policies. Further, the explicit attention to this policy area 
from external groups, such as the Gates Foundation or Achieve, may have had more impact on 
states than the more implicit emphasis given to college and career readiness in the Race to the 
Top competition, particularly as this area competed for attention with more prominent teacher 
policy concerns. In this respect, it is notable that while the effect of the Round 1 winners was 
significant in Time 2 in teacher policy, it was not significant either in the model for initial status 
or for the distance rates during Time 1 or Time 2. Additionally, the results from the model when 
interpreted with the results of the state fixed effects model point to the wide variation in both K-
12 schools and post-secondary education systems across states. It is possible that in order to see 
clear effects for RTTT, the federal guidance would have  had  to  addressed  both  states’ K-12 and 
post-secondary institutions. Impacting post-secondary institutions could be particularly difficult 
because in most states even public post-secondary systems are governed separately from the 
public K-12 system. 
 Persistently lowest achieving schools policy 
From  March  2009  through  August  2010,  states’  policymaking  patterns  for  low  achieving  schools  
policies followed a trend similar to that observed for teacher policy, a general divergence during 
the first time period followed by a tendency toward policy convergence in the second time 
period. However, there was less distance between state policies at the start of the competition 
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than in the other policy areas examined in this study. The model, while yielding interesting 
results,  explained  only  3  percent  of   the  variance   in  states’   initial  status   (r0i(un)=0.307, p≤0.001,  
r0i(full)=0.299, p≤0.001),   13   percent   of   variance   the   distance rate in Time 1 (r0i(un)=0.070, 
p≤0.001,   r0i(full)=0.064, p≤0.001), 10 percent of the variance of the distance rate in Time 2 
(r0i(un)=0.279, p≤0.001,  r0i(full)=0.279, p≤0.001),  and  none  of  the  level-1 variance.  
 States’ persistently lowest achieving schools policy at the start of the 
competition March  
As stated above, as of March 2009, states persistently lowest achieving schools policy was more 
similar than in the other policy areas–β00(pla)=2.149 se=0.111, p≤0.001 for lowest achieving 
schools policy, β00(ccr)=2.972, se=0.239, p≤0.001 for college and career readiness policy, and 
β00(tp)=3.17, se=0.103, p≤0.001 for teacher policy. This similarity is, in part, a product of the 
attention to underperforming schools as a result of ESEA Title I/No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB) and other non-competitive federal grant programs to states (i.e. School Improvement 
Grants) that had generally prescribed or encouraged a set of interventions. The most state 
variability was on indicators such as whether state laws allowed state takeover of schools, 
permitted contracting with charter management organizations, rewarded high performing 
schools, or financially penalized low performing schools. These issues, often politically 
contentious, involving debates about charter schools and local control of schools, appear to have 
played a role in many of the significant effects observed initially. Difference in state ideology 
was positive and significant, β04=0.024, se=0.007, p≤0.01, indicating that the more distance in 
states’  ideology  scores,  the  greater  the  distance in their policies. If both states in the dyad were 
controlled by Democratic governors and legislatures, the states were less likely to have similar 
policies, β07=0.118 se=0.096, p≤0.05.  
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Further supporting the idea that political concerns were prominent in state adoption 
decisions, Elected CSSO (A) was also positive and very significant, β014=0.170, se=0.047, 
p≤0.001.  States  that  had  a  Chief  State  School  Officer  subject  to  election  were  significantly  less  
likely to have persistently lowest achieving schools policies similar to those in other states. The 
finding for elected CSSO remained significant in the state fixed effects model, β014(fe)=0.246, 
se=0.085, p≤0.01.  
Finally, the effect of Round 1 winner (B) is significant at the start of the competition, 
β012=0.186, se=0.096, p≤0.05. While this result would seem intriguing, it is, most likely, more 
reflective  of  those  states’  charter  school  laws  and  state  takeover  laws  (both  states  had  a  charter  
school law, but neither had legislated provisions for state takeover) than of the policymaking 
tendencies of other states. This effect remains significant in the state fixed effects model that 
uses Pennsylvania, a state with charter laws and state takeover provisions,  as the reference, 
β01(fe)2=-0.411, se=0.186, p≤0.05, βDelaware(fe)=0.298, se=0.149, p≤0.05, βTennessee(fe)=0.805, 
se=0.201, p≤0.001. 
 States’ persistently lowest achieving schools policy change March 
-1ovember  
The  relative  stability  of  states’  persistently  lowest  achieving  schools  policies  is  reflected in the 
lack of significance of the intercept for the distance rate at Time 1, β10=0.148, se=0.089, p>0.05. 
States’  ideological  differences  are  no  longer  significant,  but  difference in state population ratio is 
significant during Time 1, β11=-0.007, se=0.003, p≤0.05,  an  indicator   that  states  were  adopting  
policies from states with different population sizes. However, there is some indication that 
political   concerns  continue   to  play   a   role   in   state  policymakers’  decisions,  as  Elected CSSO is 
significant, β114=-0.213, se=0.042, p≤0.001,   suggesting   that   states   with   elected   state   school  
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officers were more likely to be adopting policies similar to those in other states. Similarly, the 
effect of Round 1 winner (B) was significant and negatively signed, β112=-0.148, se=0.039, 
p≤0.001.  As  stated  above,  the  effect  of  these  states  charter  school  laws  and,  at  least  during  this  
time period, lack of legislation providing for state takeover may be the reason for this result. 
Prior to the release of final federal guidance, there was significant attention to the perception that 
the draft federal guidance overemphasized the role of charter schools for school (c.f. Klein, 
2009; McNeil, 2009c) and states responded accordingly. Again, the fixed effects model appears 
to support this theory.  
 States’ persistently lowest achieving schools policy change December 
 through August  
Though the sign of the coefficient for the slope intercept in Time 2 is negative, in contrast to the 
positive sign in Time 1, the coefficient is similarly small and insignificant, β20=-0.069, se=0.215, 
p>0.05. The most significant result In Time 2 is for Legislative professionalism  (A),  β25=-0.225, 
se=0.081, p≤0.01,  which  suggests  that  states  that  had  more  professional  legislatures  were  passing 
policies more similar to other states during this time period. A number of reasons may explain 
this result. Other states with less legislative capacity had focused their policymaking efforts on 
other areas, while larger legislatures may have been better able to continue to make policy in this 
area, which would be consistent with diffusion theory. Alternately, larger states tend to have both 
more professional legislatures and larger numbers of persistently lowest achieving schools, and 
the larger number of schools subject to oversight in this policy area may have led to delays in 
passage of legislation.  
Elected CSSO (A) remains significant in Time 2, β114=0.406, se=0.087, p≤0.001,  though  
the sign of the coefficient is positive, in contrast to Time 1, but in keeping with the positive 
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effect of the variable at the start of the competition. This result can be plausibly understood in 
conjunction for the significant finding for Round 1 winner (B), which also remains significant 
and reverses its sign in Time 2, β112=0.274, se=0.099, p≤0.01.   Both   Tennessee   and  Delaware  
changed their policies to allow state takeover of persistently lowest achieving schools and, 
particularly in Tennessee, expanding the range of organizations that could take over schools in 
this time frame. It is important to remember that a positive coefficient for Round 1 winner (B) 
indicates   that   other   states   are  moving   away   from  Delaware   and   Tennessee’s   policies,  while   a  
positive coefficient for Elected CSSO (A) suggests that states with an elected Chief State School 
Officer are moving away from policies in other states. Taken together, and given the political 
contentiousness of state and non-governmental   organizations’   takeover   of   schools,   elected  
officials may have been less inclined to adopt more locally intrusive policies and pointedly less 
likely   to  adopt  policies  with   the   level  of   intervention   that  Tennessee’s  allowed.  The  results   for  
the   state   fixed   effects   model   would   appear   to   support   the   proposition   that   Tennessee’s   and  
Delaware’s   persistently lowest achieving schools policies were not widely adopted by other 
states, βTennessee(fe)=1.023, se=0.292, p≤0.001,  βDelaware(fe)=0.564, se=0.236, p≤0.05. 
In summary, there was less distance between state policies at the start of the competition 
among  states’  persistently  lowest  achieving  schools  policy  than  in  the  other  policy  areas, and the 
results suggest policy decisions may have been driven less by the competition and more by 
normal policy cycles or the overarching political and policy environment. While states made 
changes to their policies, the bulk of these changes appeared to be driven by a need to conform to 
the federal requirements to receive School Improvement Grants, which were awarded in a non-
competitive process starting in 2009, rather than by the Race to the Top completion. And while 
some states adopted more prescriptive and locally-intrusive policies, such as those in Tennessee 
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and Delaware that allowed for state takeover of schools and the creation of state-run school 
districts   (Tennessee’s   Achievement   School   District)   or   externally-managed mini-districts 
(Delaware’s  Partnership  Zones),  not  all   states  were  willing   to  go  beyond   the minimum federal 
requirements. This was particularly true in states where the Chief State School Officer would be 
subject to statewide election.  
 Findings across teacher college and career readiness and persistently lowest 
achieving schools policy areas 
In this section, I will examine the findings across the three policy areas, returning to the research 
questions and hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3 and presenting related findings. In the figures 
presented in this section, it may be helpful to remember that a positive slope indicates increasing 
policy distance across states, while a negative slope indicates increasing policy similarity. 
Further, a table displaying findings with shadings to indicate the direction of the slope and 
significance for variables can be viewed in Appendix H.2. 
Broadly, I found the strongest support for the hypotheses in the teacher policy area, 
particularly  for  the  impact  of  the  release  of  final  program  guidance  and  for  the  effects  of  a  states’  
selection as a RTTT Round 1 winner or as an initial recipient of a Gates Foundation application 
assistance   grant.   In   addition,   politics   and   political   concerns   appeared   to   play   a   role   in   states’  
policymaking behavior across the three policy areas, though not consistently in anticipated ways. 
Measures of teachers’  unions  appeared  to  have  some  influence over state policy trajectories, but 
union influence, or, at least, the impact of their political contributions, appears to have waned 
over the course of the competition. Nonetheless, states were not necessarily adopting polices 
from Right to Work states, suggesting that either Right to Work states passed teacher policies 
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similar to other states later in the competition or were not states to which other states looked for 
policy ideas, regardless of the role of their unions in policy decisions. Additionally, I found 
support for the effect of a state having an elected Chief State School Officer and interesting 
differences in the role of ideology and common governing political parties across states. 
 Findings for horizontal diffusion Is there evidence that states adopted 
policy ideas from other states" 
5.2.4.1.1 Economic and demographic characteristics 
Across the three policy areas, findings do not strongly support the economic and demographic 
horizontal diffusion hypotheses; this is not necessarily a surprising result given the mixed and 
inconsistent significant findings in prior research (see Allen, Pettus, Haier-Markel, 2004; 
Grossback, Nichoson-Crotty, and Pettus) and, specifically, in research on the diffusion of 
education policies (see, for example, Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Renzulli and Roscingo, 2005; 
Wong and Langevin, 2005, Doyle, 2006).   States’   difference   in   per   capita   income   was   a  
significant predictor only for initial status in teacher policy and it was highly insignificant as a 
predictor in Time 1 and Time 2 across policy areas16. Models using alternate forms of per capita 
income (e.g. Per capita income in State B) yielded similar findings. Change in prior year 
general revenue in State A suggests that states with the greatest increase in general revenue in the 
prior year were more likely to adopt teacher policies similar to those in other states during the 
first time period, but tended to move away from the policies of other states in the second time 
period. This  indicator  of  states’  economic  health  was  also  significant in Time 1 for college and 
                                                 
16 Difference in Per Capita income was not included as a predictor in final models in Time 1 or Time 2 for any of the 
three time periods 
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career readiness policy, but not significant for persistently lowest achieving schools policy. 
Together, these suggest that state wealth may have played a somewhat small  role  in  states’ policy 
decisions. In persistently low achieving schools policy, less wealthy states may have been more 
willing to adopt these policies earlier, presumably to qualify for School Improvement Grant 
funding more quickly. And in teacher policy, wealthier states many not have been as willing to 
pass more far-reaching teacher policies to qualify for RTTT funding. 
Finally, the results for State population ratio indicate that at the start of the competition 
the greater the difference in the size of states’  populations,   the more similar their policies. The 
tendency for states to adopt policies similar to those in states with differently sized populations 
held for Time 1 in teacher policy and persistently lowest achieving schools policy, but not for 
college and career readiness policy where, in Time 1, states appeared to be adopting policies 
similar to those in similarly sized states, as would be expected. The mixed directions of the 
coefficients for this variable across policy areas and time periods suggests that, at different points 
during the competition, states may have been more influenced by other factors in their policy 
decisions. In teacher policy, the findings for State Population Ratio taken together with the 
unexpected directions of coefficients for other covariates suggested by the diffusion literature 
may be indicative of somewhat illogical policy adoption decisions at a point when states wanted 
information about federal preferences but did not have clear indications. This is a plausible 
conclusion given the speed with which states passed policy in line with the more complete 
information available to them in Time 2. 
Turning to education-related demographic and political characteristics, states’  differences  
in the percent of adults over the age of 25 with a high school diploma also did not appear to have 
the expected impact. This measure was not significant across any time period for college and 
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career readiness, contrary to my prediction. It did appear to have an effect after the release of 
federal guidance in teacher policy; in Time 2, states tended to adopt policies similar to those in 
states with similar rates of adults with a high school diploma. A similar though not significant 
pattern of divergence in Time 1 followed by convergence in Time 2 is present in college and 
career readiness policy. The predictor seemingly had the opposite effect in persistently lowest 
achieving schools policy; these effects are not significant but the signs of the coefficient for 
Difference in High School Diploma suggest that states are adopting policies from states with 
more similar high school diploma rates in Time 1 and from states with more different high 
school diploma rates in Time 2. These inconsistent effects may be indicative of the influence of 
the School Improvement Grants on state persistently lowest achieving schools policy. 
Percent of local school funds from the state in State A was not significant across any time 
period in persistently lowest achieving schools policy. The only significant effect for this proxy 
for local control of schools in teacher policy was in Time 2 and was, somewhat unexpectedly, 
positive. This suggests that states that supplied a greater percentage of local school funding were 
less likely to adopt policies similar to those in other states. That said, this measure may have 
been an inadequate proxy for local control. In some states, the state acts as a funding allocator 
and funds are not considered to be state revenue, and, thus, the percent of funds from the state 
may not be a good measure of the strength of local school systems in statewide policy adoption 
and implementation decisions. 
5.2.4.1.2 States’  political  characteristics 
State political characteristics appear to have wielded the greatest influence in teacher policy, 
perhaps not unexpectedly. The effects of a state having an elected, rather than appointed, chief 
state school officer across the three policy areas suggests that their electoral concerns may have 
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played a role in their state policy decisions. The Elected CSSO variable had the most consistently 
significant findings in the two more politically fraught policy areas–teacher policy and 
persistently lowest achieving schools policy. While states with an elected CSSO generally 
adopted policies similar to other states in Time 1, their states appeared to take a somewhat sharp 
turn away from other states in Time 2. As states with appointed CSSOs adopted more locally 
intrusive persistently lowest achieving schools policies and more prescriptive teacher policies, 
states with elected CSSOs chose to adopt less similar policies. CSSOs subject to statewide 
election may have been less willing to push lawmakers and state school boards to adopt policies 
unpopular with traditional education interests; these groups would more be likely have a greater 
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Figure  Elected and Appointed CSSO Time  
Persistently /owest Achieving School  Policy 
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Figure  Elected and Appointed CSSO Time  
College and Career Policy 
 
  




While not significant in either college and career readiness policy or persistently lowest 
achieving schools policy, Difference in State Ideology was significant in the teacher policy area. 
The variables indicating shared political party across states were most significant in the teacher 
policy area. Though in Time 1 in college and career readiness policy Republican governments 
appeared to be adopting policy from other Republican governments and Democratic 
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governments were adopting policies that were less similar than those in states also controlled by 
Democrats, these effects were not as consistent in this policy area as they were for teacher 
policy. As discussed more extensively above, the seeming contradictions across the political 
variables in the teacher policy area, particularly for Democratic governments, may have been a 
product of the push for policies most often associated with ideological conservatives by a 









Figure  Difference in State Ideology Time  
Teacher Policy 
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Figure  Unified Democratic governments Time  




Figure  Unified Democratic governments Time  
College and Career Readiness Policy 
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Figure  Unified Republican governments Time  
Teacher Policy 
 




Figure  Unified Republican governments Time  
College and Career Readiness Policy 
  
Figure  Unified Republican governments Time  




5.2.4.1.3 Teachers’  Union  strength 
The effect of teachers union strength did not show consistent results across policy areas or time 
periods, as was anticipated. Increasing teachers’   union   spending   in   a   state   resulted   in   general,  
though not consistently significant, trend away from other states’   college   and   career   readiness  
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policies. Conversely, in persistently lowest achieving schools policy, the coefficients for 
teachers’   union   spending   were   negative,   though   insignificant,   across   time   periods.   As   was  
expected,  teachers’  union  spending  was  most significant in teacher policy. The impact, however, 
was unexpected. In the first time period, prior to the release of federal guidance, teachers union 
strength was associated with increasing policy distance; after the release of the guidance, the 
effect  was  reversed  and  states  with  higher  levels  of  teachers’  union  political  contributions  move  
their teacher policies towards those of other states. Media reports from Oklahoma and Colorado 
in Chapter 4 support this result; particularly as the deadline for Round 2 approached, teachers 
unions were largely marginalized in state policy decisions in these states, which had higher 
levels of union per student political spending ($7.48 in Oklahoma, $12.71 in Colorado) than in 





Figure  Teachers’ Union contributions Time  
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Figure  Teachers
 Union contributions Time  
College and Career Readiness Policy 
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Nonetheless, states did not appear to be more likely to adopt teacher policies similar to 
those in right to work states. The effect of Right to Work (State B) was positive and significant in 
both college and career readiness and persistently lowest achieving schools during Time 2, 
suggesting that states were generally moving towards states with right to work laws in all policy 
areas other than teacher policy. It is possible that this is a product of the right to work laws 
themselves; states with protected collective bargaining processes may have been less likely to 
adopt policies from right to work states that would conflict with existing laws. This constraint 
would not have been as salient in the other two policy areas. 
5.2.4.1.4 Frontrunner states and Round 1 winners 
Perhaps the most surprising result for the variables indicating whether the second state in the 
dyad was either an initial selection to receive Gates Foundation application assistance funding or 
a Round 1 Winner was not that other states looked to these states for teacher policy in the second 
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half of the competition, but rather that they did so rather dramatically. Though Round 1 Winner 
(State B) was unexpectedly significant in persistently lowest achieving schools policy, as 
discussed above, and Gates Frontrunner State (State B) was significant, as could be expected, in 
the first time frame for college and career readiness policy, the effect was not as notable as for 
teacher policy. 
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Figure  *ates frontrunner state Time  
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Figure  *ates frontrunner state Time  
College and Career Readiness Policy 
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Figure  Round  :inner state Time  
Teacher Policy 
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Figure  Round  :inner state state fi[ed effects 
model Time  Teacher Policy 
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Figure  Round  inner state state fi[ed effects 
model Time  Persistently /owest Achieving 
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Figure  Round  inner state Time  College and 
Career Readiness Policy 
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Figure  Round  inner state state fi[ed effects 
model Time  College and Career Readiness Policy 
  
Figure  Round  inner state state fi[ed effects 




 Findings for vertical diffusion Is there evidence that federal actions 
impacted policy behavior"  
As stated in the previous paragraph, the clearest evidence for federal influence is in the effect for 
Round 1 winners in teacher policy in Time 2, after the release of final program guidance and the 
other states had information about federal preferences for Tennessee’s and  Delaware’s  policies. 
In addition to this evidence, the pattern of coefficients in the teacher policy area merits attention. 
In the first time period, when states had little, inconsistent, or incorrect information about federal 
policy preferences, state policymaking was inconsistent with the findings for the initial status, 
expectations, and prior diffusion research. At times, states appeared to be behaving 
inconsistently, as is suggested by the somewhat mixed findings across the ideology and political 
party variables. Once federal preferences were clearer and more explicit,   states’   policymaking  
reverted to the pattern seen at the initial status (i.e. the relationships between variables and state 
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policy distance before RTTT). This pattern is not evident in the results for college and career 
readiness policy or persistently lowest achieving schools policy. 
That state policymaking in the teacher policy area is following patterns distinct from 
those in the other two policy areas is not surprising if understood in the broader education policy 
and interest group context. While many groups, including the Gates Foundation with Measures 
of Effective Teaching and the U.S. Department of Education with Teacher Incentive Fund grants, 
had been working to change teacher policy prior to RTTT, Race to the Top, particularly in the 
later half of the 18 month period that is the subject of this study, focused and intensified that 
attention at the state level. (Both   Gates’   MET   and   the   Teacher   Incentive   Fund   grants   were 
focused more on district policies). While college and career readiness was an implicit focus of 
the competition, outside groups, such as Achieve through the American Diploma project, had 
been working with states on college and career ready policy prior to RTTT. And persistently low 
achieving   schools   policy   changes   were,   most   likely,   driven   more   by   the   USDOE’s   non-
competitive School Improvement Grants, which offered states funding more quickly than RTTT, 
even if the states had won, and by ESEA/NCLB Title 1 mandates. 
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Finally, the coefficients of the slopes of the intercepts, indicating the general trends in 
state policymaking, suggest that in the two areas where the federal government was actively 
working to impact state policy, teacher policy and persistently lowest achieving schools policy, 
there is a general divergence in state policies in the first time period and a convergence in state 
policies in the second time period. This pattern does not hold for the third policy area, college 
and career readiness, in which there is a general trend toward policy convergence across both 
time periods. These trends offer further evidence that with relatively small grants and without 
strong mandates, the federal government moved state policy towards its policy preferences in the 
policy areas on which RTTT was most focused.  
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The implications of these findings for state and federal education policy making will be 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
  
  168 
 CO1C/USIO1 
This final chapter will review the purpose, methods, and findings for this research, highlighting 
the findings for the effects of state ideology and politics and the results that support the influence 
of explicit and implicit expressions of federal preferences on state policy change and diffusion 
processes. This will lead into a discussion of the contributions of the study to the methods for 
studying diffusion and to our understanding of the effects of competitive federal grants on state 
policy actions. I will conclude with lines for future research suggested both by the substantive 
results and by the use of a directed state-dyad dependent variable to measure state policy change 
with a multilevel growth model in state policy diffusion research. 
 RE9IE: OF T+E STUD< 
This analysis sought to understand the impact of the U.S.  Department  of  Education’s competitive 
grant program, Race to the Top, on state-level policy diffusion during the first two rounds of the 
competition, from March 2009 to August 2010. State education policies, both legislative and 
regulatory, passed by 46 states during this time span in three policy areas were analyzed and 
coded at five time points using indicators drawn from Education  Week’s  Ed Counts database of 
state policy characteristics. These codes were used to calculate state policy distance between 
state   pairs.   Every   state’s   policies   at   each   time   point   (t)   were   compared   to   every   other   state’s  
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policies at the prior time point (t-1) for every time period. Because each state could appear as 
either the first state in the dyad or the second state in the dyad, this procedure yielded dependent 
variables representing directed state-dyads’  policy  distance.  For  time  points  where the first state 
in the dyad had not made a policy change, the observation was dropped; if there was no change 
in  the  state’s  policy,  there  was  no  opportunity  for  the  state  to  emulate  another  state. 
As   I   was  most   interested   in   the   impact   of   RTTT   on   states’ policy changes in teacher 
policy, I began the analysis by fitting the best level-1 model for time. The results indicated that 
both the quadratic model and the piecewise model (dividing   the   time   span   into   2   “pieces”   at  
November 2009) fit the data better than linear growth model. However, a chi-squared test of 
model fit showed that the piecewise linear growth model was the best fit. This finding is within 
itself important, as it indicates that, in the teacher policy area, the trajectory of state 
policymaking changed when the states received more information about federal policy 
preferences. The use of the piecewise growth model had additional benefits, allowing the 
comparison of the different effects of state characteristics on state policy changes both before 
and after the release of the final federal program guidance. 
The   full   model   included   covariates   capturing   states’   economic,   demographic,   and  
political characteristics, interest group strength, and frontrunner or Round 1 winner status in line 
with policy diffusion theory and findings in prior horizontal and vertical diffusion studies. I 
analyzed data for teacher policy, college and career readiness policy, and persistently lowest 
achieving schools policy separately for two primary reasons. First, there was evidence that states 
paid more attention to the teacher policy area during the second half of the competition, after the 
release of final federal guidance. States passed more teacher policies, and the slopes of the 
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intercepts suggest that the distance between state policies changed most significantly in teacher 
policies.  
Secondly, prior research suggests that the effect of RTTT on state policymaking in each 
of the policy areas could be distinct given the differing levels of federal and non-governmental 
organizations’  attention   to   them  (Allen,  Pettus,   and  Haider-Markel, 2004; Karch, 2006; Karch, 
2010; McCann, Shipan, and Volden; 2010). While prior attempts to impact teacher evaluation, 
compensation and tenure policies had   largely   focused   on   district   policies,   states’   college   and  
career readiness policy had been the subject of considerable attention from groups outside the 
federal  government  (e.g.  Achieve;;  Counsel  of  Chief  State  School  Officers;;  National  Governor’s  
Association) and persistently lowest achieving schools policies were the focus of a non-
competitive grant program operating at the same time as RTTT. Thus, teacher policy had the 
potential to offer the clearest view of federal influence on state policies. 
Results   from   the   full   quantitative  models   found  mixed   support   for   the   effect   of   states’  
economic and demographic characteristics on state policy diffusion. Stronger effects were 
observed for political and ideological factors. Though state ideology and shared party control 
across states were largely insignificant across both time periods for college and career readiness 
policy and persistently lowest achieving schools policy, these variables were significant in 
teacher policy. This is notable though perhaps not surprising; teacher policy was the most 
politically contentious of the three policy areas and presented both Democratic and Republican 
governments with competing political choices.  
The distinct effects for these direct measures of political characteristics in teacher policy 
continued   for   the   impact   of   teachers   unions’   political   contributions.   While   teachers’   union  
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strength  was  related  to  a  divergence  from  other  states’  policies  in  Time  1  in  teacher  policy,  their  
ability to influence their  states’  moving towards  other  states’  policies  waned in Time 2.  
Finally, the effect of an elected chief state school officer was largely similar across policy 
areas and across time periods. Particularly in Time 2, states with elected CSSOs were less likely 
to adopt policies from states with appointed CSSOs, which may be reflective of their need to be 
more responsive to education interest groups than either appointed officials or other statewide 
elected officials who would be measured by their performance on numerous issues in addition to 
education. 
The effects  of  the  second  state  in  the  dyad  (i.e.  the  “policy  sending”  state)  being  either  a  
Gates   “frontrunner” or a Round 1 winner state were notable in both teacher policy and 
persistently lowest achieving schools policy. The results for the persistently lowest achieving 
schools area suggest that while states were willing to move toward the policies in line with SIG 
program guidance that Round 1 winners Tennessee and Delaware had passed during time 1, 
other states moved away from  Tennessee  and  Delaware’s  policies  in  Time  2  as  both  Tennessee  
and Delaware had passed policies that allowed for much more intrusive state interventions in low 
performing schools, including removing schools from home district oversight.  
Perhaps most importantly, however, both the effects of Round 1 winner (B) and Gates 
“frontrunner”  state  (B) were negative and significant in Time 2. This adds to the evidence that, 
in the policy area on which RTTT had the most potential to influence states, states adopted 
policies in line with federal preferences or perceived federal competition favorites. 
Cumulatively, the model fit, the change in the signs of the coefficients between Time 1 and Time 
2 in teacher policy, and the media accounts of state political and policy activity also support this 
finding. Further, the slopes of the intercepts in the policy areas in which the federal government 
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had given the clearest guidance to the states, teacher policy and persistently lowest achieving 
schools policy, showed a pattern of  movement  away  from  other  states’  policies   in  Time  1  and  
towards other states policies in Time 2, though these effects were significant only in teacher 
policy. 
These findings and the methods employed in this analysis may have implications for 
federal education policy and, more broadly, for the diffusion literature. These potential impacts 
will be discussed in the following sections, starting with the implications for diffusion research. 
 IMP/ICATIO1S FOR STUDIES OF +ORI=O1TA/ A1D 9ERTICA/ 
DIFFUSIO1 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, prior diffusion research largely concentrates on state-to-state, 
horizontal diffusion processes; many of these studies treat federal preferences, or the impact of 
federal programs, as a nuisance for which the researcher must control rather than as an important 
influence that may significantly change state policy diffusion processes. The vertical diffusion 
literature is a fraction of the size of the horizontal diffusion literature, and the number of studies 
investigating horizontal and vertical factors simultaneously is even more limited. Particularly in 
areas where the federal government has policy preferences, such as education policy, it is 
difficult to fully understand state-level diffusion processes without considering the influence of 
federal actions or implicit or explicit preferences.  
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 Federal attention and rapid diffusion processes 
Increasing federal attention to policy areas that have historically been the domains of states 
suggests that we may see increasingly rapid and complex diffusion of state policy. However, 
much of the diffusion literature examines the spread of policies across states over many years, if 
not decades. Attention from the federal government has the potential to put policy areas and 
ideas on  states’ agendas, and policy pressures, or, in the case of RTTT, incentives, can lead states 
to rapidly adopt similar policies. The small segment of state diffusion literature that has 
examined vertical diffusion processes has noted the rapid diffusion of policies when federal 
preferences are clear and unambiguous.  
Additionally, the means of communication and the rapid dissemination of information 
across states has allowed policymakers to learn from other states more quickly, which will most 
likely influence the speed with which policies diffuse. The acceleration of diffusion processes, 
the influence of isomorphic pressures to conform to the policies of other states, and the influence 
of   federal   pressure   given   states’   contexts   and  characteristics  may necessitate considering more 
complex forms of the dependent variable, beyond dichotomous or event count representations.  
 Implications for the form of the dependent variable in diffusion studies 
These suggest that the dependent variable most often used in prior diffusion studies may not be 
appropriate for future research in policy areas where federal attention is likely accelerating state 
policymaking. The directed state-dyad policy distance dependent variable employed in this and 
other recent studies of policy diffusion (e.g. Volden, 2006; Gilardi, 2010), and used more 
broadly in the international relations literature, may be more appropriate for examining diffusion 
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when there is federal pressure particularly when, in the case of Delaware and Tennessee, states 
with existing policies in line with federal preferences can be identified.  
The directedness of the policy distance measure is also useful in understanding whether 
characteristics  of  one  of   the  states   in   the  dyad  or  states’  shared  characteristics   impacted  policy  
diffusion and adoption decisions. For example, in this analysis, the inclusion of a variable 
capturing  the  political  spending  of  teachers’  unions  in  the  state  allowed  for  the  investigation  of  
whether states with greater levels  teachers’  unions’  contributions were more or less likely to be 
following the general policy adoption patterns of other states. In the case of teacher policy, at 
least, this highlighted the importance  of  teachers’  unions’  contributions  in  policy  adopting  states  
in Time 1, with higher contributions associated with state policies less similar to other states, an 
effect which reversed in Time 2. Additionally, the ability to understand the distinct effects of 
differences  in  state  ideology  and  states’  shared  political  party  control  had  over  the  course  of  the  
competition in the teacher policy area suggests that political calculations were complex and these 
different influences may not have been so apparent without the ability to capture the direction of 
states’  policy  moves. 
 Potential advantages for the use of growth models to understand policy 
diffusion 
In addition, the piecewise linear growth model used in this model enabled me to model the 
impact of federal actions. The growth model, in conjunction with the policy distance measure, 
captured the changes in state policy distance seemingly in response to the release of final federal 
program guidance. The piecewise growth model also allowed me to compare time periods before 
and after states had complete information about federal preferences. Particularly in teacher 
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policy, prior to the states having clear information about federal preferences, states appeared to 
be making both intuitive and counterintuitive policy choices. In the first time period, states 
seemed to be looking more to their natural political allies, states controlled by the same political 
party, for policy ideas, but there was also evidence they adopted policies from states with 
population sizes distinct from their own. While the effect was somewhat small, it was, 
nonetheless, significant. In the second time period, however, many of the coefficients significant 
in Time 1 changed direction and states largely returned to policymaking patterns we would 
expect given findings from prior diffusion research. The piecewise model allowed for the 
detection of these phenomena. 
 *eographic pro[imity or state characteristics 
Finally, and somewhat more generally, this analysis highlights the importance that different 
correlates of diffusion may have in different policy areas and in different political contexts. 
While geographic proximity has been significant in many other diffusion studies, in this analysis 
its inclusion in the models resulted in significantly worse model fit. It is reasonable to assume 
that,   as   Walker   (1969)   suggested,   the   importance   of   states’   geographic   proximity   may   be  
decreasing and the effects for geography may be better explained by other state characteristics, 
e.g. ideology, per capita income, size, or educational attainment. This may be particularly true 
for policies that are most likely to rapidly diffuse. A reasonable argument can be made that 
states’  shared  border  may  continue  to  be  significant  for  tax  or  gambling  policies  where  a  states’  
workforce or revenues may be impacted. For policies where population or company mobility is 
less relevant, we should not expect significant effects for geographic proximity and should 
instead focus on  variables  capturing  states’  economic,  demographic  and  political  characteristics.  
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While North Carolina and Tennessee share a border, the findings from this analysis suggest that 
factors other than their shared border had greater impact on the diffusion of policies between 
them. 
In sum, this study suggests a number of potential directions for future state policy 
diffusion studies. Of particular importance, with the potential for increasing speed with which 
policies diffuse, may be the use of the directed state-dyad dependent variable, which has 
advantages of the state-year dependent variable employed in many previous studies of policy 
diffusion. In addition, the piecewise linear growth model used in this analysis allowed me to 
explore   the   different   effects   of   independent   variables   on   the   distance   between   states’   policies  
both before and after states had full information about federal preferences. Finally, I note the 
insignificance of geographic proximity across all policy areas in all time periods and suggested 
that where there is no a priori hypothesis about the effect of states sharing a contiguous border, 
as would be the case for gambling or tax policy, the effect of proximity may better explained by 
states’  shared characteristics, as other researchers have suggested. 
 IMP/ICATIO1S FOR FEDERA/ EDUCATIO1 PO/IC< 
While federal programs have historically relied on mandates and categorical funding streams to 
influence state policy, this analysis suggests that competitive grant programs like Race to the 
Top may be useful in moving state policies to be in line with federal preferences. The model 
building process, the results for the final model (in particular the significant effects and 
directions of the intercepts of the slopes of Time 1 and Time 2 and the indicator for Round 1 
winner), and the media reports from states provide evidence that states responded to implicit and 
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explicit information about federal preferences. In pursuit of the grant money, states were willing 
to make significant policy changes to even the most politically contentious of their education 
policies, specifically to teacher evaluation, compensation, and tenure systems, in order to make 
their RTTT applications more competitive. Though the amount of the awards to states was 
relatively small—the largest awards were $700 million over the course of four years to Florida 
and New York—and there was no guarantee that states would receive funding regardless of the 
policy changes they made, states made policy changes with tremendous speed. 
Competitive grants have advantages over mandates and categorical funding, both for 
states and for the federal government. Though states are not guaranteed funding, competitive 
programs designed in the manner of RTTT, with clear goals but no strict requirements for 
implementation of those goals, could allow states to design their proposals in keeping with their 
contexts and capacities. Whether or not states did this for their RTTT applications is somewhat 
debatable, but that core principal of goals without implementation mandates remains. This 
approach to federal policy may be more suitable then mandates for deterring states from 
establishing low standards in order to ensure that they do not suffer the consequences of failure, 
as  was  the  case  for  many  states’  responses  to  NCLB. 
It is reasonable to counter this argument by noting that states appear to have passed 
policies and written their proposals with the intent of appealing to RTTT reviewers, regardless of 
their capacity to implement the reforms. The findings of this study suggest that, for teacher 
policy, states reacted to the federal preferences without significant consideration of their 
implementation capacities. The effects of this apparent lack of consideration of their capacity and 
the context for implementation can be seen in the progress reports released by the USDOE 
(“Race   to   the   Top   annual   performance   report,”   n.d.;;   McNeil,   2013). However, it may be 
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important to remember that state implementation of NCLB was also inconsistent, though 
implementation was much more clearly delineated in NCLB regulations. The difficulties that 
states have had in implementing their RTTT proposals are, perhaps, a reflection of their inability 
to articulate internal capacity. As other researchers have noted (Brown, Hess, Lautzenheiser, and 
Owen, 2011), this may be an unintended consequence of the categorical funding streams, like 
ESEA/NCLB, through which money flows through state departments of education to local 
districts. While RTTT may not be the solution to state and district capacity issues, one can make 
a  plausible  argument  that  the  competitive  grant  aspect  of  the  program  was  not  the  cause  of  states’  
difficulties. 
For the federal government, the advantages of competitive grant making over mandates 
or categorical funding are clearer than for states. Without the guarantee of funding, states made 
significant policy changes seemingly in response to this federal program and, in teacher policy, 
at least, largely in line with federal preferences. That the effects of the program were somewhat 
muted in states with an elected Chief State School Officer may also hint that appealing to the 
competitive nature of statewide politicians whose election prospects are not solely influenced by 
state education policy, like governors, may be an advantage of the competitive aspect of RTTT. 
Further, states made these changes willingly and across political and ideological lines. 
Georgia was the most ideologically conservative state in this analysis, and,   yet,   the   state’s  
Republican governor heaped praise on RTTT and worked fervently to pass policies he and 
legislative sponsors believed would make the state more competitive. Similarly, Governor 
Pawlenty, in Minnesota, who ran for the Republican nomination for President in 2012 and 
actively  supported  President  Obama’s  opponents  in  2008  and  2012,  put forth significant effort to 
pass policies that would put the state in a better position to receive funding. And yet, of the states 
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discussed in Chapter 4, only the Democratic governors managed to pass significant teacher 
reforms (and neither of these states won RTTT funding). These cases are illustrative of the cross-
partisan state policymaking that RTTT inspired.  
While categorical grants and mandates have, historically, been the means through which 
the federal government moves state education policy, the success of RTTT in spurring state 
policy change suggests competitive grants as a viable mechanism through which the federal 
government can influence state policy. Whether RTTT or future as-yet-not-conceived grant 
competitions can impact long-term state capacity for reform remains an unanswered question. 
 FUTURE /I1ES OF RESEARC+ 
Numerous lines of research could emerge from the present study in policy and implementation 
research, examples of which are offered below. As discussed above, the dependent variable 
capturing state policy movement and the direction of state policy change, towards or away from 
other states and the quantitative model for the analysis, a growth model, have the potential to 
help policy researchers understand the trajectory of state education policy changes and the 
impact of federal actions on state-level policy diffusion. For example, as states propose NCLB-
waivers and submit revisions to those waivers, is there evidence that states are looking to more 
“successful”  states  for  change  ideas?  Additionally,  given  the  results  suggesting  of  the  differential  
effects of federal preferences across policy, is there evidence that states are finding more success 
in implementing college and career readiness policies, which appear to be the least impacted by 
federal actions, as opposed to teacher policies, which evidence suggests was an area in which 
states were most reactive to federal preferences? And, to delve further into the policymaking of 
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states during Rounds 1 and 2 of RTTT, we know that states, or at least Colorado, were carefully 
parsing the messages coming from the US Secretary of Education and the USDOE. Is there 
evidence that Round 1 reviewers, in their comments and scoring of  states’  Round  1  applications, 
influenced state policy changes?  
As the Obama administration once again pushes for re-authorization of ESEA and as 
subsequent   rounds   of   RTTT   focus   on   district   reforms   and   states’   early   education policies, 
numerous avenues for the further study of the interaction of federal action and state-level policy 
processes will continue to emerge. 
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APPE1DI; A 
STATE APP/ICA1TS FOR RACE TO T+E TOP FU1DI1* 
Table  States applying for RTTT funding in Rounds  and  
 




Alabama 37 36  
Alaska -- --  
Arizona 40 12  
Arkansas 17 21  
California 27 16  
Colorado 14 17  
Connecticut 25 25  
Delaware 1 -- 1 ($100m) 
District of Columbia 16 6 2 ($75m) 
Florida 4 4 2 ($700m) 
Georgia 3 8 2 ($400m) 
Hawaii 22 3 2 ($75m) 
Idaho 28 --  
Illinois 5 15  
Indiana 23 --  
Iowa 24 22  
Kansas 29 --  
Kentucky 9 19  
Louisiana 11 13  
Maine -- 33  
Maryland -- 6 2 ($250m) 
Massachusetts 13 1 2 ($250m) 
Michigan 21 23  
Minnesota 20 --  
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Mississippi -- 34  
Missouri 33 30  
Montana -- 35  
Nebraska 39 31  
Nevada -- 24  
New Hampshire 38 29  
New Jersey 18 11  
New Mexico 30 28  
New York 15 2 2 ($700m) 
North Carolina 12 9 2 ($400m) 
Ohio 10 10 2 ($400m) 
Oklahoma 34 20  
Oregon 35 --  
Pennsylvania 7 18  
Rhode Island 8 5 2 ($75m) 
South Carolina 6 14  
South Dakota 41 --  
Tennessee 2 -- 1 ($500m) 
Texas -- --  
Utah 19 25  
Virginia 31 --  
Washington -- 32  
West Virginia 36 --  
Wisconsin 26 27  
Wyoming 32 --  
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APPE1DI; % 
EDUCATIO1 :EEK 4UA/IT< COU1TS PO/IC< I1DICATORS 
In his 2006 research using directed-dyad   event   history   analysis   to   investigate   state  Children’s  
Health Insurance Program policies, Volden used the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
website to construct a dataset of state polices on 6 CHIP characteristics states were likely to have 
modified in the years following program initiation. There was no comparable education dataset 
with indicators of state policy change available for the time periods required for this analysis. 
However, the Education Week EdCounts policy indicators available through the Editorial 
Projects in Education website (http://www.edweek.org/rc/2007/06/07/edcounts.html?intc=thed) 
provided a baseline measure of state policies and indicators that could be used to construct a 
dataset similar   to   Volden’s   using   state   legislation   and   policy   documents   found   on   states  
education departments, legislatures, and secretaries of states websites. Of the 250 indicators 
available in the EdCounts database, 52 were selected based on their relevance to the three policy 
areas selected for this investigation. These indicators are listed below, grouped by policy area. 
College and Career Readiness Policy 
How does the state define college readiness (courses, skills, standards, tests, nodef) 
How does the state define work readiness? (courses, skills, standards, tests, no definition) 
State has defined college readiness 
K-12 education system has work/career readiness definition 
How does the state calculate graduation rate? 
Number of science credits required for graduation? 
Number of math credits required for graduation 
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State requires high school exit exam/End of Course assessment? 
High school assessment aligned to post-secondary requirements 
High school assessment use for post-secondary placement 
Postsecondary reporting to HS 
Individual Graduation/ Postsecondary Plan 
Subjects tested on state exam 
 
Teacher/School Leader Policy 
State has established alternative-route program(s) 
State has an alternative certification pathway for high needs/high needs subjects 
Does the state require alternative route teachers to pass subject tests? 
Does the state require alternative route teachers to pass pedagogical tests? 
Alternative certification program requirements (clinical experience, formal coursework, student 
teaching)? 
State require new teacher induction program? 
State requires mentoring program? 
Years state pays for induction/mentoring 
State subsidizes teacher pay for PD 
State has PD standards 
State requires PD 
Evaluation of teacher prep institutions linked to graduates' classroom performance 
State publishes evaluation data for prep programs? 
Pay for performance at group/school level linked to student achievement 
Pay for performance at individual/classroom level linked to student achievement 
Teachers rewarded for differentiated/leadership roles 
Teacher incentives for low performing schools/hard-to-staff teaching 
Administrators incentivized to work at low performing schools 
State assigns unique student ID 
State assigns unique teacher ID 
State allows student ID to be linked to teacher ID (2006) 
State requires annual teacher evaluation 
Teacher evaluation linked to student achievement 
State requires evaluator training (2010) 
State reports school-level salary data (either privately collects or publicly reports) 
 
Persistently Lowest Performing Schools Policy 
State provides assistance for PLA schools 
State rewards high performing schools 
State sanctions low performing schools 
State Sanctions allow Charter Conversion 
State Sanctions allow EMO takeover 
State sanctions allow New Curriculum 
State sanctions allow Student Transfer 
State sanctions allow School Reconstitution 
State sanctions allow School Closure 
State sanctions allow State Takeover 
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State sanctions allow Withholding Funds 
Federal Turnaround Models (exact language) 
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APPE1DI; C 
PO/ICIES A1D /E*IS/ATIO1 I1C/UDED I1 T+E A1A/<SIS 
Policies and legislation referring to College and Career Readiness, Teacher and School Leaders, 
Persistently Lowest-Achieving Schools that were proposed and enacted between March 2009 
and August 2010.  
 
Table  Relevant policies and legislation passed by RTTT states March -August  
 
State Month <ear Policy//egislation 1ame/1umber 
California 3 2009 Title 5 CCR Sec 80413, 80487 
Indiana 3 2009 HB1479 
Iowa 3 2009 HB687 
Kentucky 3 2009 SB1, Section 19 
Mississippi 3 2009 SB2315 
Mississippi 3 2009 SB2628 
New Jersey 3 2009 SB2707 
New Mexico 3 2009 SB152 
Rhode Island 3 2009 Standards for Ed Leadership 
Rhode Island 3 2009 Alternative Routes Policy 
South Dakota 3 2009 SB185 
Utah 3 2009 SB81 
Utah 3 2009 R277-462 
Utah 3 2009 HB328 
Alabama 4 2009 290-43 
Arkansas 4 2009 HB1808 
Arkansas 4 2009 HB1764 
Delaware 4 2009 HB102 
Maryland 4 2009 HB587 
Nebraska 4 2009 LB340 
Nebraska 4 2009 LB547 
New Mexico 4 2009 SB156 
                                                 
17 For legislation, month/year refer to the date of bill passage by the legislature; bills and policies were included in the 
analysis only if they were proposed between March 2009 and August 2010.  
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State Month <ear Policy//egislation 1ame/1umber 
New Mexico 4 2009 SB133 
Tennessee 4 2009 0520-02-04-.05 
Washington 4 2009 HB2261-Sections 501-507 
Washington 4 2009 HB2119 
Washington 4 2009 HB2261-Sections 201-203, 601 
West Virginia 4 2009 Title 126, 114 
Alabama 5 2009 HB262 
Arkansas 5 2009 ADE 301 
Colorado 5 2009 SB163 
Colorado 5 2009 SB160 
Florida 5 2009 HB991 
Georgia 5 2009 V-SB178 
Indiana 5 2009 511 IAC 5-2-3 
Minnesota 5 2009 HF2 
Nevada 5 2009 AB487 
Ohio 5 2009 3301-68-01 
Ohio 5 2009 OAC 3301-68-01 
Oklahoma 5 2009 SB69 
Oklahoma 5 2009 SB268 
Oklahoma 5 2009 210:35-25-4 
Oklahoma 5 2009 OAC 210:35-25-4 
Oregon 5 2009 581-022-1130 
Tennessee 5 2009 SB2312 
Utah 5 2009 R277-484 
Louisiana 6 2009 SB259; HB612 
Louisiana 6 2009 SB316 
Maine 6 2009 SB458 
Nevada 6 2009 SB389 
Nevada 6 2009 NAC391 
Nevada 6 2009 R048-09 
Oregon 6 2009 SB443 
California 7 2009 AB2 
Connecticut 7 2009 SB1014 
Illinois 7 2009 SB1828 
Illinois 7 2009 SB1276 
Illinois 7 2009 SB2119 
Louisiana 7 2009 SB285 
Missouri 7 2009 SB291 
Missouri 7 2009 SB291 
North Carolina 7 2009 HB187 
Ohio 7 2009 HB1 
Oregon 7 2009 OAR 589-007-0700 
Tennessee 7 2009 HB1988 
Tennessee 7 2009 0520-01-03-.06 
Arizona 8 2009 HB2011 
Arkansas 8 2009 ADE 291 
Illinois 8 2009 HB1079 
Illinois 8 2009 HB2675 
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State Month <ear Policy//egislation 1ame/1umber 
Illinois 8 2009 HB2235 
New York 8 2009 NYCRR 30-1.1 
Delaware 9 2009 14 Del C 1260-1264 
Arkansas 10 2009 ADE 278 
California 10 2009 SB551 
California 10 2009 V-AB429 
California 10 2009 SB19 
Ohio 10 2009 OAC 3301-24-05 
Ohio 10 2009 OAC 3301-24-05 
Washington 10 2009 WAC 181-78A-105 
Colorado 11 2009 1 CCR 301-81 
Illinois 11 2009 23 IAC 65.20 
Rhode Island 11 2009 SB1055 
Rhode Island 11 2009 SB728 
Rhode Island 11 2009 HB5896 
Wisconsin 11 2009 SB371 
Wisconsin 11 2009 SB372 
Alabama 12 2009 300-4-7 
Arkansas 12 2009 005.15.09 
Delaware 12 2009 14 Del C 103 
Delaware 12 2009 14 Del C 106A 
California 1 2010 SB1E 
California 1 2010 SB4E 
Colorado 1 2010 1 CCR 301-81 
Colorado 1 2010 SB36 
Illinois 1 2010 SB315 
Illinois 1 2010 23 IAC 23.130 
Iowa 1 2010 SB2033 
Kentucky 1 2010 HB176 
Kentucky 1 2010 HB176/703 KAR 5:180 
Kentucky 1 2010 703 KAR 5:180 
Louisiana 1 2010 LAC 28: CXI- 3,7,11,13,18,20,33,35 
Massachusetts 1 2010 SB2247 
Michigan 1 2010 HB4787 
Michigan 1 2010 SB981 
Michigan 1 2010 SB926 
Michigan 1 2010 HB5596 
Nebraska 1 2010 Title 92 NAC Chapter 10 
Tennessee 1 2010 HB7010 
Colorado 2 2010 1 CCR 301-84 
Colorado 2 2010 1 CCR 301 
Colorado 2 2010 1 CCR 301 
Delaware 2 2010 HB470 
Florida 2 2010 6A-1.09981 
Florida 2 2010 6A-5.071 
Iowa 2 2010 83.4(7)"a"(5) 
Maine 2 2010 SB677 
Nevada 2 2010 SB2B 
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State Month <ear Policy//egislation 1ame/1umber 
Virginia 2 2010 SB145/HB1172 
Alabama 3 2010 300-4-7 
Alabama 3 2010 290-3-52 
Alabama 3 2010 290-3-53 
Nevada 3 2010 R031-10 
New Mexico 3 2010 HB44 
New Mexico 3 2010 HB53 
New Mexico 3 2010 SB85 
New Mexico 3 2010 HB70 
New Mexico 3 2010 HB71 
New Mexico 3 2010 SB111 
South Dakota 3 2010 SB63 
South Dakota 3 2010 SB24 
Washington 3 2010 SB6696 
Washington 3 2010 SB6403 
West Virginia 3 2010 HB4436 
Arizona 4 2010 HB2298 
Arkansas 4 2010 ADE 301 
Arkansas 4 2010 ADE 247/005.01.10-006 
Florida 4 2010 SB4 
Kentucky 4 2010 SB180 
Louisiana 4 2010 LAC 28:XLV.501, 601 
Louisiana 4 2010 LAC28:XLV.501, .601 
Maine 4 2010 SB706 
Maine 4 2010 SB623 
Maine 4 2010 SB704 
Maryland 4 2010 HB439 
Maryland 4 2010 SB275 
Maryland 4 2010 HB1263 
Mississippi 4 2010 SB2293 
Nebraska 4 2010 LB1014 
New York 4 2010 EDU-26-09-000 
Rhode Island 4 2010 Board of Regents Rules 
Wisconsin 4 2010 SB437 
Arizona 5 2010 R7-2,-604.3 
Arizona 5 2010 SB1040 
Arizona 5 2010 HB2401 
Colorado 5 2010 SB191 
Connecticut 5 2010 SB438 
Florida 5 2010 6A-1.09422 
Georgia 5 2010 HB400 
Illinois 5 2010 23 IAC 65.110,.120,.130,.140,.150,.160 
Louisiana 5 2010 LAC 28:LXXXIII.Chapter 4 
Louisiana 5 2010 LAC 28:CXLVII.Chapters 1-9 
Michigan 5 2010 SB757 
Minnesota 5 2010 HB2899 
New York 5 2010 AB111171 
New York 5 2010 EDU-18-10-00015 
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State Month <ear Policy//egislation 1ame/1umber 
New York 5 2010 EDU-18-10-00016 
North Carolina 5 2010 SB704 
Oklahoma 5 2010 SB2033/SB2032 
South Carolina 5 2010 HJR4823 
Florida 6 2010 EO 10-126 
Louisiana 6 2010 HB1368 
Louisiana 6 2010 SB753 
Louisiana 6 2010 HB486 
New Hampshire 6 2010 SB503 
Oklahoma 6 2010 SB1617 
Oklahoma 6 2010 HB2968 
Rhode Island 6 2010 HJR8175 
Illinois 7 2010 SB3705 
Nevada 7 2010 NAC385 
North Carolina 7 2010 SB1246 
West Virginia 7 2010 SB2009 
Illinois 8 2010 HB4711 
Louisiana 9 2010 HB1033 
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APPE1DI; D 
STATES ADOPTI1* RU/ES OR /E*IS/ATIO1 










Alabama Alabama Alabama Alabama 
Arkansas Arizona Arkansas Arizona 
California California California California 
Colorado Connecticut Colorado Colorado 
Connecticut Delaware Delaware Connecticut 
Delaware Georgia Florida Delaware 
Florida Iowa Iowa Florida 
Georgia Illinois Idaho Georgia 
Iowa Kansas Illinois Iowa 
Idaho Kentucky Indiana Idaho 
Illinois Louisiana Kentucky Illinois 
Indiana Missouri Massachusetts Indiana 
Kansas Montana Maryland Kansas 
Kentucky North Carolina Maine Kentucky 
Louisiana Nebraska Michigan Louisiana 
Maryland New Hampshire Minnesota Maryland 
Maine Nevada Mississippi Maine 
Michigan New York Nebraska Michigan 
Minnesota Ohio New Hampshire Minnesota 
Missouri Oregon New Jersey Missouri 
Mississippi Rhode Island New Mexico Mississippi 
Montana Tennessee Nevada North Carolina 
North Carolina Utah New York Nebraska 
Nebraska Washington Ohio New Hampshire 
New Hampshire Wisconsin Oklahoma New Jersey 
New Jersey West Virginia Oregon New Mexico 
New Mexico Wyoming Rhode Island Nevada 
Nevada   South Dakota New York 
New York   Tennessee Ohio 
Ohio   Utah Oklahoma 
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Oklahoma   Virginia Oregon 
Oregon   Washington Rhode Island 
Rhode Island   West Virginia South Carolina 
South Carolina   Wyoming Tennessee 
South Dakota     Virginia 
Tennessee     Washington 
Utah     Wisconsin 
Virginia     West Virginia 
Washington       
Wisconsin       
West Virginia       
Wyoming       
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APPE1DI; E 
STATE SE/ECTIO1 OF C+IEF STATE SC+OO/ OFFICER 
Table  States
 selection processes for Chief State School Officer 
 
Statewide Election Appointed by Governor Appointed by State Board of Education 
Arizona Delaware Alabama 
California Iowa Alaska 
Georgia Minnesota Colorado 
Idaho New Jersey Connecticut 
Indiana New Mexico Florida 
Montana Pennsylvania Hawaii 
North Carolina South Dakota Illinois 
North Dakota Tennessee Kansas 
Oklahoma Texas Kentucky 
Oregon Virginia Louisiana 
South Carolina  Maryland 
Washington  Massachusetts 
Wisconsin  Michigan 
Wyoming  Mississippi 
  Missouri 
  Nebraska 
  Nevada 
  New Hampshire 
  New York 
  Ohio 
  Rhode Island  
  Utah 
  Vermont 
  West Virginia 
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APPE1DI; F 
/EADER STATES 
States selected to received Gates Foundation funds and technical assistance to prepare RTTT 
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APPE1DI; * 
FI*URES FOR C+ECKS OF MODE/ ASSUMPTIO1S 
* TEAC+ER PO/IC< MODE/ 
Level 1: 
 
Figure 50. Teacher policy, plot of level 1 residuals 
/ Time 1   Figure 51. Teacher policy, plot of level 1 residuals / Time 2  
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Figure  Teacher policy scatterplots of residuals and level  predictors 
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Figure  Persistently lowest achieving schools policy scatterplots of residuals and level  predictors 
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* CO//E*E A1D CAREER READI1ESS PO/IC< 
Level 1: 
 
Figure  College and career readiness policy plot 
of level  residuals / Time  
 
 
Figure  College and career readiness policy plot 
of level  residuals / Time  
 
 
Figure  College and career readiness policy graph 
of level  residuals 
 
 
Figure  College and career readiness policy plot 
of level  residuals and fitted values of level  units 
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College and Career Readiness Policy 
Level 2: 
 
Figure  College and career readiness policy 4-4 




Figure  College and career readiness policy 
histogram of MRS9AR 
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Figure  College and career readiness policy scatterplots of residuals and level  predictors 
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APPE1DI; + 
FU// FI1A/ PIECE:ISE /I1EAR *RO:T+ MODE/ A1D RESU/TS 
State Dyad Policy Distance = π00  
+ π10(Time [March 2009 – November 2009])i  
+ π20 (Time 2 [December 2009 – August 2010])i  
+ e0i 
 
π00 =  β00 (Intercept) Initial status  
+ β001 (State Population Ratio)i  
+ β002 (Difference in Per Capita Income)i  
+ β003 (Difference in High School Diploma Rate)i  
+ β004 Difference in State Ideology)i  
+ β005 (Legislative Professionalism [A])i  
+ β006 (Unified Republican Government [A & B])i  
+ β007 (Unified Democratic Government [A & B])i  
+ β008 (Teachers’  Union  Political  Contributions,  Per  Student)i 
+ β009 (Right to Work State [B])i 
+ β010 (% of Local School Funds from State Sources)i 
+ β011 (% Change in General Revenue from Prior Year)i 
+ β012 (Round 1 Winner [B])i 
+ β013 (Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  [B])i 
+ r0i 
 
π10 = β100 (Intercept) Growth Time 1 
+ β101 (State Population Ratio)i  
+ β103 (Difference in High School Diploma Rate)i  
+ β104 (Difference in State Ideology)i  
+ β105 (Legislative Professionalism [A])i  
+ β106 (Unified Republican Government [A & B])i  
+ β107 (Unified Democratic Government [A & B])i  
+ β108 (Teachers’  Union  Political  Contributions,  Per  Student)i 
+ β109 (Right to Work State [B])i 
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+ β110 (% of Local School Funds from State Sources)i 
+ β111 (% Change in General Revenue from Prior Year)i 
+ β112 (Round 1 Winner [B])i 
+ β113 (Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  [B])i 
+ r1i 
 
π20 = β200 (Intercept) Growth Time 2  
+ β201 (State Population Ratio)i  
+ β203 (Difference in High School Diploma Rate)i  
+ β204 (Difference in State Ideology)i  
+ β205 (Legislative Professionalism [A])i  
+ β206 (Unified Republican Government [A & B])i  
+ β207 (Unified Democratic Government [A & B])i  
+ β208 (Teachers’  Union  Political  Contributions,  Per  Student)i 
+ β209 (Right to Work State [B])i 
+ β210 (% of Local School Funds from State Sources)i 
+ β211 (% Change in General Revenue from Prior Year)i 
+ β212 (Round 1 Winner [B])i 
+ β213 (Gates  “Frontrunner”  State  [B])i 
+ r2i 
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+ FU// MODE/ RESU/TS 
 
Intercept, π00 Teacher Policy  
Final Model  
College/Career 




Intercept, β00 3.17 (0.103)*** 2.972 (0.239)*** 2.149 (0.111)*** 
State Population Ratio, β01 -0.002 (0.003) -0.024 (0.007)** -0.004 (0.004) 
Difference in Per Capita Income, β02 -0.00002 
(0.000005)*** 
-0.00002 (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.000005) 
Difference in HS Diploma Rate, β03 -0.007 (0.006) -0.027 (0.014) † 0.024 (0.007)** 
Difference in State Ideology, β04 0.005 (0.002)*** 0.007 (0.004) † 0.0001 (0.002) 
Legislative Professionalism (A), β05 0.787 (0.174)*** 2.166 (0.400)*** 0.004 (0.178) 
Unified Republican Government (A & B), β06 0.498 (0.161)** -0.381 (0.196) † -0.112 (0.099) 
Unified Democratic Government (A & B), β07 0.101 (0.060) † 0.243 (0.135) † 0.118 (0.058)* 
Teachers Union Contributions, per student 
(A), β08 
-0.010 (0.005)* 0.054 (0.012)*** -0.003 (0.005)  
Right to Work State (B), β09 0.062 (0.046) 0.338 (0.105)** -0.005 (0.052) 
% of Local School Funds from State (A), β010 -0.002 (0.002)  -0.012 (0.004)*** -0.003 (0.002) † 
Change in General Revenue from Prior Year 
(A), β011 
-0.021 (0.005)*** -0.003 (0.013) -0.010 (0.006) † 
Round 1 Winner (B), β012 0.073 (0.071) -0.272 (0.186) 0.186 (0.096)* 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State,  β013 -0.021 (0.042) 0.353 (0.099)*** -0.075 (0.039) † 
CSSO Elected, β014 0.020 (0.047) -0.569 (0.098)*** 0.170 (0.047)*** 
Model for Growth Rate, Time 1, π10    
Intercept, β10 0.557 (0.064)*** -0.133 (0.069) † 0.148 (0.089) † 
State Population Ratio, β11 -0.004 (0.002)* 0.008 (0.002)*** -0.007 (0.003)* 
Difference in Per Capita Income, β12 - – – 
Difference in HS Diploma Rate, β13 0.009 (0.004)* 0.006 (0.004)  -0.005 (0.005)  
Difference in State Ideology, β14 -0.003 (0.0009)** -0.0006 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Legislative Professionalism (A), β15 -0.299 (0.106)** -0.073 (0.096) 0.307 (0.168) † 
Unified Republican Government (A & B), β16 -0.166 (0.046)*** -0.141 (0.057)* 0.030 (0.087) 
Unified Democratic Government (A & B), β17 -0.139 (0.027)*** 0.130 (0.037)*** -0.002 (0.036) 
Teachers Union Contributions, per student 
(A), β18 
0.008 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.002)** -0.002 (0.004) 
Right to Work State (B), β19 -0.102 (0.025)*** 0.031 (0.028) 0.087 (0.038)*** 
% of Local School Funds from State (A), β110 -0.002 (0.0009) †  0.003 (0.001)** 0.0008 (0.001) 
Change in General Revenue from Prior Year 
(A), β111 
-0.007 (0.003)* -0.007 (0.003)* 0.003 (0.005) 
Round 1 Winner (B), β112 0.032 (0.040) -0.113 (0.082) -0.148 (0.039)*** 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State,  β113 0.022 (0.022) -0.062 (0.027)* -0.013 (0.029) 
CSSO Elected (A), β114 -0.086 (0.024)*** -0.003 (0.028) -0.213 (0.042)*** 
Model for Growth Rate, Time 2, π20    
Intercept, β20 -0.875 (0.120)*** -0.302 (0.154)* -0.069 (0.215) 
State Population Ratio, β21 0.017 (0.004)*** -0.022 (0.006)*** -0.009 (0.007) 
Difference in Per Capita Income, β22 – – – 
Difference in HS Diploma Rate, β23 -0.016 (0.008)* -0.008 (0.010) 0.0122 (0.012) 
Difference in State Ideology, β24 0.004 (0.002)* 0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 
Legislative Professionalism (A), β25 0.522 (0.224)* 0.078 (0.276) -1.113 (0.283)** 
Unified Republican Government (A & B), β26 0.060 (0.118) 0.172 (0.262) -0.051 (0.153) 
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Unified Democratic Government (A & B), β27 0.232 (0.053)*** -0.134 (0.070) † -0.093 (0.085) 
Teachers Union Contributions, per student 
(A), β28 
-0.013 (0.005)* 0.010 (0.008) -0.003 (0.009) 
Right to Work State (B), β29 0.225 (0.050)*** -0.299 (0.114)** -0.225 (0.081)** 
% of Local School Funds from State (A), β210 0.004 (0.002)* 0.004 (0.003) 0.0001 (0.003) 
Change in General Revenue from Prior Year 
(A), β211 
0.033 (0.005)*** -0.016 (0.010) † -0.009 (0.010) 
Round 1 Winner (B), β212 -0.311 (0.089)*** 0.167 (0.195) 0.274 (0.099)** 
Gates  “Frontrunner”  State,  β213 -0.106 (0.044)* 0.060 (0.062) 0.005 (0.061) 
CSSO Elected, β114 0.153 (0.049)** 0.096 (0.076) 0.406 (0.087)*** 
Random Effects    
Initial status, r0i 0.249 (0.499)*** 1.535 (1.234)*** 0.299 (0.547)*** 
Growth rate, Time 1, r1i 0.026 (0.161)*** 0.046 (0.213)*** 0.064 (0.254)*** 
Growth rate, Time 2, r2i 0.065 (0.255)*** 0.201 (0.448)*** 0.251 (0.501)*** 
Level-1 error, e0i 0.114 (0.337) 0.061 (0.247) 0.038 (0.195) 
Deviance (estimated parameters) 6709.34 (7) 6554.08 (7) 3506.045 (7) 
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